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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction • • 
Ihe philosophy of language deals with several issues like problem of 
meaning, uses of language, and reference determination & stipulation of 
proper names. This dissertation deals with the last problem. One of the most 
significant issues of philosophy of language is: how many ways are there to 
fix the reference of proper names? Frege thought that a reference is fixed by 
a singular term called proper name, by mean of a definite description 
uniquely satisfies that proper name. 
Russell, independently, thought that a proper name is "truncated definite 
description," which determines and stipulates reference through that 
description. He endorses this view in his theory of description. 
Searle and Austin, modern descriptivist theorists, argue that a cluster or set 
of descripfions can idenfify and stipulates the reference of proper names. 
The development of present civilization has been possible because of 
human's capacity to think, to pass information, to share ideas & beliefs, 
feelings etc. There is no evidence of the exact origin of language. However, 
some archaeological evidence suggests that the origin of language dates 
back to 20 million years.' 
Ralph W. Fasold (2006), An introduction to Language and Linguistics,, J.C Linton (ed.), Cambridge 
University Press, p. 1. 
Language is a social phenomenon of communication among members of 
society. The main objective of language is to investigate/understand the 
meaning of utterances used among a community of speakers. The primary 
function of language is to establish communication among the members of a 
particular speech community. This establishment is aimed at sharing 
information on the basis of their mental framework. The mental frameworks 
may reflect their beliefs, desires, values, perception etc; and determine the 
contents of proposition that they use while establishing the communication. 
The speakers intend to recreate their own mental states in the minds of the 
hearers. For example, when a speaker says, "pass me that book," he actually 
intends to express his desire to have a particular book. He expresses the 
intention in such a way so as to communicate the desire to the hearer. But is 
it necessary to have linguistic communicatidn? Certainly there are cases 
when communication is established in a non-linguistic manner. Most of the 
species in the animal kingdom communicates that way. 
Unlike animals, human beings are capable of inventing linguistic 
devices/symbols for enhancing communication. These devices 
have to be used repeatedly in order to endorse their specific use 
among the community of speakers. The conventional use of these 
devices further endorses particular state of affairs. For example a 
speaker passes an utterance, "It is very cold"; he is actually 
expressing a state of affair. Since language is essentially a social 
phenomenon, it is very important to recognize tlie use of conventions. The 
recognized conventional linguistic devices may consist of words/terms and 
sentences of a particular language (by using the term "language," I mean the 
use of language in general and not any particular language like English or 
French). 
* • ' • 
*, . 
The use of conventions is a mutual quasi-agreement among speakers of a 
language so as to develop a system- of effective communication. A speaker 
encodes a message by passing utterances that may be decoded by the hearer. 
Sentences are designed to fulfill this purpose so as to encode mental state of the 
speaker. Then the message is decoded by the hearer. In the absence of the 
quasi-agreement or general public commitment, no convention can be 
maintained; and thus effective communication may not be established. 
So the primary function of language is to convert mental state of the speaker 
» - '* 
t 
into prepositional content. The hearer, on hearing this content, reproduces the 
mental state of the speaker. In this way, language function as a medium 
through which mental states of speaker is transmitted to the hearer. The task is 
impossible without inventing conventional devices that are socially approved, 
otherwise the devices are meaningless. The devices (like words) have meaning, 
but cannot reveal meaning in isolation while passing utterances. The words are 
just parts of the utterances and are used according to fixed rules of the language 
so as to deliver meaning. These rules of grammar provide meaning unit of 
language to be used in communication. 
Apart from these units, language has the property by virtue of which, speakers 
can generate countless new sentences. These sentences may be meaningful. 
meaningless, ambiguous, or vague. This feature of language separates human 
beings from lower strata of living beings. 
Language serves the function of passing requests, orders, greetings etc. 
Philosophers of 21 '^ century tried to put detailed account of functioning and 
usage of language. Later Wittgenstein {Philosophical Investigation 1953), 
emphasized a wide variety of language use like making promises, apologizing, 
ordering, acting a play, making fictions, passing joke, solving a problem of 
geometry, reporting an experiment etc. 
Copi and Cohen tried to categorize the usage of language into: informative, 
expressive and directive. The informative use stands for all those events of 
language usage in which a speaker of language passes arguments, whether 
correct or incorrect. The expressive use of language is concerned with the 
communication of feelings, emotions, or attitudes of the speaker. The third use 
of language is directive that involves triggering or prevention of an action. 
Often, the directives are presented in the form tof commands or requests. 
For example in a college cafeteria it is written, "No Smoking." This is an 
example of command that suggests students not to smoke in the cafeteria 
premises. The same directive may be used as a request in various other places 
like hotel, restaurant etc. 
According to Copi, effective communication demands a blending of these three 
usages of language. For example, Obama's slogan during his presidential 
election campaign was "Yes, ^  we can change." The slogan signifies the 
informative as well as expressive content. Oii the one hand, information is 
^ Copi, Cohen (2010), Introduction, to Logic, Pearson Higher Ed., USA. 
being passed by Obama to the audience tliat we possess the ability to change 
the present socio-political structure of United States of America. On the other 
hand, the use of the slogan was an expression of his motivation to bring drastic 
changes in the socio-political scenario of America. Likewise, there are various 
other occasions that endorse the blending of three kinds of language usage. 
Linguists understand the universal properties that are common to all natural 
languages of the world. The properties may include modularity, constituency, 
discreteness, productivity, arbitrariness, reliance on context, variability etc. 
However, philosophy of language deals with the issues of langliage differently. 
Primarily initiated by German mathematician Gottlob Frege; the philosophy of 
language is concerned with philosophical questions to clarify, to explore, to 
analyze, and to make sense of human language. It tries to put a systematic and 
organized account of language. It is philosophical critique about language 
which looks into the nature, origin, and development of language. It inquires 
about the meaning of "meaning" itself i.e. it seeks to know the nature of 
meaning of words; and thereby sentences. 
In his earlier thesis Grundlagen , Gottlob Frfege is interested to know the 
meaning of words which combine to make a sentence meaningful. While using 
the word "meaning," obviously we are not talking about literal meaning of 
words. Rather, the intention is to know: in virtue of what a particular word has 
got a particular meaning? How is it that some two words have got the same 
meaning? How is it that a word has got more than one meaning? What is the 
exact meaning of a particular word? What speaker does with this word while 
Geach, P.T. Frege's Grundlagen, The Philosophical Review, Vol. 60, No.4 (Oct. 1951), Duke 
University Press.pp:535-544. ! 
using it? How the hearer is going to understand a word, uttered by a speaker in 
the same sense? 
Philosophical interest in language had been observed in 20"^  century, followed 
by work done in the field in 19"^  century, along with the development of logic 
in which philosophers made their profound contribution. In his work 
Begriffsscrift\ Frege introduced quantifies-variable notation for generality 
which is the foundation of present system of predicate logic. He expressed 
conjunction, disjunction, or the existential quantifier through three logical 
constants. He has symbols for these constants. It could be achieved by the 
addition of predicate, non-logical constants etc. This pattern of symbols could 
incorporate a formal language. Now, it is possible to frame sentences on any 
subject like arithmetic, mathematics, so that deductive reasoning may be carried 
out on these sentences. 
Contrary to Frege, in 1960, Linguist Noam Chomsky demonstrated that even 
complex grammatical structure of natural language may be described in formal 
Vv'ay. If this is so, then there is no need to develop any formal language, as 
Frege did. 
That's why in philosophy, language has become centrally important and has 
been used as a methodology to analyze not only it, but other disciplines also. 
Philosophers of other disciplines are interested to know the meaning of singular 
terms, because our judgments depend on the clarification of the terms which 
we are using. R.M. Hare points out that a singular term like "red" may be 
misused, if the conventional meaning of the language is not followed. As 
"* Frege, G. (1879), Begriffsscrifl, a formula language, modeled upon that of arithmetic, for pure 
ihmight.pp.\-19. 
mentioned above, conventional devices need to have public commitment of 
their repeated usage; in the absence of which there may be mismatching 
between speaker's meaning and hearer's meaning. This problem arises 
primarily because of lacking public commitrfients of using the devices or 
unrepeated usage of the devices. 
Language has also been discussed in empiricism. John Locke realizes the 
importance of language. According to him, human beings had been provided a 
unique ability of making articulate sounds, which he calls, "words." These 
sounds are used as marks and this is how the idea of corresponding object is 
created in the mind of speaker. He can share this idea with other users of 
language. This is how communication is established between speakers of a 
certain speech community. According to him, tlie meaning of a word is nothing 
but the idea in speaker's mind. It seems plausibly clear that Locke uses words 
(in terms of ideas) as tools for communication.^  
It may be argued that words alone cannot be used as tools of communication. 
They need a definite syntactical arrangement so as to construct meaningful 
sentences. In the process of communication, these sentences may be used to 
pass utterances. Moreover, Frege argued that the association of ideas in 
speaker's mind possesses no logical relationship between them. He tried to 
provide an account of language in terms of dealing with truth conditions of 
sentences. 
OQ the basis of inferences drawn from above, it may be maintained that 
philosophy of language enjoys much philosophical achievement during past 
Walter R. Ott, Locke's philosophy of language (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004),25. 
one century along with other discipHnes hke linguistics, philosophy of 
linguistics, and linguistic philosophy. 
Philosophy of Language, Linguistics, Philosophy of Linguistics and Linguistic 
Philosophy: 
It is useful to make distinction among these disciplines, one by.one. Linguistics 
may be described as scientific, organized study of language. It is concerned 
with the empirical investigation of language. In other words, it deals with the 
theories of syntax and semantics. It is related with structural problems of 
language, while the philosophy of language is concerned with conceptual 
questions of language such as the problems of meaning. Recently linguistics 
has discovered that in order to understand language, not only syntax but 
meaning is also important. The work of Noam Chomsky is an evidence of this 
evolution. • - ; . „ 
The linguistics philosophy is interested in studying a proposition to know facts 
of language while the philosophy of language (as analytic philosophers put it) 
does so to analyze the nature and working of the proposition itself; and 
investigates the role of propositions in language. 
Indian system of philosophy also found to discuss language. The Vaiyakdrarjas 
school holds that the primary function of language is referential i.e. it is used to 
refer to things. Such use is augmented by social conventional practice of 
language. Bhartrhari (an Indian philosopher ofilanguage) think df language as 
the foundational being which illuminates itself and its meaning as well. The 
language possesses the characteristic of natural fitness which reflect meaning 
of words and thereby sentences which are being used in utterances. According 
to Bhartrhari, a name is the expresser of meaning of a particular referent to 
wliicli it stands for. 
1.2 Historical Perspective of names: 
The approach of Early Greek Philosophy: 
In early Greek Philosophy, the issue of names was first found to be discussed 
in Plato's dialogue Cratylus. In the beginning of the dialogue, Hermogenes (a 
character in the dialogue) asks Socrates to clarify Cratylus's idea that names 
are natural devices for communication. 
Hermogenes thinks that names are conventional devices of communication. 
>James are used only through convention. A thing has got its name which users 
agree to call by that name. Convention implies that the meaning of a name is 
revealed only through its usage by a community of speakers of language. 
Socrates replies by describing the meaning of .the names of various gods. He 
provides several arguments and examples. For example, name of a God 
"Hermes" has something to do with speech. The legislator forms this name of 
God who invented speech and language itself 
That's why Cratylus calls "Hermogenes" as incorrect name because he is not 
good at speech. Homer often talks about different names to the same thing. He 
thinks "Astyanax" as correct name of Hector's son instead of 'Scamandrius.' 
"Astyanax" means 'king of the city.' Now he is so called because he defended 
city and the long walls of his country. Tikewisje, name of God "Pluto" means 
'the giver of wealth.' Pluto God provides wealth. Hence, Socrates asserts that 
all names may be shown to indicate the nature of things. 
Another remarkable observation Socrates made in naming practice is that the 
name of most of the things is associated with the idea of motion or change. The 
idea is an inspiration from Heraclitus. The name of some concepts like 
"Wisdom" suggests state of flux or perception of motion. Such naming practice 
is doubtful to be true as it seems something to 4o with the legislators of name 
themselves and not with the reality. By providing several counterexamples 
Socrates refutes the idea of motion to be associated with names. Names do not 
possess power to describe things according to the notion of change. There are 
several nouns or verbs that show stability by their names. For example, 
"faithful" shows 'cessation of motion,' "knowledge" shows 'stopping soul at 
things,' "memory" would mean 'rest in the soul' etc. Moreover, how can there 
be a real thing which is always in motion? 
In the state of flux, knowledge would be ceases to be called as knowledge 
because transition would always go on. There will be nothing to be known. 
Socrates tries to portray the picture of naming practices. According to him, 
naming practice is performed to establish communication. He claims that in 
communication, we replicate the nature of things. Communication may be 
established without using linguistic devices. For example, lifting hands upward 
would mean 'upward ness.' He asserts that names are vocal imitation of that 
which an imitator would like to express. The initial imitators or legislator 
would have been experts in naming things ty their true nature. In order to 
know the things, is it necessary to know their names? It may be argued that 
things would have been existed even, if they would never have 
been named. This is what Socrates wishes to emphasize that 
getting real knowledge of things is not depended on the knowledge 
of their names. They may be understood even without assigning 
any names to them; but it would not be conventional. These will 
be the cases where no communication would be established. 
Socrates holds that a word resembles with the thing which stands 
for it, This function of a word is to be augmented by the use of 
convention. This is how correctness in names may be established. 
According to Socrates, it would be most perfect state of language. 
In contrast with views reflected in Plato's dialogue Cratylus; 
Aristotle holds that names are not natural. They are signified only 
by convention. This convention determines a particular name by 
virtue of which a name refers to some object. He thinks of words 
just as symbols through which we refer things. He advocates that 
names possess significance only if they refer something. From 
Aristotle's views on formal language, we may infer that names are 
individual constants. Such kind of names may be termed as 
"proper names." The kind of objects they refer makes the subject 
matter of the philosophy of language. Aristotle believes that each 
name is invariably related to its referent. An atomic sentence may 
be described as the unit of language. It contains an object named 
with a predicate. He thinks that verbs are predicate parts of 
propositions that name a set of objects which are true in virtue of their having a 
refsrent.^  
The approach of Indian Philosophy: 
The notion of names is as old as the human civilization itself. In ancient India, 
the issue of names has been discussed in Veda (1500 B.C. to 600 B.C.). The 
name is called naman in Sanskrit (in Vedic period), nama in old English and 
Frisian, namo in old high German, naam in Dutch, name in German, nomen in 
Latin, and onoma in Greek.^  
Names, and name-giving practices (namkarana) have been considered as sacred 
activity in Veda. According to Vedic tradition,.' one name may be given to more 
than one person. Vedic people were concerned about giving meaningful names. 
For example, they obtain names from'natural things like plants {t.g.Uddalaka) 
and animals (e.g. Asva). They also fix name-giving {namkarana) practice from 
ritual (e.g. Yajnasena), from qualities of mind (e.g. Buddha), or from numbers 
(e.g. Ekata, Dviya) etcl 
* See also, Richard McKeon, The Basic Works of Aristotle, (New York: Random House, 1941). 
' See, Shorter Oxford Dictionary, on historical principles, 6* ed. Vol.2, Oxford University Press, 2007. 
It is important to clarify the distinction between various words like noun, proper noun, common noun, 
name and proper name. According to the dictionary (.in grammer), "a noun is a word or combination of 
words constituting individual designation by which a person, animal, place, or thing is known, spoken 
of, etc. So it need not be confused with name." A proper noun is "the name of particular person, 
animal, thing, place, etc."A common noun is a "name that can be applied to all the members of a class." 
(See, Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary, Ed. A.M. Macdonald. New ed. New Delhi,1972). In 
ge:ieral, a name is a linguistic device which refers to some object, thing, place or person. It is through 
naTies that we can differentiate or identify any object. Some grammarians do not create distinction 
between the word name and proper name (See Nicholson, Wiihelm F.H. "Name and Appellative" 
pp.384-39.3). 
Philosophical interest on the issue of names has been started with debate: whether names possess 
meaning of their own or they are mere conventional devices. Plato's Dialogue explores this issue. In 
analytic philosophy, the issue has been initiated with German mathematician Gottlob Frege. For the 
fust time, he used the word Eigename fov proper names. He used it for all singular terms generally. 
^l!yid..62-65. 
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Yaska, a Sanskrit grammarian (Vedic Period) is the author of Nirukta that deals 
with etymology and the semantic of words including names. The book tries to 
explore the mechanism of revealing meaning of words. He believes that the 
meaning of word is immanent in itself The words, especially names, consist of 
some historical background to be so called as. revealing a definite meaning. In 
contrast with Vaiyakdrams school of Indian Philosophy (consist of holistic 
approach), the approach has got monistic aspect. Linguistics had been started 
with Pahini, another Sanskrit grammarian (400 B.C.).He realized that not only 
syntax but semantics plays vital role in understanding human language. 
In Indian philosophy, Upani§ad (a religious text) also deals with the issue of 
names. According to the text, all phenomenal things are nothing but only 
linguistic expressions or names. Brhaddranyaka Upani§ad (a type of 
Upani§ad) says that entire universe is differentisited in to just names and forms. 
In the same Upani^ad, a dialogue has been found between Artahaga (a 
charcicter in the dialogue) and Ydjfiavalkya (another character in the same 
dialogue) which suggests that a name survives even after death of the person. 
It is an interesting investigation: Kripke's doctrine of rigid designation bears a 
resemblance with the approach of Upani^ad (on the issue of proper names).^  
Chdndyogya tTpan/^aJ signifies'that availability of any space means names and 
forms.'" ' ' .; • •• . 
A detailed account of the issue will be discussed later. 
'" Chakrabarti,S.C. (2007), Proper Names of Persons in Vedic Literature, School of Vedic Studies, 
F^ abindra Bharati University, pp.26-27. 
13 
According to Indian philosophy, a word (sabda) has got meaning 
eternally associated with it. So is a name. Vaiyakdraijas school treats 
this eternal relationship as natural correctness or fitness (yogyatd) of 
the word {sabda). A word {sabda) is eternally related with a definite 
meaning through this fitness {yogyatd). ,Here word "eternal" may be 
compared with what Socrates calls "natural." In the system of 
Vaiydkdrajja, a word is the expresser of meaning. It expresses all 
meaning: primary, secondary, and tertiary. The system also promotes 
convention by which a particular word reveals a particular meaning 
(artha).'° Like Socrates, the school also admits the instrumental 
nature of a word {sabda). 
This debate between "naturalists" and "conventionalist" forms the 
subject matter of the issue of names. It was actually an enquiry about 
the nature and working of language through the usage of names. 
Both Plato's dialogue Cratylus and the Indian school of philosophy 
take names as holding natural or eternal correctness to them. They 
are to be supplemented by the convention which reveals their 
meaning. 
In absence of conventional practices, names cannot reveal 
any meaning i.e. cannot function as referential devices. The 
use of names essentially needs social recognition so that 
speakers may communicate the same words in the same sense. 
'° Tiwari,D.N.,"Cognition, Being, and the Possibility of Expressions" in ICPR, Vol.XIV No.l,Sep.-
Dec,1996,p.85. 
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1.3 Proper names: Singular terms 
Every language contains various conventional devices that may be called as singular 
terms. The devices are so called because they stand only for particular persons, places, 
or objects. They include proper names (like "Barack Obama," "Osama Bin Laden," 
"Aligarh Muslim University," "Sunday," "6," "7:25 a.m." etc.); definite descriptions 
(like "the Prime Minister of India," "the first wonder of the world" etc.); demonstrative 
pronouns (like "this," "thaf) etc. In contrast, there are general terms that stand for many 
objects at the time of their usage like "table," "fish," "red" etc. 
Out of these terms, proper names are the most cofnjnon invariable singular terms that 
are used to refer to unique single objects. They display a closed semantic configuration 
i.e. their meaning is reflected by the things they refer; they don't have meaning of their 
own. Hence, the meaning of proper names is the referent they refer. They are 
meaningfiil by virtue of their relation with single objects. 
The relation between proper names and the objects for which they stand may be defmed 
in terms of their consistent association between them. This association is a product of 
repeated usage of proper names in a community of speakers. In this way proper names 
fijnction as conventional linguistic devices that are used to refer to.unique single 
objects. 
But how this convention is established at the first place? First, proper names 
are introduced by a speech community. This introduction may be performed 
either through formal system of initial baptism" {namkarana in Veda) or 
In his seminal lectures Naming and Necessity, Kripke too emphasizes that proper names are 
introduced by mean of initial baptism; then the name is passed through a chain of communication 
among the members of a speech community. 
15 
arbitrarily. After being introduced, proper names are practiced by users of 
language. This is how proper names are propagated in a given society; and 
reinforced in the mind of users. Then the names may be used for 
communication. 
Are there necessary and sufficient conditions for describing something as 
proper name? The characteristic of an object named must be matched with the 
used proper name. For instance, "Barack Obama" is a proper name. It is 
necessary for it to be so named as "Barack Obama." The real question is: does 
the name satisfy the real person in question? If the proper name satisfies the 
person as the present president of USA, then the name is successful in 
providing right kind of reference i.e. "Barack Obama." This is the sole function 
of convention-picking out the right reference. 
Proper names do not provide any description of the object to which they refer. 
In this way proper names are different from singular terms of others kind. 
According to description theorists "Barack Obama" is synonym for "the 
present president of United States of America." The former, being a proper 
name, refer while the later provide description. This is how a relationship may 
be developed between a name and an' object The usage of proper names 
assumes particular characteristics of the object in question. Is there any 
criterion for this assumption? The criterion is set by the users of language, 
according to the nature of object to which they refer. 
Proper names don't describe the characteristic of objects, in the way as definite 
descriptions do. But they consist of inseparable connections with the 
corresponding object. Proper names function as vocal expressions standing for 
16. 
objects. They have no meaning except their referents which they stand for. 
Wittgenstein too emphasizes that names are directly referential i.e. they refer to 
unique objects; and provides immediate acquaintance with the objects. 
This acquaintance is necessary in order to differentiate one object from the 
other. Proper names are meant through which different objects may be 
distinguished. The objects may be of various kinds. They may be place, person, 
color, number, time etc. Proper names are singular terms that have 
conventional utility to make a distinction among these kinds of objects. That's 
why; they need public recognition to be used as proper name. This recognition 
provides meaning to them, in terms of their association with single objects. 
Hence, the issue of meaning is central in the philosophy of language. 
Competent speakers of language, speak and understand meaningful words (and 
thereby sentences) with ease, even without getting involved in thinking about 
the meaning of their utterances. Philosophers of language are interested to 
know: in virtue of what people understand only meaningful words (and thereby 
sentences)? How does language deals with the problem of meaning? 
Different philosophers like Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, Quine, Austin, Searle 
etc. try to deal with the issues of philosophy of language, including the issue of 
meaning, in the form of theories of meaning. 
1.4 Theories of meaning: 
Theories of meaning try to offer an organized account of the issue of meaning 
of referring expressions like proper, names. Some philosophers like Frege, 
Russell, and Wittgenstein think that meaning of sentences is something to do 
with truth conditions. Locke considers meaning of words as ideas in people 
17 
mind. Searle thinks that meaning is a matter of intentionality. 
Speaker's intention contributes in revealing meaning of utterances 
passed by him. He passes the utterances in such a way so as to 
recreate the intention in hearer's mind. Kripke's theory of meaning 
argues that referring expressions has no meaning of their own. The 
expressions are conventional devices introduced by speakers by 
mean of initial baptism- and then propagated through a chain of 
communication. Their only meaning is that they rigidly designate the 
same object in all possible instances. In this way, philosophers have 
got different approaches towards the issue. 
A widely discussed idea in philosophy of language (including in 
Plato's dialogue Cratylus and in Vaiydkdraijas school of Indian 
Philosophy) is that referring expressions are meaningful only if they 
stand for things. Words are symbolic representations that denote 
referred things. Names are most common Referring expressions. 
All l inguis t ic expressions such as proper names , definite 
descr ip t ions , demonstra t ives (such as " t h i s " or " t ha t " ) , 
and pronouns are true of th ings , hence meaningful , in 
vir tue of their convent ional associa t ion with the things 
they stand for. The express ions are in fact conven t iona l 
devices used in communica t ion . A speaker u t t e r s and 
under s t ands them by vi r tue of the t h ings ; and the things 
they refer to. They do not reflect any meaning apart from standing for things. 
The approach of this kind may be termed as "referential approach" of the 
theory of meaning. 
The theory focuses on one of the most fundamental characteristic of language-
referential aspect. But there are more dimensions of language that suggests that 
referring of things does not explain meaning successfully. In Frege's classical 
example, "Morning Star" and "Evening Star" are identity terms 'that refers to 
the same referent i.e. planet "Venus"; but they display different sense. 
Frege calls sense as something that function as an ingredient in meaning. The 
slogan of the approach 'meaning is reference' may not work in several cases, as 
described above. However, reference still remains to be central in any theory of 
meaning. The theory of meaning reflects certain corresponding facts that 
contribute in revealing the meaning of terms/sentences. The theory raises a 
number of issues like: In virtue of what a term has got more than one meaning? 
In \irtue of what two terms have got the same ineaning? These problems have 
fascinated philosophers to speculate and theorize on the issue of meaning itself 
John Locke thinks of meanings of linguistic expressions or statements as ideas 
in speaker's mind. Speakers try to transfer the state of affairs framed in his 
mind to the hearer. For example, a speaker has belief that "there is no danger 
there". He intends to transfer this belief to the hearer. According to Locke, 
these mental states are ideas in the mind. He did not provide the mechanism 
through which these ideas transfer to the hearer while the speaker establishes 
communication. 
Contrary to Frege and Russell, Wittgenstein is against any organized theory of 
language. He believes that natural languages are adequate in revealing meaning 
as far as sentences of ordinary language reflects sense, thoughts etc. He holds 
that the function of philosophy is not to construct an ideal language; doing so 
will only supply logical pattern of thoughts to philosophers. According to early 
Wittgenstein Tractatiis, the function of language is to communicate thoughts 
by supplying the expressions in pictorial form. The only role of propositions is 
to explain the state of affairs. If propositions are successful in describing the 
state of affairs, then the proposition is said to l^ ie true. A proposition \s, said to 
be false, if it fails to describe the state of affairs. 
Propositions consist of logical expressions that may or may not be analyzed (by 
paraphrasing or by analytic definition). The later ones are simple names that 
represent simple objects. These objects are meaning of simple names. In this 
way names connect language to reality. The names possess meaning only when 
used as representing objects. This usage must be in the context of propositions. 
The elementary proposition is nothing but concatenation of names that reflect a 
state of affairs. i • 
Later Wittgenstein Philosophical Investigations speculates that it is the "use" 
which makes a proper name or a sentence meaningful. If a proper name has 
never been used, the question of its meaning does not arise in the first place. 
Logical positivists put forward the verification theory of meaning. The theory 
put emphasis on the meaning of individual sentences: its verifiability. There are 
several schools of logical positivism like Vienna Circle, Reichenbach's Berlin 
School, and Kaiser Wilhelm Institutes. This approach was practiced by various 
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philosophers as well as scientists in Berlin School, under the influence of Hans 
Reichenbach. Moritz Schlick was responsible for encouraging the approach 
through Vienna Circle. Both schools share common approach of Mach except 
not allowing space for mathematics.-According to the approach, verifiability 
functions as a criterion of providing meaning to theoretical assertions. 
With Frege, Cantor and Russell mathematical logic came into existence. 
Russell's Principia Mathematica is an important contribution in this direction. 
The idea was that all mathematical assertions may be proved in terms of logic. 
The logic works as the essence of mathematics. It also means that mathematical 
statements and also the definitions of theoretical terms like "heat" may be 
» - ' • 
supplied by mean of mathematical logic. This objective property of 
mathematical logic motivated these philosophers to the same organized account 
in other natural languages like English. This development of Vierma Circle 
resulted in the slogan, "The meaning of a term is its method of verification". 
The theoretical scientific terms may be explained in terms of phenomenal 
conditions. Because of these conditions; assertions containing these terms may 
be verified. This doctrine was known as the verification theory of meaning. The 
theoiy held that the sentences of ordinary natural language may not be verified; 
and hence lacked empirical significance. The principle target of the theory was 
metaphysical entities. The theory promotes elimination of metaphysics as there 
IS no possibility of verification of metaphysical entities. There had been efforts 
to construct "logically perfect" language that may ensure the empirical 
N'erifiability and may avoid errors on its own accord. One surprising thing is 
that, in doing so, the natural aspect of language is discounted. 
Donald Davidson'^  proposed a theory of meaning according to which meaning 
of a sentence is revealed by determining its truth conditions. What it is that 
determine meaning of proper names or sentences? Davidson held that natural 
language, though spoken by finite number of people; consist-of ability to 
produce infinite number of meaningful sentences, each of them is 
independently meaningful. This property of natural language is learnt among 
community of speakers. This means that the speakers are aware of rules that 
may construct infinite meaningful sentences out of the application of the finite 
set of rules. 
Davidson argues that the meaning of a sentence may be revealed by revealing 
the meaning of its constituent parts. This is the strategy to understand complex 
sentences; and is technically called as compositmnality. 
In the philosophy of language, a theory of meaning try to explain the meaning 
of each sentence of any natural language likes English. Davidson tries to do so 
by compositionality. He holds that the truth conditions of simpler sentences 
determine the truth conditions of complex sentences. Syntactic structure of 
simpler sentences is equipped with semantic apparatus which reveals the 
meaning of complex sentences used in utterances of any community of 
speakers. 
1.5 Saul A. Kripke's problem in the Philosophy of Language: 
Saul A. Kripke is a living philosopher of language who may be called as genius 
v/ith uncontroversial spirit. He produces a number of claims about meaning and 
'^ Davidson, 1967 b, 1970,1975. 
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reference of proper names that leads to instant transformation in the way the 
philosophy of language was done by the philosophers of language like Frege 
and Russell. One can't afford to ignore Naming and Necessity while studying 
philosophy of language. Conselo Preti depicts ''...Naming and Necessity is 
more than just a key text; it just about reinvented the way the philosophy of 
language was done, and, along with other work being done at the time, 
refashioned the way in which the theory of meaning was examined..."' . It is 
no exaggeration to say that Kripke's three seminal lectures called Naming and 
Necessity are one of the greatest achievements of 20"^  century that philosophy 
has ever seen.'^  
One of the most important contributions of Saul A. Kripke (1972, 1980) is that 
he provides several counter arguments' against descriptivism'^, as put forward 
by Frege and Russell independently. In hi^  seminal lecture: Naming and 
Necessity, he provides several counterexamples to refute the theory. He claims 
that a proper name does not necessarily followed by any definite description in 
all possible worlds. 
Based on the idea as put forward by Ruth Marcus Barcan'^ , he argues that a 
proper name is a rigid designator which rigidly designates a particular referent 
in all possible worlds. By describing the notion of possible worlds, he did not 
mean Lewis idea of concrete, physical world alternative to our own. He 
'"Consuelo Preti (2002), On Kripke. Wadswortii,p.30. 
'^Seealso,/i)/d,30. 
He is providing tinree sorts of arguments viz., metapliysical, semantic and epistemological. Out of 
these tJTree, metaphysical seems to be his most discussed argument on which his refutation against 
Frege and Russell is based. 
Broadly, descriptivism may be described as a theory which looks proper names as abbreviated 
definite descriptions. 
"* Marcus, Ruth Barcan. (1971), "Essential Attribution," .lournal of Philosophy, 68, 187-202. 
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actually means trans-world identity br counterfactual situation of the actual 
world. It may also be called as 'the things that might have been'. Kripke uses 
example of a dice which possess six possible instances; there are actually six 
possible worlds. 
He further holds that descriptions are service of stipulation of reference in some 
worlds; but not necessarily in all possible worlds. For example, Wittgenstein 
refers to description "the author of Tnactatus Logico-Philosophicus." 
According to Kripke's thesis, he might have adopted his earlier profession-
being a mechanical engineer. He might never have studied philosophy at all. 
Hence, the description is not necessarily true of it in all possible worlds. 
One of the most significant problem before philosophy of language is; how to 
determine the referent of a proper name? In virtue of what a proper name 
designate a referent? Kripke criticizes descriptivism by suggesting an 
alternative model to it. The model suggests that causal historical chain 
determines the referent of a proper name. 
Kripke tries to solve the problem of functioning of proper names by 
propounding the doctrine of rigid designation. He thinks that we name a certain 
person or thing by mean of some initial baptism. Then a name is passed 
successively to later stages of its usage; through a linear chain of 
communication in a certain speech community. This is how a proper name 
rigidly designates a referent in all possible worlds. He also argues that like 
proper' names natural kind terms like "water," "gold," "heat" also behave 
rigidly. ' ' ; 
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In my view, Kripke talks about conventional rigidity (that is my term) of proper 
names i.e. rigidity acquired by mean of usage of proper names by a community 
of speakers. Kripke's work reorganized analytic philosophy. A debate had been 
started whether his arguments against Frege and Russell are well directed and 
justified or the work rests merely on assumptions. Unlike Frege; Kripke too did 
not provide any organized theory of meaning but he restructured the methods in 
which the theory of meaning may be evaluated. These contributions of Kripke 
made him a landmark of philosophy of language. 
Kripke deals with the several issues ofphildsophy of language like naming, 
necessity, identity, meaning, reference etc. One of the main problems which 
Kripke considers is that: how referent of a proper name may be identified and 
stipulated? He tries to refute descriptivism (of Frege, Russell, and Searle) so 
that an alternative account of reference stipulation practices of proper names 
may be established. 
This dissertation is an effort to evaluate Kripke's thesis against this refutation. 
In order to do so, next chapter deals with Frege's theory of proper names which 
clarifies position of Frege vis-a-vis nature ancj functioning of proper names. 
The chapter also highlights alternative approach to Frege, in terms of 
Internationality and Speech Act theory. 
Third chapter explains classical (of Frege and Russell) and modem (of Searle) 
description theories of proper names which had been the principle target of 
Kripke. The chapter also clarifies the approach of Bertrand Russell. 
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Fourth chapter elaborates causal theory of proper names which Kripke takes as 
an alternate approach to description theories; in dealing with the problem of 
reference identification and stipulation of proper names. 
Fifth chapter is about the critical evaluation of Kripke's refutation of the 
description theories. The chapter not only explores Kripke's modal, 
epistemological, and semantical arguments; but deals with criticisms of 
Kripke's theory against descriptivism (of Frege and Russell) also. Chapter six 
concludes the thesis. 
26 
CHAPTER II ^ 
THE THEORY OF PROPER NAMES: FREGE 
2.1 Introduction: 
The German mathematician and logician Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob Frege was 
the first to provide a systematic account of proper names. He used the word 
eigename for proper names to all singular terms generally. He did not provide a 
precise definition of proper names. He was interested to construct a formal 
language so that the defects and ambiguity of natural language may be avoided. 
He tried to integrate formal logic with language. Proper names have been 
encountered as an important issue by Frege because of their importance in 
sentence construction. 
Frege uses the term "proper name" for all singular terms generally. However, 
he nowhere provided a definite criterion for an expression to be regarded as 
proper name. He thinks that proper names are linguistic devices that stand for 
objects. According to him, proper names reflect the most general logical 
function of linguistic expressions. This reflection is the formal criteria of 
expressions to be called as proper names. Proper names serve the function of 
picking out a particular object for which it stands for. He takes this object as 
the meaning of that proper name. 
In his work Grundlagen (1884), he described proper names to a variety of 
objects such as planets, human beings and the terms of natural kinds such as 
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"tiger," "water," "gold" etc. Frege even regards numbers as objects and hence 
numerical terms may be described as proper names as per the Fregean criteria. 
The criterion for such ascription of numbers in the category of proper names is 
that they fall in to the category of objects. For example, number "One" may be 
associated with those objects which show oneness in nature like God'^ . This 
oneness is unique because, by its very nature, it does not allow plurality. 
Because of this unique quality of proper names, they can be treated as numbers 
also. 
On the one hand, objects possess proper names while on the other hand number 
of objects also functions as proper names. This is the dual attribution of proper 
names. For example, number "ten" corresponds to ten objects. Each of these 
objects keeps proper names of their own. Number "ten" also acts as a proper 
name because the number is the bearer of ten objects. Frege even think of 
"points," ""lines,'" "shapes," and even "weights" as proper names because of the 
same argument. 
According to Frege, proper names may be distinguished from expressions of 
other kind by providing some definite criteria associated with the functioning 
of proper names. However, he never provided any such criteria for determining 
which expressions are to be classified as proper names and which are not. 
He treats proper names as objective devices. That's why; he expects that proper 
names should reveal same meaning in all contexts i.e. to refer to single objects. 
He tries to integrate formal logic with the philosophy of language. He talks 
'^  Freee G (19680) The Foundations of Arithmatics , Northwestern University Press, pp. 1-3. The 
enliehtened insight of my supervisor had been very useful to understand this concept. See also, 
Mohammad Muqim. '"Sense And No-Sense Theories On Proper names" Indian Philosophical Quaterly 
XXXII1 No. 1, Jan 2006, p.95. 
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about reconstruction of language in logical form i.e. in the form of premises 
and conclusion. According to the idea, only those sentences are meaningful that 
reflects truth conditions. These sentences consist of constituents parts that are 
separately meaningful. One such meaningful constituent part is proper names. 
Proper names are separately meaningful as long as they refer to objects. 
Frege never bothered to provide any organized method by which one can 
identify a linguistic device as proper names. What we need to decide 
whether a term is working as proper name or not is to examine whether they 
belong to the category of objects or not. Wliat exactly are objects? Does Frege 
prescribe any particular definition of objects? He devoted large sections about a 
wide range of objects, including abstract ones. In the category of objects, he 
also added "directions," "shapes" and even "classes" such as the class of 
human beings. He even regards colors such as "blue" as proper name (only 
v/hen i1 is used as noun). For example, blue is 'the color of the sky.' But when 
i; is used as an adjective, the color does not function as proper name, as in the 
sentence-'That car is blue.' 
Frege thinks of proper names as complete and predicate as incomplete 
expression. He also treats propositions as complete expression which looks 
similar to the criterion provided for proper names. Hence, propositions may be 
called as complex proper names. It means that complex terms like propositions 
may also be treated as proper names. He is actually looking for exploring all 
possible definition of proper names. He was very aware of the fact that there 
always lies a possibility of proper names that possess no meaning because they 
are empty. "Unicom" is an example of such empty proper name. These may be 
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cases of fiction or story. The referent of proper name of this sort is not real; it 
inay be imaginary or fictional. He dares to hold that even such proper names 
display meaning. 
Frege invents the term "sense" which functions as ingredient in providing 
meaning to proper names or sentences. Sense provides a way of expression 
which may be differed from context to context; from speaker to speaker. The 
significance of Fregean sense is that it provides meaning to even empty proper 
names. He argues that imaginary proper names appearing in the work of fiction 
or story cannot be considered as meaningless. These names are meaningful 
because of possessing sense. In any fiction or story, such names display sense; 
and therefore meaningful. 
Frege further ascribes classes in the category of proper names e.g. "the class of 
mammals," "the class of bachelors" etc. because the classes fulfils the criteria 
of being a proper name. That's why he calls such classes as objects for objects 
can be the only criteria of being a proper name. 
2.2 Criteria of Identity: 
Frege often tries to provide a grammatical test for whether a certain expression 
is proper name or not. In Grundlagen, he talks about the criterion in which one 
object may be recognized as same in repeated occurrences. Frege was aware of 
the fact that it is not possible to recognize a particular object as same in every 
repeated observation because an expression will reveal different senses in 
different contexts. The concept behind the identity of proper name lies in the 
general notion of stipulation of identity criteria with a proper name. The 
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intention is to set a criterion tlirough which proper names may be identified in 
different contexts. Such stipulation brings forward the stipulation of truth 
condition of propositions. We may claim our assertions as true or false on the 
basis of such conditions. We may use them for future references like providing 
a definition or narrating a stoiy. The criterion of identity may serve the purpose 
of enhancing communication between speaker and hearer in a certain speech 
community. 
A number and the object for which it stands are inseparably associated to each 
other. The idea is that numbers cannot stand in isolation on their own. Numbers 
always stand for some objects. Even number "zero" signifies the absence of 
objects or the presence of zero objects (that means the same). Numbers match 
with the criterion that Frege provided for proper names. That's why he treated 
numbers as proper names. But from the side of objects, there seems to be no 
principle basis of such criterion of identity. 
2.3 The problem of meaning: 
I will now show that Frege's position to base the theory of meaning on the truth 
conditions of sentences is not well directed. Fie holds that the meaning of a 
proper name is the object of immediate acquaintance. His idea is that the 
meaning of propositions depends upon the meaning of its constituent parts. 
Moreover, the meaning of any sentence depends on the thoughts expressed by 
the speakers during the utterances made in conversation. The meaning is also 
concerned about the contexts, speaker's belief, proposifional attitude etc. Frege 
was concerned about the role of meaning in the determination of truth value of 
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propositions. In order to answer this question Frege invents the notion of 
"sense." The meaning of a proper name may be displayed by the sense it 
reflects. To grasp the sense of a proper name is to know its meaning in terms of 
identifying a given object. The sense functions in setting a criterion whether a 
given proper name is true for tlie corresponding object (it stands for) or not. In 
other words, in a sentence one may determine the sense of a proper name and 
thereby it's meaning and then knows whether il is true for the given predicate 
or not. 
Frege's describes the term "sense" as an ingredient in the meaning of proper 
names and the propositions in which they occur. It is important to verify the 
utility of sense as an important ingredient in the theory of meaning. I think that 
Frege revived several ideas of Aristotle regarding names and their referents. He 
talks about ideality in language. He was more concerned about objective aspect 
of communication. This pattern was also followed by Aristotle when he tried to 
formulate a formal language. 
However, Frege elaborated these vie\ys in the light of advocating an organized 
'".heory of meaning. Frege raised the issue of meaning occurring in the 
utterances of natural language which is full of ambiguity and vagueness. 
In his work Grundlagen, Frege raises the issue of meaning of words occurring 
in propositions. The meaning of any word occurring in a sentence solely 
depends on its role in determining truth value of the propositions rather than 
any mental image or idea of the word (as empiricist holds). Frege holds that the 
utterance of propositions should be restricted to the determination of its truth 
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condition. In the later part of the Grundlagen, lie emphasizes that the meaning 
of a sentence directly depends on the meaning of its constituent parts. 
The meaning of constituent parts is directed by their conventional usage. This 
seems to be the reason why Aristotle believed words to be conventional 
devices. The idea is that such devices may change their meaning with the 
passage of time. This is what Socrates says in Plato's seminal dialogue 
Cratylus- that the meaning of words is changed with the passage of time. Frege 
spins the same thing in terms of truth condition of propositions. 
For example, name "cobra" had been used for all snakes generally, but because 
of passage of time it has changed its meaning and applied to a particular 
category of neurotoxic snakes. Similarly, name "buffalo" is derived from a 
Greek word for an antelope that used to be found in North Africa. Now the 
name is being used for a particular category of a rummant animal. 
Frege seems to infer, like Aristotle, that names are conventional devices. These 
devices don't have meaning of their own. They reveal meanings only if they 
refer something. 
Frege calls meaning (Bedeutimg) a semantic property. He found, like Cratylus, 
that the meaning of any name can't remain static. It changes with the change in 
context, speaker's belief, attitude etc. That's why Frege invents the notion of 
"sense" (Sinn). Sense is that semantic property (of a word or a sentence) by 
virtue of which it reveals meaning of that word or that sentence. He thinks of 
sense as a way of description. This way seems to be an important ingredient in 
These examples were initially used by Gareth Evans. 
33 
providing meaning to words or sentences. Now he thinks that the sense of a 
sentence directly depends on the sense of its constituent parts. 
However, he was more concerned about the sense of a whole sentence that may 
be revealed by the truth condition of sentences. This invention of sense made 
Frege's earlier work {Grudlagen) more justified. This is an important 
contribution of Frege in the philosophy of language. Frege further holds that 
both words and sentences may have meaning (Bedeutung) as well as sense 
(Sinn). 
In contrast, Wittgenstein thinlcs that words possess only meaning but no sense. 
The meaning of word or name is nothing but the object it names. In Tractatus, 
he holds that propositions have only sense bilt no meaning. The sense of a 
proposition is revealed by the situation it describes. For Wittgenstein a 
proposition only describes a situation or a thing. It does not mean in the way 
names do i.e. having corresponding object it names. 
The objective of Frege's invention of the notion of sense is to provide the 
maintenance of some objective content in the utterances being used among 
speakers of language. Hence, sense seems to be the property of propositions by 
virtue of which they are capable of transferring this objective content. 
This new approach of Frege helped him in developing the theory of meaning. It 
was an effort to provide an analysis of particular atomic sentence such as "Sir 
Syed Ahmad Khan is wise." A kind of mechanism had been tried to establish in 
which the truth value of the atomic sentences may be determined as true or 
false. But what is the principle basis of claiming a particular atomic sentence as 
containing truth or false value? 
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Frege was concerned about the utterances being made between speaker and 
hearer. Both the users of language involve in linguistic practices that is directed 
towards providing the truth conditions of propositions used in their utterances. 
They involve in utterances that claim truth or felsity of the propositions being 
used. The idea is that both speaker and hearer must communicate the same 
thing in the same sense in every repeated utterances performed by them or 
within that community of speakers. Frege tries to clarify the working of atomic 
propositions. 
A singular term or proper name like "Ram Dev," serves the functions of 
introducing an object. However, speakers may falsely believe the introduction 
of an object. It is likely to be the case in which the proper name may not even 
exist, as in case of "Harry Potter." Now the'truth condition of the atomic 
sentence in which the name occurs fails because "Harry Potter" is a non-
existent entity. The organized definition of Frege suggests that the meaning of 
proper name is the object that solely stands for it. According to this definition, 
any proper name that does not lead to an existent object is meaningless. That's 
why "Harry Potter" is meaningless proper name. 
However Frege even considers these empty proper names as meaningful 
because these names reveal meaning in the context of that fiction or 
storytelling, beyond that context, the truth value'of these sentencesya//^. 
This failure of truth condition distorts semantic property of that sentence. The 
basic purpose of the semantics of natural language is to provide semantic 
values to the propositions i.e. whether propositions are true or false. But truth 
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value of propositions may be confused by the speakers to be true or false. In 
spite of this fact, one may go on believing a particular proposition to be true 
while in actual case the proposition is false, or vice versa. That's why Frege's 
projects to base the theory of meaning on truth conditions of propositions 
seems to be shattered. Firstly, he utters that only those proper names have 
meaning that consists of particular objects. The second premise of Frege's 
argument is that some proper names do not possess corresponding objects. 
Hence, it follows that some (empty) proper names are meaningless. In his later 
v/ork, Frege seems to contradict his own work by ascribing sense to empty 
proper name. This ascription of sense provides meaning to even empty proper 
names. But in that case, the argument becomes invalid. 
Because of this shattering of the theory of meaning, the notion of reference also 
stands ambiguous. The reference of an object is something that provides 
meaning to the proper name which stands for it. In other words, the meaning of 
a proper name is its bearer. . 
Tliat's why the theory of reference plays central role in the theory of meaning. 
It is the reference that provides meaning to a proper name. This meaning 
determines whether a sentence containing a proper name is true or false. Again 
this is an evidence of invalidity of Frege's argument. 
It also rejects Dummett's idea that the theory of meaning may be treated as 
integral whole of the theory of reference and the theory of sense. One the one 
hand, it is not necessary that reference is the criteria of providing meaning to 
proper names and thereby propositions in which they occur. Proper names 
without reference also own sense (as per Fregean criteria). 
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2.4 Sense theory of proper names: 
Frege describes sense as a 'mode of presentation' of objects by mean of proper 
names. He thinks of sense as an ingredient in tlie meaning of proper names and 
thereby sentence containing them. I have maintained that some identity terms 
like "Aphla" and "Ateb" consist of same referent but they have different 
informative content. Both proper names- "Aphla' and "Ateb," share the 
description 'the mountain 5000 meters high' from northern and southern region 
respectively. Later, it was found that both travelers were actually-talking about 
the same mountain. If we hold this point of view of Frege, then both the names 
are intersubstitutable i.e. substitution of one proper name with another is not 
going to change the truth value of the expressed proposition. 
Frege observed that new discovery of "Aphla" and "Ateb" is informative. Now 
"Aphla" abbreviates the description 'the mountain over 5000 meters high from 
northern region' and similarly for "Ateb," 'the mountain over 5000 meters high 
from southern region.' This is where the relevance of the notion of sense comes 
in. ! •' 
For Frege the sense of a name is supplied by the sense of its associated 
description. The sense of a proper name, say "Barack Obama" is reflected by 
its associated description-"the present of United States of America." Initially, 
sense seems to be in service of determination of its reference. Using the sense 
Jamil, S. (2010), "Frege: The Theory of Meaning Concerning Proper Names", Vol. 4, No.l, Kritike; 
An online journal of philosophy. Phillipines. 
37 
of the description, the sense of "Barack Obama" may be inferred. Hence, the 
notion of sense helps in reference determination and identification. 
As maintained above, the notion of sense is extremely useful in case of identity 
terms like "Aphla" and ''Ateb." 
For example, in a metaphor used by Frege we may infer the following: 
a) "Aphla" is "Aphla" 
b) "Aphla" is "Ateb" 
a) is a tautology and not informative while b) is informative i.e. "Aphla" 
and "Ateb" refers to the same mountain. Bbth a) and b) differ in meaning 
because they differ in the senses they express. "Aphla" and "Ateb" are 
associated with different descriptions. That's why both exhibit different 
meanings. However both terms have got same referent. 
The descriptivism (of Frege) suggests the use of the term "sense," so that 
meaning can be provided to propositions. Sense is even displayed by empty 
proper names (as maintained above). They don't denote any object but still 
reflects sense. Despite its severe criticism, it may be asserted that empty proper 
names still display sense owing to their 'attachment with some sort of 
description. In the absence of any denotation, the notion of sense remains 
unaffected. This is the point, as I infer, which Frege wished to emphasize. 
Frege's classical examples include "Morning Star" and "Evening Star." These 
two proper names refer to the planet Venus but display possesses different 
senses. In the morning, Venus is called as "Morning Star" while in the evening 
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ihe same referent is called as "Evening Star." These proper names have got 
different informative content or value of cognition. This is what Fregean Sense 
is all about. Now these proper names provide a priori knowledge that both the 
names refer to the same referent. 
Dummett claims that such knowledge may be established by what he calls two 
routes towards the Venus by mean of both terms of identity ("Morning Star" 
and "Evening Star"). Sense seems to be in service of reference fixation of both 
proper names. Here Frege seems to be concerned about to provide a way 
towards stipulation of reference through the notion of sense . The muddle is 
that is there is any fixed way to determine route to the right reference (for 
which the name is being used)? In fact there are no fixed conditions sufficient 
to identify the reference. 
Usage of these proper names in two propositions reveals different senses of the 
propositions. It shows that the sense of names possess the sense of their 
associated definite descriptions. Sense does not reveal any meaning in 
isolation. Frege asserts that even empty proper names consist of sense but no 
reference. 
Frege thinks that a speaker of language, who knows the referent of a proper 
name, assumes that the hearer understands the sense of that proper name. But 
the hearer may or may not possess understanding of the referent. In virtue of 
what the hearer knows the sense of a particular proper name? The sense of an 
expression (or proper name) provides information about its referent. This 
•Jamil, op.cit, 158. 
' Dummett, Michael (1981), Frege: Philosophy of Language. London; Duckworth.p.99. 
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referent provides meaning to that expression or proper name. Is it possible to 
malce sense of any proper name that does not possess referent? 
For Frege yes! There are occasions when proper names show sense even 
without having any referent. For example, the existence of AHens (people 
living in other planets or galaxies of the universe) is doubtful but it has got 
sense in the works of scientific fiction. However, some peopl? even claim 
availability of evidences of their existence. If one day it is found that Aliens 
exists then the sense of their existence will become more powerful. 
Frege's thesis of reference and sense says that propositions containing proper 
names of. this sort are devoid of any truth values. He tries to make his point 
clear in holding that if someone accepts a sentence containing empty proper 
names, then he is forming a belief about the world and not about the language 
itself In the words of Gareth Evans: 
But what Sense can be made of a belief which literally has 
no truth value- which is neither correct nor incorrect? It is 
precisely this incomprehension, so effectively voiced by 
Dummett that makes Frege's choice of truth values as the 
semantic values of propositions so opposite^ "*. 
This position leaves us in a state of paradox. On the one hand empty proper 
names do not possess referent while on the other hand these names display 
sense. As maintained above, this shows the invalidity of Frege's argument. 
However, as I may infer, he presented this position so that the crises of empty 
proper names may be dealt with. Empty proper names that appear in movies, 
""Gareth Evans,The Varities ofReferences.Ed. John McDowell, 24. 
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stories, fictions cannot be called meaningless at once because these names 
reveal meaning in the context of that movie, story, or fiction. This could have 
been the reason that produced the temptation in Frege to call such names as 
having sense, even without reference. In spite of the invalidity of his argument, 
this position of treating empty names as containing sense sounds quite safe. 
Is there any possibility of making a reference of proper name without sense? It 
seems surprising to consider. Let us consider the example of "Pluto." Recently, 
it had been discovered that planet "Pluto" will'be no more in the category of 
planet in our solar system, being devoid of characteristic of planet. It used to be 
a planet in our solar system. What sense these singular expressions possess? 
What will be its mode of presentation as Frege held? The speaker of the 
language, who is not aware of this fact, will continue to add sense to it. But 
there seems to be no meaning being revealed by the term "Pluto" in terms of 
being a planet. However, reference is there as just a heavenly body present in 
the outskirts of the orbit of our solar system. 
2.5 Criticism of the theory: 
I have discussed above the invalidity of Frege's argument as far as notion of 
sense is concerned. On the one hand Frege considers sense to be an ingredient 
in determining meaning of proper names that consist of actual referent while on 
the other hand he endorses sense to even empty proper names. 
Descriptivism of Frege (and Russell) has been the principal target of Kripke's 
criticism. That's why it is very important to see how Kripke takes Frege's 
notion of sense? 
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In his seminal lecture Naming and Necessity, he holds: 
...Some people may give one sense to the name 'Aristotle', 
others may give another. But of course it is not only that; even a 
single speaker when asked 'What description are you willing to 
substitute for the name?' may be quite at a loss. In fact, he may 
laiow many things about him; but any particular thing that he 
.knows he may feel clearly expresses a contingent property of the 
object. If 'Aristotle' meant the man who taught Alexander the 
Great, then saying 'Aristotle was a teacher of Alexander the 
Great' would be a mere tautology. But surely it isn't; it expresses 
the fact that Aristotle taught Alexander the Great, something we 
could discover to be false. So, being the teacher of Alexander the 
Great cannot be part of [the sense of] the name . 
In the' above quote, Kripke is actually criticizing descriptivism of Frege. 
According to him, the sense of proper name 'Aristotle' is not. supplied by the 
sense of the definite description followed by the name. The sense does not 
reflect any essential property of the referent that may be stipulated to the name; 
rather it merely supplies contingent property of the referent. This contingent 
property is likely to change because of various reasons like passage of time, 
wrong attribution by the speaker etc. Hence, the sense of proper names cannot 
stipulate their reference. 
"' KripkQ. Saul. (1972) Naming and Necessity, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 
p.30. 
i 
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Kripke emphasizes that sense cannot contribute in fixing a reference by giving 
meaning of a proper name. The reference may^  not be fixed by a description; 
however a causal chain of communication stipulates the same. He further 
asserts: 
Frege should be criticized for using the term 'sense' in two 
senses. For he takes the sense of a designator to be its meaning; 
and he also takes it to be the way its reference is determined. 
Identifying the two, he supposes that both are given by definite 
descriptions. Ultimately, I will reject this second supposition too; 
but even were it right, I reject the first. A; description may b,e used 
as synonymous with a designator, or it may be used to fix its 
reference... 
Kripke's criticism is two-fold. He not only considers the rejection of the notion 
of sense to be the meaning of a proper name (designator) but also the way by 
which sense fixes the reference of a proper name. As maintained in the first 
chapter, the main problem before Kripke is: how to fix the reference of proper 
names? According to him, Fregean sense is unable to provide a way so that the 
referent of a proper name may be determined', flis criticism falls .heavy on the 
Fregean idea that sense is an ingredient in providing meaning to a proper name. 
While refuting descriptivism of Frege and Russell, Kripke takes the sense of 
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proper names to be the sense of their associated definite descriptions . 
Kripke's two fold criticism does not seem well directed because, as I see it. 
" Ahmed. Arif. (2007) Saul Kripke. New York, NY; London: Continuum.Arif Ahmed, p. 10. 
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Frege takes sense to be the meaning of proper names in terms of supplying 
referent (whetlier real or unreal). For the second sense i.e. the sense of fixing 
the right reference, there might special cases when the right reference may be 
fixed by the notion of sense. But that does not mean sense fails to do so in all 
cases of reference determination. Even by describing the contingent properties 
of referent, one may successfully make the reference by the use of proper name 
that stands for the referent. For example, a speaker describes "Aristotle" as 'the 
teacher of Alexander the Great'. Now, the sense of proper name "Aristotle" is 
being described by the sense of associated definite description. According to 
Kripke, the definite description shows contingent property of Aristotle; in some 
counterfactual situation the property may not satisfy the referent. 
But it does not mean that the property will not be satisfied by the referent in all 
situations. In some situation, the proper narne, say, "Aristotle", satisfies the 
property by virtue of which reference may be established. 
Ahmed criticizes the approach in holding that it does not show whether all 
proper names possess such sense. It also does not show whether it is necessary 
condition for all proper names to behave in such a way. As I see it, Frege 
nowhere tried to make a distinction among proper names in terms of with or 
without sense. In fact, he tried to ascribe the property of sense to all proper 
names,' including empty ones'. This ascription leads to invalidity of his 
argument. 
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2.6 Reference theory of proper names: 
The theory of reference is at the core of Frege's theory of meaning. The only 
meaning of proper names is the bearer that stands for it. Referent of proper 
names is something that determines the truth value of utterances passed during 
communication. This determination supplies meaning to those utterances. 
That's why referents of proper names are something very fundamental entity in 
providing meaning to them. The referent is also stable, rigid, permanent feature 
of proper names that is always there as an evidence of meaning. 
Frege takes the notion of reference as something central to the theory of 
meaning. The notion of sense works on the periphery as without reference there 
would be no such thing as meaning. According to Frege, mere presence of 
referent of any proper name is neither necessary nor sufficient condhion for 
making an understanding of the name. This is where the relevance of sense 
comes in. It was only to say that mere existence of referents does not guarantee 
the meaning of proper names. There must some way of determining it- the way 
is known as sense. 
Reference is essentially provides the substratum on which the theory of 
meaning rests. Frege takes reference as the meaning of proper names. 
Determining reference of proper names is as if one has determined the meaning 
of proper names. 
On the issue of reference, one interesting! comment is given by Donald 
Davidson. He suggests that because the theory may be justified empirically, 
there is no problem in dropping the reference. He thinks that in order to know 
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the meaning of a proper name, there is no need to protect the reference. He 
holds that "The theory gives up reference, then, as part of the cost of going 
empirical." 
Davidson rationalizes that the dropping reference does not mean that the 
semantics had also been dropped. But practically dropping reference would 
also drop the semantics of the propositions. If he would insist that the 
semantics of the propositions would be preserved then the reference would 
include it. In my view Davidson's claim of dropping reference is not well 
directed. It has been discussed above that it is only referent that determines the 
semantic value of propositions. The theory of meaning needs reference in order 
to equipped with empirical investigation. Reference dropping will drop the 
meaning of proper names also, and thereby, the propositions containing them. 
2.7 Alternative approach to Frege: Intentionality and Speech Act Theory 
Frege seems to be too much concerned about objective dimension of 
communication. He has ignored the natural aspect of human languages. Searle 
introduced the notion of intentionality which seems to present an alternative 
model to Frege's approach. Instead of Fregean obsession with truth conditions, 
he prefers intentionality as natural aspect of communication. The intentionality 
establishes an improved account of communication. 
Davidson, Donald (1984) Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. Oxford: Clarendon Press.138. 
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2.7.1 Intentionality: Searle 
Wayne A. Davis points out that Searle proposes intentional content associated 
with proper names as a substitution of what Frege describes as propositional 
content.^'^ This association provides understanding in the mind of speakers and 
hearers (provided both associates same intentional content). Searle utters 
"[T]he speaker refers to the object because and only because the object satisfies 
the Intentional content associated with the name." Searle insist on the 
competency of speakers to recognize the object for which he is using, what he 
calls identifying description. Any proper name, say, "Manmohan Singh" is 
capable of expressing intentional content. It is not necessary that speaker is 
able to describe that name. His recognition of a proper name as that name 
seems to be sufficient for identification of that name's referent. Searle's claim 
rests on the principle that proper names reflect a concept that corresponds to 
some unique objects. 
Searle advocates descriptivism asserting "an utterance of a proper name must 
convey a description just as the utterance of a definite description must if the 
reference is to be consummated." '^ He actually means that hearer identifies the 
utterance of speaker, in terms of recognizing the object, which the speaker 
refers to. Davis tries to provide counterexample to Searle. According to him, if 
the hearer of a demonstrative doesn't know anything about name, say, 
''Manmohan Singh", how can he identify the reference of that proper name? 
1 have already maintained that Frege, in his theory of meaning, deals with the propositional content. 
Searle, Intentionality: An Essay in the philosophy of Mind Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.234. 
' Searle (1969), Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language, Cambridge University Press, 
165. 
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Likewise, if a hearer, a layman doesn't know about 'the first person on moon,' 
how can he identify the same? But as I put it, it is already taken for granted that 
a hearer is known to a particular demonstrative or definite description which 
the speaker is talking about. Searle already took it for consideration in his 
theory of speech acts which has something to do with the hearer's side. 
Searle inquires in virtue of what we use and learn proper names. Again 
providing argument in favor of descriptivism, he says: 
...we can only identify the object (the necessary preliminary to 
teaching the name) by ostension or description; and, in both 
cases, we identify the object in virtue of certain of its 
characteristic. So now, it seems as if the rules for a proper name 
must somehow be logically tied to particular characteristics of the 
object in such a way that the name has a sense as well as a 
reference. 
Davis argues that proper names express a concept which a corresponding 
referent satisfies. For example, "Manmohan Singh" expresses a concept which 
no other name satisfies. This is what the notion of rigid designator is all about. 
A particular concept expresses a name that, what Kripke calls, rigidly 
designates that concept. Kripke adds metaphysics to it by inventing the notion 
* , • 
of possible worlds in which that concept exists. Searle asserts: 
-^Searle . "Proper Names," Mind, 67. 1958,167. 
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See also, Wayne A. Davis, "Intentionalism, descriptivism, and proper names", in John Searle's 
Philosophy of Language: Force, Meaning, and Mind, (ed.) Savas L. Tsohatzidis, Cambridge University 
Press, 2007, 102-24. 
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... if a proper name occurs in an existential statement, it seems 
tliat it must liave some conceptual or descriptive content. But if it 
has a descriptive content, then it seems Frege's theory must be 
correct, for what could that descriptive content be except the 
sense of the proper name? Thus, the occurrence of proper names 
in existential statements poses another grave difficulty of the 
non-sense theorists. 
According to Searle the referent of a proper name, say, "Dartmouth," is 
determined by the intentional content as we use it for the city. "Dartmouth" is 
not called according to Kripkean causal theory of reference, rather intentional 
content play primary role in determining the referent of proper names (instead 
of some causal chain). Even Fregean notion of "mock proper name" may have 
meaning based on the intentional content beipg used. The intentional content 
serves the purpose of stipulating reference of proper names. 
2.7.2 Speech Act Theory: Austin and Searle 
J.L.Austin's invention of Speech act theory tries to provide an alternative 
model to truth conditional approach of Frege. It does not refute Fregan doctrine 
but have tried to present what I call an evolutionary approach to Frege's thesis. 
It retdins Frege's propositional approach along with prescribing other 
dimensions of communication. Speech acts are jthose acts which compel one to 
Searle (1967), Proper names and DescriptionsAn P. Edwards (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 
vi, New York: Macmillan. P-488. 
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actually move in to action while performing communication. Austin calls such 
utterances as, performative wrterance .^-Examples include "I swim", "I criticize", 
"I praise" etc. These utterances may be categorized in terms of giving 
appreciation, making a request etc. lUocutionary force is a property of 
utterances which decides the kind of speech acts to be performed. If this is not 
the case, then utterances may be termed as what he calls hollow and the speech 
act, in such cases, may be called as infelicitous. 
Austin's approach does not reject proposition^l approach of Frege. Rather, he 
suggests that the fundamental function of passing statements is to create actual 
performances in the absence of which communication may not be established. 
The approach also rationalizes my severe criticism to Frege's notion of 
"mock thoughts" or "mock assertions" or "mock proper names" in maintaining 
that such utterances are simply hollow. Austin emphasizes that hollow 
utterances are parasite that infect the normal usage of language . Hence, the 
theory works as a buffer for Fregean thesis of empty proper names and 
provides strength to the same. The utterances may be used without any problem 
because the speaker is aware that he has not the intention to produce actual 
performances, be it the case of fiction.or movie or story etc. 
Both Frege and Austin consider the involvement of speaker and hearer but with 
different orientation. Frege seems to observe the process of communication 
from speaker's side while Austin just reverses the matter by looking the same 
from hearer's side. He calls this property of utterances as perlocution. 
'^Jamil, op.cil, 162-63. •' . 
'^'J.L. Austin, How to do Mngs witlj words (Oxford: Clarendori Press, 1962), 22. 
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Jolm R. Searle also considers the advancement over Frege's theory of proper 
names. According to him, sometimes a speaker wants to perform more than his 
utterances. This Hnguistic ability of speakers enables them to perform indirect 
speech acts. These acts are performed in such a way so as to pass the real 
meaning of utterance. For example, a speaker may say to his servant "Will you 
give me a cup of tea". Now, he is not requesting him to prepare a cup of tea. 
The intention is to pass an order so that a cup of tea may be provided to the 
speaker. If the speaker passes the same sentence to his colleague; the intention 
would be to make a request rather than passing orders. However, in both the 
cases, the literal expression of the sentence is same . 
I think that the notion of speech acts equally Works in case of identity terms. 
Frege uses metaphors "Aphla" and "Ateb," the intention is not to explain any 
geographical discovery about two mountains but to explain his notion of sense 
as mode of presentation. This is what Searle calls primary illocutionary act. 
The aspect focuses on the real intention behind speaker's utterance. Literal 
expression of any sentence reflects secondary illocutionary act which need to 
be the primary intention of the speaker. I have held that "there may be still 
another aspect (which may be called as tertiary) which suggests that both the 
names "Aphla" and "Ateb" refer to the same referent, i.e., mountain)."•^ .^  
The theory offers an alternative model to the classical problem of reference 
stipulation of proper names. The reference may be determined by specification 
of the kind of illocutionary act under which it is being made. This reference 
37 
See also, Searle, John (1979), Expression and Meaning (Studies in the theory of Speech acts) 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 30-32. 
^^im\\lop.cit,\lQ. 
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framing (identification and stipulation of the reference) is one of the primary 
objectives of any organized theory of meaning (Hke that of Frege). Kripke 
seems to praise the Frege's thesis as long as it works for reference 
identification and stipulation of proper names. However, Frege's (and 
Russell's) descriptivism had been the principle target of Kripke's criticism. 
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CHAPTER III 
DESCRIPTION THEORIES OF PROPER NAMES 
3.1 Description Theory of Proper Names: Classical Approach 
According to description theory, the referent of a proper name consists of 
unique properties, necessarily deUvered by the definite description attributed to 
that referent. The theory holds that the meaning of a proper name is same as its 
definite description because both share common properties that are uniquely 
attributed to the referent. In other words, a proper name is synonym to its 
definite description. 
The theory suggests that a proper name stands in direct relationship with its 
definite description. In other words, a proper name abbreviates a definite 
description. The association between a name and its associated description is 
established by the speakers of language of a certain speech community. 
For example, "Aristotle" abbreviates the description "the teacher of Alexander 
the Great." Now, the name "Aristotle" may be used in place of its 
corresponding description. The definite description plays pivotal role in 
determining the referent of a proper name. This practice of reference stipulation 
IS central to the descriptivism of Frege and Russell. The format of description 
theorists may be presented as follows: 
Frege and Russell are called as descriplivisis because both argue that the description theory of 
proper names is true and justified. 
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Suppose, there is a definite description-"D," denotes a proper name "p". The 
"D" doesn't denote anything except "p" in every situation. For example, the 
description "the author of Discourse on Method" denotes Rene Descartes 
because the description stands only for Rene Descartes. The description may 
be used as synonym of a proper name. ^ • 
I would like to call the theory as replacement theory because the description 
may replace a proper name with its corresponding definite description. 
Kripke's argument (especially modal argument) is actually a consequence of 
this theory. 
The description theorists deal with the problem of reference in terms of 
providing designation of proper names and denotation of the descriptions. It 
indicates that a competent speaker of our natural language will associates a 
proper name with the description provided; and this is how he got the 
reference of that proper name. 
Any theory of reference aims to provide the right kind of reference which a 
name designates. In this case, any competent speaker denotes some 
reference by mean of a proper name which applies uniquely to it. It creates a 
belief in the speaker, that such and such reference is designated by this 
proper name. The belief may be reinforced into his mind. In this way a 
reference is passed by one speaker to others in a certain speech community. 
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The descriptions supplied in the theory may be pure or impure-Kripke's 
argument is actually against impure aspect of description theory. 
A description is pure if and only if it provides a unique description about some 
particular referent. In order to be pure, the description also should not contain 
any indexical, demonstrative or even a proper name. Examples include, "the 
most poisonous snake of the world," "the tallest building in the world," "the car 
of the prime minister of India" etc. Rest of the possible definite descriptions 
may be called as impure. However, the thesis of Frege and Russell does not 
draw a firm distinction between pure and impure aspect of definite description. 
In Naming and Necessity, Kripke's argument seems to be more directed 
towards pure aspect of descriptivism""*. Hence, pure descriptivism has got 
central importance because Kripke tries to refute the same. 
According to the thesis of Frege and Russell (as Kripke pointed out), a proper 
names do abbreviate a description. We may consider that "Shahjahan" 
abbreviates "the founder of Taj Mahal." So, if "Shahjahan" uniquely satisfies 
the definite description; then what the therm "Taj Mahal" satisfies? Or what 
"Taj Mahal" refers to? Now, "Taj Mahal" requires another description like 
"one of the most beautiful buildings in the world" or 'the symbol of eternal 
love." In this way, eternal love requires further description and so on. 
So, does it mean that the description, that are being provided, must contain 
some proper name or can there be such sort of description that don't include 
any name, indexical or demonstrative? There are definite descriptions of such 
sort which may be called as pure definite description. Hughes holds that 
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impure aspect of descriptivism seems plausible to retain because if name are 
being supplied to include in definite description, then names in English 
language v^ 'ould come to exhaust and at last will found to move in a circle"*'. 
3.2 Description Theory of Proper Names: Modern Approach 
According to the modern approach of description theory, a proper name is 
attached to a set or cluster of descriptions which uniquely, necessarily and 
analytically satisfies the referent of a proper name. The idea is against directly 
referential theory of proper names. In other words, proper names refer to some 
uniquely attributed to cluster of descriptions which are uniquely true of that 
name for which they are being used. This set or clusters of descriptions supply 
the sense of that proper name."*^  
Searle claims that the referent of a proper name is determined by a set or family 
of descriptions rather than a unique one description (as the classical theory 
suppose). Instead of associating one definite description to a proper name, a 
group or set or clusters of descriptions correspond to a proper name. This 
cluster serves the function of reference determination and even expresses the 
sense of the name."*^  
Cluster theory suggests that a proper name should satisfy most of the 
descriptions corresponding to it. The cluster of descriptions may be of different 
sort: some of them may be weaker, while sonie of them are what Kripke calls 
'" Hughes, Christopher. (2004), Kripke: Names, Necessity, andldentity,p.5-6. 
''^  Kripke argues against Fregean sense in holding that none of the attached description of a proper 
name is sufficient to provide essential property of the referent. See also, Naming and Necessity, 30. 
''^ See also, Devitt,M. and Sterelny, K. (1999) Language and Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of 
Language, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers), 2nd edn revised. 
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weighted most '^ description. I will prefer to call dominant description of this 
sort, as the description is dominant on the rest of the available description. For 
example, for "Aristotle," several descriptions are available like "the man who 
taught Alexander the Great," "the man who was fond of dogs," "the great 
philosopher of antiquity," "the father of zoology" etc. Out of this group or 
family of descriptions, the description "the man who was fond of dogs" is most 
weak while the description "the great philosopher of antiquity" seems to 
dominate on the rest of the descriptions. However, other description like "the 
father of zoology" may also be included in the category of dominant 
descriptions. But there seem to be no methodology to determine the dominant 
most description. Kripke was also aware of this difficulty. He holds "A theory 
really has to specify how this weighting goes." 
The theory tries to present a mere flexible, open-textured version of the 
descriptivist's idea that names are nothing but abbreviated descriptions. 
Hence; the idea follows that if "Aristotle" exists, then "Aristotle" uniquely 
satisfies most or weighted most or dominant descriptions in availajble cluster of 
descriptions. 
Now, if only "Aristotle" and nobody else satisfy the properties attributed to 
"Aristotle," then only "Aristotle" does so. But is there any principle basis to 
consider which description is the dominant or weighted most? Now, this sort of 
description reflects the sense of "Aristotle" (as per classical description theory). 
'"'Kripke, Saul, op.cit. 64. 
''V6/d:,65. 
''^Hughes,0/).c//.4. 
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It is necessary, analytic, and a priori that a thing is n if and only if it is the 
unique satisfier of most dominant description attached to the proper name. 
Kripke too tries to consider such an account while presenting six theses on 
what he calls the cluster concept of theory of n^mes.''^  But the updated version 
of description theory, too involved in Kripke's criticism against the approach. 
He depicts that there may be several counterfactual situations in which 
Aristotle would not have had most of the properties attributed to him . But in 
virtue of what the speaker knows dominant description attributed to a particular 
proper name? As per Kripke's conviction, historical chain of communication 
reinforces the most dominant description. 
In Lecture II of Naming and Necessity, Kripke puts a condition on the six 
theses; which he provided for cluster theory. Hfe suggests that the theory must 
not go circular. It means that term must not involve itself while determining the 
referent of a proper name. According to Kripke, Kneale tries to present a theory 
of reference. For "Socrates," he says "Socrates" must simply mean a particular 
person called "Socrates." This is what Kripke means by the violation of non-
circulatory condition of the determination of reference. There must be some 
independent way of reference determination. This is what we already 
discussed as impure, hybrid or mixed aspect of description theory. Hence, the 
pure description must not be circular i.e. any singular term or proper name like 
"Socrates" must not be involve itself while a description is being provided 
about the term. 
"'Kripke, op.cit, 64-65. 
^^Ibid, 65. 
^'ibidlX-i:,. 
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3.3 Merits of Description Tiieories: 
There are several merits of description theories (of both classical and modern) 
of proper names. Kripke observes that a definite description which a proper 
name abbreviates, describe about a particular referent; otherwise how one is 
going to differentiate one referent from other. For example, "Barack Obama" 
refers to a particular person by mean of a definite description "the person who 
is the first black president of United States of America, belonging to muslim 
background," Now, "Barak Obama" abbreviates a defmite description 
attributed to it. The description which speakers use, are generally from the 
achievement of the person to which we are refereeing. 
The doctrine of Frege and Russell (as Kripke holds) that proper names function 
as abbreviated descriptions seems to be useful to refer to their referents. In 
most of the cases, speakers may be successful in this practice i.e. to refer to 
some particular description that uniquely stands for the referent. 
Some proper names like "Aphla" and "Ateb" (Frege's classical example) 
consist of same referent but they have different meanings or what we may call 
different informative content. Both proper names i.e. "Aphla" and "Ateb," 
share the description "the mountain 5000 meters high" from northern and 
southern region respectively. Later, it was found that both travelers were 
actually talking about the same mountain. If we hold, this poiiit of view of 
Frege, then both the names are intersubstitutable i.e. substitution of one proper 
laame with another is not going to change the truth value of the expressed 
]3roposition. Frege observed that new discovery, of "Aphla" and "Ateb," 
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informative. Now, "Aphla" is expected to abbreviate tlie description "tlie 
mountain over 5000 meters high from northern region' and similarly for 
"Ateb," "the mountain over 5000 meters high from southern region." 
Kripke argues that co-referential definite description may not be substituted 
salva veritate for each other in belief contexts.^ "^  But if we suppose that proper 
names are directly referential i.e. without involving definite descripfions, then 
it will be difficuh to explain the non-intei;substitutability of co-referential 
definite description^'. Looking this point, Frege-Russell thesis that name are 
abbreviated descriptions, seems to possess utility. In spite of the fact that 
"Aphla" and "Ateb" are referring to the same referent, both names got different 
meaning. 
Now, in virtue of what they have got different meanings? Frege would have 
answered because of different ways of presentation, of the same mountain, on 
the part of two travelers. Dummett calls this property as different cognitive 
values. This is what Fregean sense is all jabout. In such cases, different 
information is being provided. So what information is being provided here? 
The information is that "Aphla" is "Ateb." 
3.4 Demerits of the Description Theories: 
In spite of enjoying several merits, the description theory possesses some major 
drawbacks. The description theory seems to be unable to provide a necessary, 
•'"Hughes, op.cil.2 
Kripke, "A Puzzle about Belief. See also. Naming and Necessity, p-28. 
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sufficient criterion of determining the reference of a proper name. The supphed 
description may mislead the speaker to identify the referent correctly. 
If "Socrates" is followed by some sort of description like "the master of Plato;" 
then there seems to be very little possibility that every competent speaker of 
language is going to use the name followed by the same description. One may 
not be successful in determining reference of a certain proper name like 
"Socrates" (I may call my dog as 'Socrates'). Hence, no condition is being 
provided which is sufficient for identification of proper name. 
Fregean sense had been defended by Saul' Kripke in his serninal lectures 
Naming and Necessity. Frege seems to concern about one of the most 
fundamental problem of philosophy of language i.e. how the referent of a 
certain proper name may be determined and stipulated? This problem seems to 
be central in the invention of the notion of sense by Frege. I have already 
maintained that according to Frege sense is a mode of presentation in the 
determination of a particular reference. 
Now, it is neither necessary nox sufficient for the speaker to present a particular 
object in the same way. Hence, in every case pf reference determination, the 
5;ense is going to differ and thereby different meanings will be revealed. If a 
sipeaker says "Kripke won Schock Prize in logic and philosophy in 2001;" then 
according to description theory, it means same as uttering "the author of 
Naming and Necessity won Schock Prize in logic and philosophy in 2001." 
"Kripke" is synonym of the definite description "the author of Naming and 
Necessity.'" Now, the former utterance seems necessary while the later does not 
seems so. If we talk in terms of modal intuitions, we may infer that it is mere a 
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contingent fact that "Kripke" won Schock prize in logic and 
philosophy in 2001. Some other person liiight have won the prize. 
The theory does not explain whether one heavy description is 
enough to determine the reference of a proper name. Secondly, a 
competent speaker of our natural language may not find a 
description in the cluster of descriptions belonging to a particular 
name. He may use some other description which is not present in 
the cluster. In doing so, he may successfully determine a reference 
of a proper name. 
Thirdly in this theory, there seems to be no definite criteria of 
choosing one sef '^ of descriptions rather than other. Hence, several 
speakers of language may ascribe different sense to the same 
proper name as per their inventory of descriptions about the name. 
If a speaker selects only one description then there will be 
retrogression towards the previous version of description theory of 
proper names. There also lies a threatening to get out of the track 
of determining reference in case he wrongly identifies a name with 
a set of descriptions. 
Fourthly, there seems to be ambiguity involved in the theory 
because it does not explain whether the same set of description is 
used by all competent speakers of the language in a certain speech 
community. 
•'' I will prefer to use the word set instead of cluster as used by modern descriptivists. 
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3.5 Variable Description Tlieory:^ ^ 
i^ i.ccording to this theory, proper names correspond to different intentional 
contents, in different contexts. These contents refer to the same object but 
according to variation in the situations. For example a person utters, "Sir Syed 
i^ lhmad Khan was a social reformer" to express the proposition that "Mahatma 
(jandhi" was a social reformer. Now, "social reformer" displays the intentional 
content. Davis holds "...On the variable description theory, like indexicals, 
proper names are associated with different contents in different contexts." 
The point is that the description may not correspond to the intentional content 
of the speaker. The theory may also be explained in terms of Searle's speech 
act theory. Speaker's meaning (what Ssmleprimary aspect) and literal meaning 
{secondary aspect) may not correspond to each other. There may be huge gap 
between a description uttered and the meaning which the speaker wishes to 
communicate. 
3.6 Some remarks on Description Theories: Kripke 
The theory prescribes that a set of descriptions is followed by a proper name. 
According to Kripke, in some counterfactual situation "Aristotle might have 
been died in his infancy.'"* Now, it is not necessary that the name satisfies the 
unique set of descriptions. Kripke argues that proper names are rigid 
designators i.e. they designates the same object in all possible worlds while the 
descriptions abbreviated by the name does not' behave as a rigid designation. 
Hence, description theories are implausible to accept. 
•' The attribution of variable definite description theory goes to Searle, See Davis, 117. 
''^ Ibid.,]]S. 
'"Kripke, op.cit,3l. 
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For example, 
a) "Socrates" was fond of cats. 
b) The master of Plato and the founder of dialectic method were 
fond of cats. 
One may assume that "Socrates" would have,died in his infancy and some 
other person would have been the master and founded the dialectic method. 
Now, a) is true if and only if that person is fond of cats, but the truth of b) lies 
in its truthfulness whether in actual situation or in some counterfactual 
situation. "Socrates" will continue to remain 'Socrates' in all possible worlds 
that's why behaving as a rigid designator. 
On the other hand, the description entirely depend on the person who is such 
and such, it may be "Socrates" or some other person. Hence, contrary to 
descriptivist conception, the name is not goihg to abbreviate, any description 
\^ 'hether in actual or counterfactual situation. According to Kripke, in modal 
contexts a) and b) results on the following: 
c) "Socrates" might not have been "Socrates". 
d) "Socrates" might not have been fond of cats. 
n f^lects truthfulness, but c) seems to be always false, as "Socrates" can't 
remain except being "Socrates" ( However, if "Socrates" would have been 
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CE.Ued 'Cosrates'^'', then 'Socrates' would have been called 'Cosrates'. But 
here, we don't bother to go in to such details). 
Kripke criticizes Fregean notion of sense and prefer to cultivate only theory of 
reference and abandon the theory of sense, being non-rigid i.e. the notion of 
sense and thereby its meaning would continue to change in some counterfactual 
situation. This treatment seems to solve the shortcomings experienced by 
description theory of proper names. 
Hence, the strategy selected to solve these problems is to abandon the notion of 
meaning, whether in the form of Fregean sense or in the form of Russell's 
connotation of description. 
3.7 Some more objections and suggestions for Description Theories: 
The description theories assume that supplies of description or their clusters 
would be sufficient for any speaker to determine its reference. 
Michael Devitt tries to provide a solution to the various problems suffered by 
description theories. His suggestion is that a name may be synonymous with 
description which should be rigidified. Further, he suggests the attachment of 
rigidly operators with the description. For instance, such operator like 'in 
actual world' may be added in the description 'the person who, in the actual 
world, was the master Plato and the founder of Dialectic Method' looks so as to 
designate Socrates in all possible worlds. Now, the intention is to re-claim the 
^^Hypothetical/Imaginary name. 
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slogan of description theorists that "names do abbreviate a description", in 
claiming that such sort of description would behave rigidly. 
The description theories may not be abandoned unless a superior theory 
replaces the same. Kripke's argument.is directed towards the central theme that 
all description theories provides a reference of the name by some speaker, in 
some using application of proper names within a speech community. 
Providing arguments against descriptivism (Frege and Russell), Kripke insist 
that a name designates a particular object. This association of name with a 
particular object provides impression in the mind of speaker in the form belief 
The belief leads to identification of the object by the supplied description. 
Now, according to Kripke this picture does not seem plausible because it is 
neither necessary nor sufficient that a speaker would have such specified 
beliefs that identify the object. Hence, the problem of reference determination 
and its stipulation remains unanswered. 
It seems that the expectations of description theories are too high. The theories 
expect that every competent speaker of language must have such beliefs which 
functions sure shortly so that reference may be determined. Epistemologically, 
we may hold that the expected beliefs are in the form of knowledge (satisfying 
knowledge conditions- truth, justification and belief). 
The beliefs have to be identified by the speaker as true. For example, what 
descriptions may be followed by proper name "Plato"? The description 
theorists may supply descriptions like "the master of Aristotle," "the disciple of 
Socrates." But are these descriptions sufficient for creating a belief about the 
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identification of an object? These descriptions again involve other proper 
names, and make the description impure. 
Here, there seems to be an urgent need to supply the description; but no 
description independently comes to fill this lacunae. It leads to what Kripke 
calls "circulatory condition," a vicious circle seems to be created here. Michael 
E'evitt thinks that even some great- scholar try to dig the historical facts 
regarding a particular proper name, he will be unable to present a description 
vvhich is completely devoid of proper names. Thus a situation is created in 
which a proper name requires again a proper name to describe itself 
Moreover description theorists assume that speaker and hearer of language are 
not going to make any mistake in identification of objects. In other words, they 
have taken for granted that the speakers and hearer are going to use a proper 
name correctly i.e. they have performed right identification. On the other hand, 
their beliefs too don't seem to be justified. In the absence of justification, they 
may not claim their information about the proper name, as per the conditions of 
knowledge set forth by Gettier." 
It is a matter of sincere observation that people tend to make mistakes about 
historical figures. Considering the example of historical proper name "Gautam 
the Buddha," then we find that there are various possibilities of existential 
mistakes. For example, "Gautam the Buddha" is associated with the 
description, say, "the founder of Budhism," "the person who gave its first 
sermon at Samath (India)," and "the greatest enlightened man existed in 322 
B.C." etc. The possibility of even non-existence of "Gautam the Buddha" 
" Gettiei-. Edmund, "Is justified true belief knowledge?" Voi.23, 1963, 121-23. 
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remains open. May be "Gautam the Buddha" designates nothing or may be it is 
just a void proper name. 
Kripke tries to demonstrate that such situation may arise in which no historical 
evidence is available regarding a particular proper name in question like 
"Gautam the Buddha." 
Even the greatest scholastic work falls short of supplying a reliable, justified, 
unique description about the name considered. However, the possibility of 
discovery of such evidence remains open. Hence, a speaker's belief may not 
identify the reference in question, and hence not necessarily true. 
Suppose a person narrates a story about a man but audience is completely 
CO 
unaware that it is just a narration and not reality. In doing so he is actually 
introducing some imaginary person but the acceptors (audience) is unaware of 
this fact. On the basis of this introduction, information is passed to others in 
similar fashion. As a result a linear chain of cornmunication is developed. Now, 
even if we find such person in reality, just by coincidence, the speaker was not 
referring to that person. 
Kiipke considers an example of Godel Theorum. Godel is the person who 'first 
proved the incompleteness of arithmetic'. Eventually, it is found that his 
student "Schmidt" actually proved the theorem and somehow found dead in 
some mysteries and unexplained circumstances. "Godel" availed the golden 
opportunity and presented the theorem by his name. Now, if somebody asserts 
that Godel first proved the incompleteness of arithmetic, he is actually referring 
to Schmidt (according to present counterfactual situation). But even in this 
^^  ] have provided a detailed account of such eases in 'Using application of proper name'. 
68 
situation, "GQdel" will continue to be "Godel" being rigid designator. 
However, the phrase "Godel" first proved the incompleteness of arithmetic 
becomes false if the situation is realized. But 'Godel' will continue to be 
"Godel" and can't be replaced by "Schmidt." 
This illustration clearly demonstrates that speaker's beliefs used in reference 
identification seem to be insufficient. Thus, by using a name speaker's beliefs 
may identify a referent; still he may not refer to the particular referent in 
question. W.V.O. Quine also tries to portray the picture of those proper names 
which are not occurring referentially i.e. their reference determination does not 
sound justified. Like in our previous example, if I believe that "Michael is 
going to qualify competifive examination," then this statement is not going to 
W(3rk as far as referential determination is concerned. The name "Michael" may 
fall a victim of referential opacity.^  Hence, the problem of reference 
determination still seems to remain unsolved. Quine provides counterexample 
against principle of identity^" prescribes that a proper name is no more an 
abbreviated description. 
3.8 The Approach of Bertrand Russell: 
The principle basis of description theory may be described as the criteria for 
referent identification of a certain proper name. Now this principle seems to 
regulate the functioning of proper names i.e. to refer something. 
Quine says that we may speak of the contexts like "is unaware that..." and "believes that..." as 
referentially opaque. •' . 
^^ See W.V.O. Quine, 'Reference and Modality' in Reference and Modality, edited by Leonard Linsly. 
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The classical approach of Frege i.e. every object is followed by a particular 
proper name is partially accepted by Bertrand Russell. According to Frege, 
objects are the meaning of proper names. I have maintained that the approach 
may be called as object-oriented theory of proper names; because the approach 
prescribes the orientation of objects towards proper names. Russell asserts that 
proper names are devoid of meaning but they serve the purpose of denotation. 
In propositions such as "This rose is red," connectives like "is," "red" contains 
meaning but are devoid of denotation. However, "this rose" possesses 
denotation but reflects no meaning. As per the conviction of Russell, this 
functions as demonstrative expression and is known as logical proper name. ' 
Such names would refer to something without describing the attribute of that 
thing. And refer to the thing itself, iridependent of any description behind the 
nsme. 
He suggests that a proper name is devoid of meaning but serves the function of 
denotation, while predicate part of an atomic sentence possesses meaning but 
devoid of denotation. However, certain words that finish with the suffix- "ness" 
like redness behave similar to the functioning of proper names i.e. of denoting 
the objects; and are devoid of meaning. Verbs^ and adjectives are equipped with 
some sort of definiteness like 'the horse who won the race last week' serves in 
denotation and possess meaning also, in the sense of demonstrative operator 
like this or that which reveals the meaning of whole phrase presented and its 
denotation will be reflected by its meaning as per the situations and contexts at 
Bertrand Russell, Foundation of Logic, edited by Alasdair Urquhart with tiie assistance of Albert C. 
Lewis, Vol.4 (Routledge, London, 1994), 284. Published in the form of collected paper of Bertrand 
Russell 
*"' Bertrand Russell, The Philosophy of Logical Atomism, reprinted in Logic and Knowledge, 200. 
70 
that time. In this sense, the word 'horse' is a part of meaning of "the horse who 
won the race last week" and the "horse" in question is a part of the denotation 
as per the RusselHan treatment. The description attached with the word "horse" 
distort its behavior and compels is to act as a proper name. 
Perhaps one of the most controversial issues in the philosophy of language of 
Fiege is that of void proper names which we have already defended. It is 
worthwhile to consider the conception of Russell regarding the issue of void 
proper names. 
Russell does not seem to agree with the Fregean treatment of void proper 
names, in holding that such names are not to be treated in the category of 
proper names. But as a matter of fact fictitious names consist of some sort of 
characters i.e. descriptions. Thus, such names n\ay be replaced by'descriptions. 
One may be substituted for another. 
In dealing with two fundamental questions viz. what is to be done of phrases 
which contain meaning but devoid of any referent? And what are the 
cii-cumstances under which the names are going to denote something, Russell 
tried to portray the picture of void proper names and found that in such cases 
names don't denote in spite of the fact that form of their proposition is similar 
to those proposition which denote something. 
According to Russell, examples like, "the present king of France is bald" is 
neither true nor false because it is devoid of denotation. According to him, 
words and phrases may denote while lacking meaning, may mean while lacking 
denotation and there is also possibility that words may both mean and denote. 
He depicts: 
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In 'Socrates endured death, 'Socrates' and 'death' are both terms. Here 'death' 
denotes the same object as is meant by died (omitting the tense from the latter); 
the word "death" is a proper name, for it denotes without meaning, but it is 
unUke "Socrates" in that what it denotes can also be meant. Thus, 'death' is the 
proper name of a function.'''^  
Russell's conception of denotation is.subject to much criticism as we will see 
later on. Now, if we consider "Aristotle was the master of Alexander," both 
terms "Aristotle" and "Alexander" denote and the term "the master of 
Alexander" both denotes and mean. Now, "the master of Alexander" is definite 
description of the word "Aristotle," both denote the object (person) in the same 
way. The expression as a whole leads to some meaning and also operates to 
de;note an individual. 
R(iplacing "Aristotle" with any other word will distort the truth value of 
proposition. If the phrase is not a historical fact, then the proposition expressed 
by the phrase will be neither true nor false (as in case of Frege's notion of 
"mock proper names" occur in the "mock thoughts"). 
Russell was very careful in the analysis of proposition by applying his theory 
of denotation. In simple propositions substitution of words with others, would 
pnsserye the making of propositions, provided the word should not be part of 
any word other than it which also denotes, For example, phrase "Russell 
motivated Wittgenstein to study philosophy," the words "Russell" and 
" Russell,B. op.cit. 287. 
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"V/ittgenstein" may be replaced by other words and the proposition (other than 
this) would be preserved. 
A proper name derived from a definite description denotes but may not be 
fragment of phrase's denotation e.g. "the author of Tractatus Logico-
philosophicus'' denotes "Wittgenstein," but this certainly means that 
"V/iittengstein" is not a fragment of this phrase. On the other hand, 
"V/iittengstein" as a proper name denotes "the author of Tractatus Logico-
philosophicus" and has meaning. 
In our common language practice, one may use a proper name in place of its 
associated description. But is there lays a difference between using a proper 
name and description. Russell holds "A name in the narrow sense is merely a 
symbol arbitrary selected to designate some object; but a description is not 
arbitrary, being determined by the designations of its parts." '^^  
Russell even holds that meaning is not a subjective property, even in the case 
of translation, a sort of objectivity must be maintained. The meaning of a 
proper name may be a consequence of speaker's intention, belief, prepositional 
attitude etc. 
He maintains that there are certain words like "this," "thaf etc. which directly 
reier to objects in question i.e. provides immediate acquaintance and can't be 
substituted by any description whatsoever. Hence, these demonstratives may be 
described as genuine names owing to their inbuilt capacity of denoting objects 
immediately. They function as what Russell says ambiguous proper names 
because they can be used for different persdns at the same time. Moreover, 
'^ "p.ussell.B.o/i.d/. 316. 
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users of language (speakers/hearers) may be distracted in having 
communication. 
It may be inferred that "this" goes on'changing every time we use it to refer to 
different objects at the same time or at different times and in this way its 
meaning also changes. 
Like Frege, Russell was also looking for some sort of reconstruction in the 
proposition of our natural language, but he too, like Frege, did not provide a 
map or procedure; how we can do it with the fragments of our natural 
language. Robert J. Clack utters "....Russell doesn't even attempt to carry out 
an actual reconstruction of ordinary language. At most, he suggests how 
various particular types of proposition could be re-cast so as to improve their 
forms." Hence, it may be asserted that Russell seems to engage only in 
theoretical perspective of such reconstruction. 
3.9 Proper names and Definite Description: Donellan 
The description theorists think of referential use of proper name in synonym 
with the referential use of definite description. Donnellan thinks that Russell 
never bothered about the later. According to him, Russell's phrase denoting is 
different from referring. Strawson, who was also advocate of the referential use 
of definite description, according to Donnellan, also did not observe that 
Robert', J. Clack, Bertrand Russell's Philosophy of Language , Martinus Nijhoff, The Haque, 
Netherlands, 1972.,35. 
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definite description may be used non-referenlially while occurring in the same 
sentence.*'^  
Donnellan thinks a sort of bifurcation in the'use of definite descriptions. He 
thinlcs two uses of them i.e. referential and attributive. He prescribes that the 
description may be used in either way. Perhaps the gigantic assumption of 
Russell regarding the working of definite description is that they may be 
described independently of a using application in a certain speech community. 
He further moved in holding that there lies a presupposition on the part of the 
users of language while making a definite description fit for the concerned 
object.' This presupposition suggests the referring function of definite 
description. ' , „ 
The essence of Donnellan's idea is that attributive use of definite description is 
something essential to the use of definite description rather than referring. 
Former provides information about the concerned object, even when no 
reference is to be made. 
He further holds that in both uses of definite descriptions, there lies a 
presupposition, but of different sort. In the attribute use, there lays a specificity 
regarding the concerned object. That's why presupposition is also originated by 
this sort of use. In the referential use it is objecf-specific, concerned only about 
what to refer, even if it is not fitted by the description(s). 
It may be common perception that the kind of treatment of the uses of definite 
description, which Donnellan suggests, seems to be move around the belief of 
speakers. He was himself aware of this fact. He asserts that the presence or 
'"^DonneIlan,K.S. op.cil.p. 281-304. 
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absence of beliefs, while using definite description, makes no difference in 
referential or attributive use of definite description. Hence, speaker's beliefs 
don't determine about the use of definite description taken into consideration. 
Donnellan thinks that Russell's theory is applicable to attributive use of 
definite descriptions only as Russell used, the word denote. He also 
maintains that speaker's intention also plays an important role in determining 
the use of definite description, he intended to describe. 
Russell's intention was to discover referential function of an expression. The 
function of descriptions is to pick out or trigger thoughts of the thing that 
uniquely satisfies it. 
I think that Donnellan's refutation of Russell and Strawson is not well directed. 
Firstly, it is based on the speaker's beliefs and not about the thoughts. Any 
content available in the definite description riiay or may not reflect a fact. 
Hence, the proposition may turn out to be true or false. Speaker's belief seems 
to play no role in referring a certain thing because his belief may vary while 
actual reference remains the same; every speaker would like to refer same 
referent differently as per his belief 
I think that Strawson's position seems to be more justified. He did not mix two 
uses of definite descriptions, as Donnellan held. Rather, he tried to portray the 
right picture of the functioning of the definite descriptions. I think that it is the 
property of the definite descriptions to be used referentially as well as 
attributively simultaneously or independently from each other. 
"lbid292. 
Donnellan seems to be quite justified in ascribing the denotation with attributive use of the definite 
description. 
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Thirdly, Donnellan insists that attributive use of definite description is 
something essential to them as such use provides some information about the 
thing being referred. But in virtue of what such information is provided? What 
is the need to involve in such practices? Obviously, after all we use the 
information to refer something or some thought in speaker's mind while 
making utterances in a certain speech community. In this sense, I think that 
referential use of definite description is more fundamental than attributive use. 
It is this property of the definite description which Russell tries to equate with 
the functioning of genuine proper name. In order to refute the aforesaid issue, 
in his seminal lectures-A'a/wwg and Necessity, Kripke created several counter-
examples to refute the description theory of Frege and Russell. 
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CHAPTER IV 
CAUSAL THEORY OF PROPER NAMES: KRIPKE 
4.1 Introduction: Causal Theory of Proper Names 
The credit of propounding causal theory of proper names may go to Saul 
Kripke while delivering his seminal lectures Naming and Necessity. But in fact 
he never introduced this theory. He is providing arguments against 
descriptivism of Frege and Russell. The argument had taken the form of what 
we may call causal theory of proper names. Kripke himself holds "...I may not 
have presented a theory, but I do think that I have presented a better picture 
than that given by description theorists"^ .^ The theory may be better explained 
by reference borrowing practices. 
Kripke argues against Frege and Russell's descriptivism that their position fails 
to provide the reference of a proper name. But what is the alternative approach 
so that'the reference of a proper name may be stipulated? He says that a name 
may be introduced by mean of initial baptism.' The baptism may be in terms of 
providing reference-fixing description or by ostension.^ ° 
In the later type, an introducer may introduce a proper name by mean of some 
direct contact with the referent or nominandum or by some impure 
demonstrative (involving sortal demonstrative). For example, a speaker may 
utter: 
'''^Kripke,S. o/?.a7.p. 97. 
Hughes, op.01136. 
78 
a) We name this planet as Pluto 
It involves sortal "We" and demonstrative "this." In the description theory, 
reference-stipulating practices of proper names may be performed by means of 
providing definite description that may fix the reference of a proper name. For 
example, "Dolly"^' is 'the first cloned sheep (a mammal) in the world, from 
somatic cells' which is, pure description. It is natural to consider that introducer 
may introduce fictitious name or hypothetical name such as "Unicorn". In 
either case, there is no actual referent available. Such names are what I call 
void proper names. 
Sometimes a baptized name co-refers different referent, when two people 
endorse the same name to different referents. Kripke himself realizes this 
possibility. He utters: 
... when the name is 'passed from link to link', the receiver of the 
name must, I think, intend when he learns it to use it with the 
same reference as the man from whom he heard it. If I hear the 
name 'Napolean', and decide it would be a nice name for my pet 
aardvark, I do not satisfy this condition. 
These are the cases of superimposition of &n existing name on the newly 
introduced referent (as in Kripke's pet aardvark). This practice had been 
performed intentionally. If Kripke says, "Napolean" is very mischievous, then 
"Dolly (a mammal) sheep was the first one to be cloned by Keith Campbell ,Ian Wilmut and their 
colleagues at the Roslin Institute (Scotland). See also wikipedia.See also, McLaren A (2000). "Cloning: 
pathways to a pluripotent future".5de/7ce288 (5472): 1775-80. doi:10.1126/science.288.5472.1775. 
PMID 10877698. See also, Wilmut I, Schnieke AE, McWhir J, Kind AJ, Campbell KH (1997). "Viable 
offspring derived from fetal and adult mammalian cells". Nature 385 (6619): 810-3. 
doi:10.1038/385810aO. PMID 9039911. 
" Jamil 161. 
"Kripke, Saul, 0/7.c;7. 302. 
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he means "Napolean" for new usage of the name. The hearer may understand 
what he means, provided the hearer is aware of the new context which he had 
endorsed. Hence, the name "Napolean" co-refers for two referents (obviously 
these can be more than two). 
Now, changes have been made in the usage of a proper name is on the hearer's 
side (acceptor's side).'''* It is also possible that the name may be used (in similar 
fashion as above) unintentionally on the point of acceptors. Kripke observes 
that the name "Madagascar" is being used for an island of Africa and not for its 
real referent i.e. the mainland of Africa. Now, the new referent is superimposed 
on the old one, by the usage of the name. 
Now, a new using application of proper name has been started. A new 
conventional practice of "Madagascar" has been enforced by the recent 
acceptors of the name. In this case, it seems plausible to abandon the old using 
application. Evans example clearly demonstrates that these are the cases of 
accidental, unintentional usage of proper names. However, the usage may be 
superimposed on new referents intentionally as in Evans example of using 
"Madagascar" for new referent. Evans's example "Madagascar" presents 
counterexample to causal theory. According to him, if the theory would have 
been right, then it would have designated to original mainland of Africa, 
instead of referring to an island. Searle thinks that Madagascar's referent is 
qualified by the intentional content of the speaker.^ ^ 
"' See also, Hughes, op.cit.37. 
See also, John R. Searle, Inlenlionalily: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 237 
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tLripke is not trying to provide what he calls a full blown theory of the 
reference of proper names. He is rather considering the possibilities of the sort 
tnat we have just discussed. Hence, he is not providing an organized theory of 
the reference of proper names. The reference of a proper name is fixed by 
originally baptized name (arbitrarily or by fixing a description) or non-baptized 
one (wrong use of a proper name) as in case of "Madagascar" or by what 
Hughes calls referential shiftJ^ as in case of usage of "Napolean"'(as shown in 
Kripke's example).^ ^ In one place, Kripke emphasized: 
I believe that many important theoretical issues about the 
semantics of names (probably not all) would be largely 
unaffected had our conventions required that no two things shall 
be given the same name... For language as we have it, we could 
speak of names having a unique referent if we adopted a 
terminology, analogous to the practice of calling homonyms 
distinct objects count as distinct nahies. This terminology 
certainly does not agree with the most common usage, but I think 
it may have a great deal to recommend it for theoretical 
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purpose . 
[t seems that for a theory of reference (however, it need not be organized), 
there is no harm to acquire a method by which usage of same name (as Hughes 
calls though phonetically and orthographically indiscernible); determines the 
names as different, each referring to an intended referent. 
""Hughes, 39. 
Kripke points out tlnat it is not necessary tJiat every name must got reference by mean of some initial 
baptism. 
^^Naming and Necessity, 7-8. 
Hence, Kripke's using of "Napoleon" applies to tiis pet while the occasion on 
which he borrowed this name "Napoleon" refers to, in fact, another historical 
man under discussion. And likewise, as in Evans's example, the use of 
"Madagascar" by Marco Polo refers to "the island of Africa" while the native 
of Africa used to use the name "Madagascar" for the mainland of Africa7^ 
I believe that Kripke's suggestion provides a revolutionary approach for the 
theory of reference of proper names. Evans elsewhere describes the situation as 
co-referential use of a proper name has something to do with two distinct using 
applications of proper names. According to Evans, Kripke does not seem to be 
aware of the idea of name using practice.^ ° 
Hughes beautifully describes bi-vocal aspect of a proper name like 
"Madagascar" or "Napoleon." They can express more than one name. How is it 
possible to use the same name for two different referents at the same time? The 
idea is that it is possible through expressing same expressions but two different 
proper names. In other words, some name like "Madagascar" or "Napoleon" 
may be used simultaneously in two using applications of proper names. 
"Napoleon" would mean, to Kripke, "the name of his pet" and also "the 
his:orical name under discussion" (the referent which he borrowed from 
others). In this case, Kripke is aware of the fact that both usages of same names 
are true. Their expressions are same, but in fact, they are two proper names 
being used in two different contexts or in two using applications of proper 
name. 
Ojie name has got two referents, while in Fregean sense two names has got two 
referents. In the example of "Madagascar" or "Napoleon," a person knowingly 
using two names with different senses. According to Frege, the sense is an 
ingrewlient in meaning. 
Nathon Salmon assumes a hypothetical name of a human being called 
'Lauranda', who would have existed if the sperm cell called Laura had 
'" See also, Hughes, op.cit.4l. 
"^Evans G (1982) The Varieties of Reference, McDowell J (ed.;). Oxford: Clarendon,p,152. 
82 
fertilized the egg cell called Amanda, According to Salmon, Kripke too thinks 
that such names may be introduced in similar fashion. Actually, Salmon's 
example seems to be quite blurry. It seems' to be an effort to, be a causal 
connection of the name so called. But there is no such hypothetical being, to 
which one may refer (again what I .call a void proper name). The name of 
possible individual, whose causal link is missing, does not seem plausible to 
accept, at least to Kripke.**' 
A person introduces a name by some initial baptism, which passed from one 
person to another in a linear fashion. A person identifies reference by mean of 
some descriptions that identify the person in question in terms of its unique 
properties, achievements etc. Speakers have to involve in some reference 
borrowing practices from others. In this process of passing name from one 
person to another, a sort of linear chain is created. This chain m^y be used in 
fuTure to know the history of name i.e. how its referent had been determined. 
So, everybody is engaged in borrowing reference in a linear fashion. But the 
introducer, who first introduces a name, may not be a reliable person. In such 
cases, one may not borrow the right kind of reference. 
Suawson advocates reference borrowing in acquiring the conception that 
known reference play central role in the association of a definite description. 
He claims that a reference may be borrowed by one person from another to 
whom he knows. For example, "Peter" heard "John" talking with great interest 
about "Mary." "Peter" did not know about "Mary." Now, he is known about 
her through "John" who knows "Mary" very we.ll. 
Now, "Peter" may identify "Mary" with the description "the lady whose name 
is Mary, John was talking last night." Here "Peter" has involved what we may 
call reference borrowing practices. Likewise, he may tell about "Mary" to 
"Thomson" and "Thomson" talks to "Michael" and so on. Hence a chain of 
communication has been created with some historical link involved into it. This 
is what Kripke wishes to emphasize. 
Hughes,op.c//.45. 
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Kripke distinguishes his conception regarding reference borrowing in holding 
that one need not know the person from whom he borrowed the reference; here 
he is different from Straw son's proposal. Kripke thinks that a reference is 
borrowed one by one as a member of certain speech community and hence a 
chain of communication has been estabhshed.in which a name is handed over 
continuously one by one. It is not necessary that a borrower knows all the 
details about name. For example, somebody have heard name "Sir Syed 
Ahmad Khan" somewhere or read in some book or newspaper. Now, this is 
how he got the name, but in order to know the referent of name he has to go 
retrogressively through the established chain of communication. The person 
may not know that "Sir Syed Ahmad Khan" is the founder of Aligarh Muslim 
University or he may not have heard at all about the University, even in such 
cases he may successfully use the name in using application of proper names. 
In order to know the reference rightly, he has to pass the actual chain of 
communication as there may also be the chances of misleading from the actual 
1 - 8 2 ' . • •• 
cham. . 
The chain of communication may not run one by one necessarily. There is also 
lies possibility of one to many or many to one communication. For example, 
"Harry Potter" had been borrowed by several speakers simultaneously. It does 
not matter whether "Harry Potter" has existed at all. In initial baptism, a name 
may be introduced by some introducer in some using applications of Proper 
names, through a description. But Kripke recommends that such practice only 
serves in fixing a reference and is not synonym with the name it presents . 
Here, Kripke differs from the conviction of descriptivist- Frege and Russell. 
Secondly, in case of initial baptism, one is acquainted with the referent to 
which one stipulates name. But the traditional' description theories of Proper 
names seem to provide no satisfactory answer, in case of the names like 
" See also, Kvipke.op.cit, pp.90-92. 
"•' Description theories serve the function of fixing a reference and plays pivotal role in initial baptism. 
"'' See also, Krlpke.op.cil, p. 96,Footnote 42 
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"Aristotle" who is a historical figure and there is no immediate acquaintance 
available by anyone. 
Thus, created chain of communication in linear fashion projects backward from 
person to person, if we are required the historical evidence of a name which is 
so called. In the example of "Mary," if we move further from "John," we could 
find initial baptism of the name "Mary" - how she got this name? But here too, 
there seems to be no definite criteria involved^ At the first place John's talking 
about Mary is reliable? Are there requirements of some more descriptions, 
which may reinforce the name with some set of unique descriptions borrowed 
from its reference, so that the bearer of name may be identified? Now, what is 
th(; definite criterion of such identification of reference by one or a set of 
descriptions which is being borrowed? 
It is not so easy to comprehend the borrowed reference as the identification of 
some person. People may have different borrowing histories and accordingly a 
different Sense may be ascribed in each case of borrowed reference. That's 
why the question still remains the same: whether descriptions about a name 
from borrowed reference will ensure reference stipulation through the right 
route. There are some suggestions which may be presented. 
Firstly, a borrower should use other-borrowed reference regarding the same 
name, from different acceptor in some using application of proper names. It 
may ensure the information about the borrowed reference. Moreover, other 
users (acceptors) beliefs will be involved coupled with the borrower himself In 
this case, there is risk of what Kripke calls circulatory condition here. "Peter" 
borrowed reference about "Mary" from "John;" "Michael" borrowed reference 
about "Thomson." Now, "Peter" becomes depend on "Thomson;" ignoring 
"John" from where he took the knowledge of reference. Hence, here is a 
violation of non-circulatory condition. i 
In some using application of proper names, the probability of acceptors having 
identifying beliefs regarding the name is very low. There is no guarantee 
whether the right person will be picked out by the name or not. It may be 
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inferred that reference determination seems to be difficult in such cases (just 
described). 
Cine of most striking feature of our natural language is that it cannot be bound 
in to a fixed servitude. It is always depend on many things like context of 
utterances, speaker's belief, intention, propositional attitude etc. It lacks what 
Frege says objectivity in the utterances being made between speakers and 
hearers, This poverty of human language had been described by Michel Devitt 
in holding that it is stimulus depended. A speaker cannot be bounded to 
respond according to its immediate environment. The speaker may talk about 
any object or event anytime, which may be liemote to us in spatiotemporal 
order. 
This feature of human language compels us to lose our grip on the possibility 
of finding descriptions which are self-evident whether single or in cluster. 
Hence, description theories are seriously threatens by realizing this fact of 
human language. What we may do is that we may refer to only those entities 
which we can describe with confidence (in terms of their accuracy). But 
unfortunately, most of the objects we talk about are brought to us by those 
channels of communication which can't be considered as reliable and hence 
n:.ay not enhance our understanding and knowledge regarding those objects. 
4.2 Criticism of CausalTheory: 
Searle criticizes causal theory in holding that a proper name like "Aristotle" 
may be used in varied senses. Davis holds: 
...It is logically possible that Aristotle was not a man but a god, a 
Martian, or an exceptionally sophisticated machine planted on 
earth by gods or Martians. "Concrete object" is more defensible. 
85 See, Devitt.M. and Sternely,K.o/7.c//.,9/. 
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Either way, the sortals that might be part of the meanings of 
aft 
names are far too general to be identifying. „ 
(Contexts in which utterances are being made, also plays an important role in 
i^ eference identification and determination. In present context, I believe that the 
solution to this problem may be concluded in holding that what lies in the mind 
of speaker, may determine the name token which he intended to designate with 
an object. In other words, speaker's intentional content may enable him to 
recognize the object, matched with his intention. Further, Devitt thinks that 
causal theories try to create ultimate association between world and language. 
However, no causal theorists ever claimed it, as they are just trying to create a 
link between a proper name and its right reference, obviously on causal basis. 
Donald Davidson tries to bifurcate the theory of meaning in to two methods i.e. 
the building-block method (simpler propositions form complex ones) and the 
holistic method (starts with complex propositions and then deal with its 
fragment parts). The first method does not possess pragmatic approach while 
the second one may serve only to understand fragments but semantic value of 
0 0 
the proposition may be distorted. Davidson claims that " With the 
building block approach goes the causal theory of proper names, which Saul 
Kripke, Hilary Putnam and David Kaplan, among others, have done so much to 
make plausible."^^ 
If we accept Davidson's methodology of comprehending the theory of meaning 
by mean of the building block method, it seems very clear that the causal 
theory does not possess any pragmatic value. Elsewhere, Kripke himself 
accepts this issue. 
See also, Wayne A. Davis, "Intentionalism, dcscriptivism, and proper names", in John Searle's 
Philosophy of Language: Force, Meaning, and Mind, (ed.) Savas L. Tsohatzidis, Cambridge University 
Press, 2007, 116. 
The solution to this problem may be provided by the recently introduced cognitive sciences, which is 
beyond the scope of this work. 
''^ John McDowell, "On the Sense and reference of a proper name" in Reference, truth and reality 
(essays on the Philosophy of Language), p. 136. 
'•^  John McDowell 136. 
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4.3 Using applications of proper names^ ^ 
I have maintained that the philosophers of language like Frege, Russell were 
concerned with finding Ideal aspect of language. It seems virtually impossible 
to maintain full fledged ideality in our natural language owing to its constant 
changing behavior with speaker/listener beliefs, their psychology, contexts in 
which the expression of thoughts are being made, intentions, propositional 
attitudes etc. 
A speaker is expressing a thought regarding a particular object in using a 
proper name in a particular sense which directs a way of thinking in 
determining the proper names. I think that there may be huge differences 
among speaker in the comprehension of a proper name in terms of its having a 
referent. 
Gareth Evans remarks that there are gigantic variations among the 
understanding of producers and acceptors. '^ It's,eems unjustified that Evans put 
so much emphasis on the introducer side in holding his point that they play 
more important role in reference stipulation than acceptors . While in fact 
Exceptors are the real players in using application of proper names, these 
speaker apply name to a particular referent on the basis of information received 
from introducer. After such reinforcement of informative content regarding a 
proper name, the acceptor may rely on it and use the name accordingly. 
However, there lies a possibility of distortion of received information by the 
acceptors but some fundamental facts regarding a certain proper name have 
already been stipulated. Moreover, only acceptors make the application of 
'" Gareth Evans uses terminology i.e. 'proper-name-using practices' in his book, "'The Varieties of 
References", edited by John McDoweli,(New Yoric.Ciarendon Press: Oxford University Press,1982), 
376-382, which follows the model of personal proper names and summarily the cases where there is 
presentation of referents. 1 have used this title for a different intention which is signified by the title 
itself i.e. 'using applications of proper names' and tried to apply the title in exploring the various 
applications of proper names among different group of users of proper names. 
" Evans, Gareth,o/).d/. p.399. 
" I already described that ] am using words introducer and acceptor in place of Evans words producer 
and consumer respectively. 
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proper names more and more usable as they are huge in number. Thus, they 
greatly contribute in the usage of proper names. 
Proper names may be introduced to the hearers (acceptors) so as to make them 
known the referent of a particular proper name. It seems true that it may be 
done in a variety of ways and there seems to be no universal and standard way 
for each proper name to be used. It is not in the very nature of things of using a 
natural language. Hence, there seems a very Kttle possibility that the hearer 
(acceptor) understand the description of speaker (introducer) vis-a-vis Proper 
name. But it is also not necessary that they don't. Evans says that" We do 
not necessarily have to conclude that the audiences do not know what the 
speaker is referring to."'^ '' 
The meaning of proper name is provided by its immediate correspondence with 
a particular object. That's why a proper name and referent should go together; 
thinking one will lead the other. We may also assert that any speaker may use a 
certain name even without having an understanding of it, which means simply 
the understanding of the corresponding object i.e. its referent. But one may 
claim that any misinformation may contaminate thinking of' the speaker 
regarding the referent of name. 
Reference determination may be performed by the using application of proper 
names which a speaker applies. The speaker focuses on the use of name, in 
fixing a referent. In later sense, Evans argues that "Full understanding of a use 
of a name requires that the referent of the name be an object of the subject's 
thought."^ "* A proper name itself possesses some unique impulse which 
compels a speaker to present his capacity to make use of a proper name, if and 
only if he proves his spontaneous thoughts about its referent. 
The utterances involved in using such referential expressions (i.e. proper 
names) by users of language who immediately witnessed with that unique 
utterance. The proper names are less dependent on these attitudes and thoughts 
'" Evans, Gareth,op.f;7p.400. 
" Ibid.,p.402. 
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of users of a natural language and are linguistic symbols which represent things 
in terms of providing immediate presence of the concerned object such as 
phrase "It had blue" may be applied as "...that colour." 
Proper names, as we maintained, are linguistic expressions of some objective 
entity which stand tied to them by some initial speakers of a language by some 
initial way of application of proper name what Kripke calls baptism or by some 
introduction provided by some introducer. Proper names are seems to be 
ambiguous as they can't exist in isolation from the belief, thoughts and 
intentions of their users; which inspire some philosophers like Russell, 
Strawson to portray the picture of proper names in the form of some 
demonstrative references as we will see later on. For instance, "James Peter is 
D" may be interpreted as "That man known as "James Peter" is D." 
Gareth Evans considers a general account of using applications of proper 
names,^ ^ in which a proper name is used to refer to a particular person. The 
distinctive feature of such practices identifies a concrete aggregation of 
speakers of a natural language to whom the name has been introduced as a 
result of their immediate acquaintance with the person. 
These people have been occasionally told, or anyhow they have become aware 
of its truth which may be expressed as 'This is I?N' (here 'PN' is a proper name 
and 'this' provides a demonstrative reference). This truth, once at least, may be 
re-used on the occasions to come as 'This is PN' and this is how the name may 
be applied in practice. Now, the name is associated with its being recognized 
the person in all occasions. 
Members of this foundational group are what Evans cdW-producers. I will 
prefer to call such members as "introducers" as they introduce some name in 
direct relation with its referent, rather than producing something by themselves. 
The name may be introduced by the introducers regarding the person, in a 
speech of community. Repeated application of the name will provide 
reinforcement of casual use of the name as referfing the person. • 
He originally uses the piirase 'proper-name- using practices', as I described above. 
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Making a careful and speculative treatment of proper name, Evans proceeds 
further like this: "I shall call these members 'consumers," since on the whole 
they are not able to inject new information into the practice, but must rely upon 
the information-gathering transactions of the producers."^^ 
Now I would prefer to replace Evans's "consumers" as "acceptors," as those 
who would accept the introduction of the name by the introducers. The 
previous notion of introducers may be associated with the conception of 
baptism i.e. naming for the first time a particular individual with the name 'PN' 
as qualified with the name 'PN' as qualified with the demonstrative reference 
and after the introduction of a proper name by the introducers, it becomes 
generalized. Thereafter, the introduced proper name may then be used by the 
introducers, acceptors and by the person himself whose name has been 
introduced. 
But it seems not necessary that all acceptors are going to use the name 'PN' in 
the same contexts as originally did by the introducers, as the demonstrative 
treatment may differ widely, down to the acceptors which are also prone to 
their subjective treatment of the name introduced. 
The introducer-acceptor treatment of the using application of proper name, an 
acceptor who accepts a sentence of the structure like 'PN is the 9' (where 9 
stands for object generally), if he assumes 'PN' to be an ordinary proper name, 
which is known by him, the object 9 is identified as 'PN' or it may be 
identified on different occasions as true. 
When somebody hears the phrase 'PN is the 9' and treat 'PN' as ordinary 
proper name, he takes for granted that there found a certain person who is 
known as 'PN'. It seems quite justified that acceptor who accepts 'PN' as 
ordinary proper name does not possess a full information while using the name, 
at least, in comparison to the introducer. 
Evans,'Gareth, op.cil.95. 
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That's why only an introducer presents sound arguments owing to his original 
witnessing with the name 'PN' of the person. Evans already maintained that: 
..thus I am claiming that there is a difference in kind between the 
introduction to a name-using practice which a producer receives 
and the introduction which a consumer receives. One might say 
that an ordinary proper name is used subject to a convention, but 
that it is only the producers who can be credited with knowledge 
Q7 
of this convention. 
The acceptor knows the referent immediately after the introducer provides 
information about the referent. Evans further asserts that "Contrast a 
descriptive proper name; the convention is to use 'PN' to refer to whatever is 
the (p, and this leaves no work to be done by' a distinction between producers 
OX 
and consumers" . 
Now, in case of descriptive proper names, as Evans maintains that there is no 
need to draw the distinction between introducers and acceptors, in former case 
it appear , and in some cases it is so, that only introducer may assert with 
absolute authority that "This is PP" owing to his own existential experience. 
Contrary to Evans conception, the ordinary proper names are also going to 
reflect the same introduction, in case of acceptors also; because they serve the 
objectiye content of reference. Attaching the same sense with a particular 
reference will yield the similar output in all occurrences i.e. the truth value of 
sentence is not going to change in more than one occurrence. 
The way people use application of proper names may run like this: People use 
1:0 remember and learn the name of those person who are appealing to them, or 
to whom they show interest and they obviously use the name of the person they 
are already familiar with. 
Evans, Gareth, op.cU, 378. 
'•^Ibid, 378. 
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There are instances in which both speaker and Ustener perfectly understand the 
name of the person regarding whom they talk about, they may make assertions 
about him easily. And there are instances when a speaker intends to describe a 
person with a certain description true of it like the phrase "Aristotle was the 
teacher of Alexander the Great," shows its predicate " was the teacher of 
Alexander the Great" as definite description. 
When a name goes on repeating by a huge niimber of speakers, it becomes 
reinforced in the mind of speakers as well as in the mind of listeners of 
language. In this way, the repeated usage of a particular name, say, 'PP' will 
make it more and more genuine and authoritative as far as its usage is 
concerned. 
In practice, there may also be instances in which the same person bearing the 
name 'PN' may not be equally identified by two speakers of speech. Think, for 
example, of a large class of students. Two teachers in that concerned 
department may be not successful to have a communication regarding a 
particular student. However, both teachers used to deliver lecture in that class, 
even then they have got difficulty in the recognition of that student. Often, 
additional information (like his father's name, his sir name or its being 
possessed some most distinctive feature) regarding that student may help in 
achieving their referential communication. And in that class, it is quiet possible 
that two students may share the same name, in this case too that extra 
information may help. 
In this using application of proper names, the introducer may introduce a name 
to a newly born child from the book containing names. Now, the book 
containing several names, of which, some or all of them have already got the 
reference or baptized. For instance, in that book a name, say, "Peter", already 
possess several persons corresponding to it; eabh differing with each other by 
some sort of unique description and equipment of additional information with 
each of them, thus separating each from one another. More importantly, every 
occurrence of name 'Peter', as I think, will belong to a different using 
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application of Proper name or what Eyans calls a different 'Proper name-using-
practices'. And the introducer just picks one of them at the time of baptism and 
attaches the picked proper name with the child. 
In Frege's example of "Aphla" and "Ateb;" two travelers were in fact two 
introducers of the name referring the same mountain, completely unaware 
about this fact. After the discovery that both names refer to the same mountain-
using application of two names need not be different in distinctiveness of 
names. These two names using applications in fact uses two distinct network of 
communication, these two networks passes ihfprmation with each other, only 
after the discovery that both names are referring to the same mountain. Searle 
holds: 
The only chain that matters is a transfer of intentional content 
from one use of an expression to the next; in every case reference 
is secured in virtue of descriptivist Intentional content in the mind 
of the speaker who uses the expression. '^ 
Searle tries to clear that stipulating reference may be performed by mean of 
intentional content. He holds: 
...Since linguistic reference is always dependent on or is a form 
of mental reference and since rnental reference is always in virtue 
of Intentional content including Background and Network, proper 
names must in some way depend on Intentional content.'°° 
Searle, Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
1983,245. 
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4,4 Reference stipulation practices of Proper Names: 
Using the same example, the association between name 'PN' and the actual 
person is established by introducers of proper names. The referent of a proper 
name is established by virtue of this association. 
The numerical terms also claims to fell in to the category of proper names 
which may be distinguished from other terms by the introducers who possess 
the ability to identify the terms when displayed from them. Now, these 
numerical terms runs parallel with identification ability of the producers and 
which are, say, 'numbers', numerical terms show on systematized pattern of 
these objects which will always be identified^ as that particular 'number' by a 
speech of community. These terms possess certain unique characteristics 
through which they can always be separated from other terms. But it throws no 
clarity how can we describe the numerical terms i.e. numbers as proper names. 
We can only say that an 'object' may be corresponded by number for which it 
stands or which is the meaning of that object. Dummett tried to pin down the 
reason because of which Frege think of number as proper names in holding that 
"....we are forced to count numbers as objects because our intuition compels us 
to recognize numerical terms as proper names." 
These numerical terms may be practiced by the introducers down to other 
acceptors and in all instances the terms provides an association between its 
practice and the concerned object or term; which it refers to. If a certain 
utterance ends in 'tiger', then the predicate refers to such and such number if 
and only if it possesses all its characteristics of being a number. 
Hence, using application of proper names seems to be concerned about the 
tight association of it with the actual world in which speech of community 
exists. The fact that introduces continuously practices a name 'PN' as 
corresponding to the object, which is the referent of the name 'PN'. This kind 
Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Language, 56. 
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of association makes us plausibly to understand the utterances involving the 
name with its referent in the using application of this name either by the 
introducers or the acceptors as speakers and hearers who also behave as 
member of the particular speech community. As a result of which, any speaker 
of our natural language may deliberately and with intact intentions, presents a 
name containing the particular corresponding object as its referent. 
One prominent practical problem has been encountered during using 
application of proper names i.e. there may be several kind of using applications 
in a speech community, each acting as a closed system by the surface of which 
information may flow or enter. And we can't reject the possibility that the 
system may be window-wall less i.e. completely opaque through which any 
information may neither enter nor exit. For instance, taking example of a 
student who possesses a nickname of which people in his home are aware. 
Now, the using application of name in school ^nd in his home will be different. 
Teacher and other people in the school of that student may completely be 
unaware about his nickname, but not vice-versa. Parents or the people at home 
know this fact that the student has got his real name in the school. 
There exist the two separate networks of speakers of communication in school 
and in home. In former case, the information is not rurming from the later. 
However, the later is perfectly aware about the full information regarding that 
student, being the introducer of the name. It is quite possible that the 
information may pass from one network to another.'°^ 
In the later stages of communication, this constant bombardment of 
information by the introducer vis-a-vis the s?tudent as two having names, in 
spite of being perfectly aware that both names refer to one and only one object 
as their referent. 
One of the interesting observations is that the name of this student, in the 
school, may be distorted intentionally by some mischievous fellow students. 
" I mean on the occasion such as birthday party in which the student invite some of his classmates and 
in this occasion his classmates may come to know his nickname. Or it is possible that some of the close 
friends of the student may know his nickname. 
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Now, the third using application of proper names may be introduced by the 
acceptors (mischievous students) of the name of that student. 
Hence, several apphcations of proper names are being used by different 
speakers, each as per their own types. These applications run parallel to each 
other, sometimes overlapping each other, in case the information flows 
between all channels of communication and sometimes it may go on running 
parallel until each type of application is realized by different existing channels 
of communication. 
Now, any speaker from that speech community must indicate the kind of using 
application of proper name , he is applying or involving in. Hence, it is his 
responsibility to describe the kind of application of proper name; mere 
describing its referent may distort the comprehension regarding that name in 
the speech community. 
This illustration raises one of the most significant facts than simply applying 
the applications of proper names and perhaps, the notion of baptism too. It is 
true that the criteria \vhich a speaker uses in reference identification by the 
application of proper name of a particular kindun a certain speech community 
may not always function properly. 
The possibility of expression of a incorrect information may happen in the 
utterance 'PN is the cp' taking for granted the name used for the person where 
the name is used by the speaker and the student is not identified as 9. In this 
example the name of the student has been distorted by the acceptors 
(mischievous students).Now, this distortion may also take the form of 
spreading false and groundless information for the student; such rumors are 
likely to make adhesion of the name with such false information which may be 
used by still another using application, consciously or unconsciously in spite of 
the fact that the referent has not got the kind of attribute, say, p (false 
information), which is merely enclosed in the mind of acceptors while at the 
some keeping other applications intact and unaltered. 
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The using application of proper names may be performed generally i.e. when a 
name is applied by a particular speech community in terms of its having a 
referent or when a particular speaker uses the name in its having as reference. 
Evans argues against the description provided by the Saul Kripke's account of 
the treatment of using application of proper names in these two cases. 
Kripke tried to provide a framework of stipulation of reference by names'°^ 
which he tried to encounter through initial baptism, in the process of which a 
particular name is attached with a person for life time. In case particular 
speaker apply name as per its reference assignment. Kripke put it forward by 
introducing Recursive Principle according to which if an acceptor (acceptors) 
accepts the application of a name by an introducer or (introducers) and in 
applying the consequences of that enforcement of name with a particular 
reference, then the name ejected out from that acceptor (or acceptors) will 
corresponds directly to that introducer or (introducers) in those using 
application of Proper names out of which the names emerges out. 
Evans depicts that Kripke was not seems to be concerned about the idea of 
name using practice. His refutation of Kripke's Recursive Principle runs like 
this. One may use a name to refer to a person say, 'PN' in all my utterances, 
even if there lays a confusion by similar looking person say, 'PN*'. Hence, a 
lacuna is found in using practices of proper names.'°^ , . 
Now, Kripke's Recursive Principle was concerned about to portray the whole 
picture of the mechanism by which ah acceptor accepts his own application of 
the name 'PN' by accepting description, 'PN is cp', 'PN is P' etc. from other 
speakers of language (or introducers) who were thought to be responsible for 
providing reference to that name. Gareth Evans asserts that Recursive Principle 
suffers from a sort of deficiency of using applications of proper name, which a 
In his seminal lectures entitled, "Naming and Necessity," Kripke provided a detailed description of 
stipulation of reference of proper names. 
See also Evans, Gareth,o/7.c/7. 386. ' ; • •. 
lbid,p.3S6. He used x as we have used in our example for 'wa'and introducers and not producers. 
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speaker must realizes clearly that a particular application is being used in which 
he has involved. ^ 
Hence, choosing one of the using applications of proper name'seems to be 
appealing which Kripke's Recursive Principle was lacking, as Evans raised 
objection. Kripke's Recursive Principle had been defended by Evans in holding 
that a particular speaker exploits using applications by wrongly identifying a 
reference by some principle.'°^ However, the Recursive Principle has got some 
utility like the use of some proper names such as 'agronomist'. It can also be 
used in intuitive practices in which a speaker realizes to involve in the same 
using practices as originally belong to those speakers who first used a Proper 
name and provided information about that name. 
Hence, Recursive Principle proposed by Saul Kripke seem to draw a path 
which is enlightened by the speaker (or introducer) involved in reference 
stipulating practices in using application of Proper names and the acceptors is 
going to use the name introduced in the light of received information ( a name 
endowed with reference) by the introducer. In this case, nothing seems to be 
left except assuming that the speaker is using a particular application which is 
matching with similar application used by the introducer initially. 
4.5 Reference Changing: 
The theories of proper name discussed so far do not suggest any account of 
change in references. Reference changing even does not seem possible, as per 
the conviction of description theories. The theories do not even raise the issue 
of change in reference. Gareth Evans tries to portray the significance of change 
in reference, right from the beginning i.e. from initial baptism. For instance, 
the name 'PN' refers to person, may change its course of referring to some 
another person also. Does it mean that the name ceases to refer to the person? It 
is true that the reference 'bb' with the name had been introduced by some new 
°''Ibid,37S.S 
°'/WJ.,387. 
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introducers and using of new application of the same proper name 'PN' will be 
started. 
But the fact that the person as referent of the name 'PN' had already been 
reinforced by some introducer (or introducers) and they did so by gathering 
some piece of authentic information regarding;the person. Henc?, it is not so 
easy to eradicate the applications of proper name 'PN' as one of the circle of 
using application of proper names. 
The users of language within a speech community involving using application 
may confuse. The name 'PN' was initially baptized by a particular person but 
because of the confusion; erroneous use of the name (use for other person) had 
been taken place which actually was grounded in the person for whom name 
was initially baptized. Hence, the name 'PN' is now designates some other 
person. A sincere digging out the information regarding name 'PN' will reveal 
the fact that the name had already been referred to the person in some using 
application of names which is not relevant to piresent applications.,, 
If we take for the granted that some speakers of language are completely 
unaware about the using application of names of the person. Hence, changing 
reference of proper names seems to be much more difficult than the terms of 
natural kind. Evans frames the point as: "It also explains why a change in the 
reference of a name for a place is so much easier to imagine than a change in 
the reference of a name for a person"'^ ^. He also provides actual case of 
changing in reference. For example, 'Madagascar' which was the name of a 
large African island, was actually the name of African mainland. The confusion 
was created on the part of Marco Polo who unintentionally bifurcate the speech 
community into two. One speak island 'Madagascar' as Africanisl^ ind (for those 
v/ho agree with Marco Polo) and the other community speak the name for 
i^ Lfrican mainland (for those who do not agree with Marco Polo). Now because of 
Jbid.p.390. In footnote of this page, Gareth Evans uses several examples of changes in the reference 
of natural kind terms: 'buffalo' is from a Greek word for a North African antelope; 'daffodil' is 
from 'asphodel', but the daffodil does not grow in Greece; 'oil' derives a word for the 
olive tree; 'apple' was formerly used for all fruit other than berries, and 'cobra' for all snakes. 
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this mistake, the meaning of Madagascar' became different, at least'in absence of 
awareness of the fact behind this mistake. 
4.6 Later stage of using application of Proper Names: 
Now, the using application of proper names has reached the last phase of its 
life cycle which come its matured stage or immediately after it. The persons 
will have to die and with them using application of their proper name suddenly 
comes to a hah. But their Proper names may retain for a considerable period of 
time. And several using applications may be handed over from old generation 
to new one, and this is how their name persists for a definite span of time. 
In this stage, only acceptors remain as participants. For instance, in historical 
documents the name of several mughal emperors like "Akbar," "Shahjahan" 
had been applying continuously even after their death or Greek philosophers 
like "Thales," "Socrates," "Plato," "Aristotle" etc. have got similar tendency. 
The name of such kinds may be used from some historical document. 
As far as the using application of proper names for historical names are 
concerned, nothing sounds absolutely correct. However, several historical 
monuments, events, written texts etc. confirms the existence of the historical 
names coined by some producers. And it is expected that the recent acceptors 
(speakers) of the name, should comprehend the name exactly in the same 
manner as producers did. ' ; . . 
For instance, every speaker of language involving in writing such historical 
application of proper names had been introduced to it by encountering 
propositions such as "Shahjahan built the Taj Mahal" and "Shahjahan was a 
great Mughal emperor." 
The historical names such as these seems to possess reference freezing quality 
as the tradition of repeating these names go on happening down the ages by the 
past users and the concerned reference is preserved. 
It is quite possible that some historical names may even not have a reference or 
its background claims some misinformation. Still the name is going to be used 
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as possessing some referent .Now, the forthcoming using application of 
proper names are going to refer to the same name having agreed on past 
practices. 
Hence, on the basis of such past practices one may assert that a specific 
character is known as , say, 'Akbar', naturally one would not like to add 
som(2 informative content of his own being involved in later application of 
proper names (the acceptor would just accept the informative content of the 
past from historical documents and reference is stipulated , despite the fact 
that such historical features are subject to prove to be false, in case of some 
discovery in the later stage of application. It may be asserted that the 
historical name, say, "Akbar" would still be' described as "Akbar" as the 
referent of the name. 
In the transition from mature to later stage of using application, there seems 
to be justification involved in holding that the informative content regarding 
a particular name diminishes. However, it does not mean that the 
informative content diminishes to such an extent that is completely 
exhausted. There would remain some basic facts regarding the historical 
name. For example, in sentence, "Shahjahan built the Taj Mahal" there is a 
reflection of such fact and the fact may freeze as a stipulation of reference. 
Such facts may be known as what Evans calls a 'secondary practice', of 
using application of proper names. 
^.bove discussion clearly demonstrates that Kripke has better presented the 
theory of reference of proper names. Instead of advocating description 
theories, Kripke provides an alternative model of the identification and 
stipulation of reference i.e. causal theory of reference. That's why the theory 
may also be described as 'new theory of reference.' 
In spite Evans's counterexample "Madagascar," the causal 
theory presented a better model of reference identification and 
stipulation practices of proper narnes. Even in case of co-
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referential proper names like Kripke use of 'Napoleon' in two 
occasions (one for his pet and other for historical man), the 
position of the causal theory seems to be quite safe. 
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CHAPTER V 
KRIPKE'S REFUTATION OF DESCRIPTION THEORIES: 
CRITICAL ESTIMATE 
5.1 Introduction: 
In his seminal lectures Naming and Necessity, Kripke argues against the thesis 
of Frege and Russell, according to which proper names are abbreviated or 
truncated definite description"°.He claims that 'Nevertheless I think it's pretty 
certain that the view of Frege and Russell is false'"'. He provides several 
counterexamples to refute the theory. Salmon asserts that Kripke's argument 
against descriptivism (pure aspect) is three fold i.e. modal, epistemological, and 
semantical"^. While delivering the lectures, the basic problem before Kripke is 
to refute the thesis of Frege and Russell. I belieye that the refutation is. actually 
directed to mention that description theories fail to solve the problem of 
reference fixation of proper names. 
Kripke holds that considering 'Aristotle was fond of dogs' may be analyzed, 
according to Russell, in terms of the description 'the last great philosopher of 
"" See, Mark Sainsbury, "Philosophical Logic", in A. Grayling (ed.), Philosophy: A Guide Through the 
Subject (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 74-6. He doubts whether the view actually belongs to 
Frege and Russell or not. However, Russell has been found to claim the point that proper names behave 
as truncated descriptions. But there seems to be no evidence ibund which may show that Frege has this 
standpoint. Still some philosophers taken it for granted that Frege too possess similar view. Frege 
seems to talk about that description are service of reference fixation of proper names. If 1 rightly 
understood, he has never approached the issue (that proper ndmes are truncated descriptions) directly. 
For present purpose, we will have to assume Kripkean position against what Ahmed calls 'Frege-
Russell Thesis' or FRT. 
'"Kripke, op. c/;. 29. 
"^ See, Salmon, Reference and Essence, 23-31. 
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antiquity was fond of dogs'. Kripke insists that in some oounterfactual 
situation, there could have been some person other than Aristotle; who would 
ha\'e been the last philosopher of antiquity. This impure definite description 
seems to be central concern for Russell. Kripke holds: 
...we merely use the description to fix the referent then that man 
will be the referent of 'Aristotle' in all possible worlds. The only 
use of the description will have been to pick out to which man we 
mean to refer... "^ 
Kripke tries to portray the picture of inability of a definite description to 
stipulate the referent of a proper name. According to Kripke, the description 
theories are in service of reference identification and stipulation and they don't 
provide meaning to proper names. For example, 'Aristotle' may not be 
substituted with the description 'the teacher of Alexander the Great' as there 
might have been some other person who had taught Alexander the Great in 
some other counterfactual situations. 
The description theories only provide reference to a proper name. The 
description does not provide meaning to a proper name but it only helps in 
refi^ rence determination of the same. Fregean sense is that property of 
description which provides a way to determine the reference of a proper name. 
Kripke tries to present an alternative model for reference identification and 
stipulation. He invents the notion of rigidity; and maintains that a proper name 
behave as a rigid designator which rigidly designates the same referent in all 
"^ Kripke, op.cit.57. 
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possible worlds. According to him, the description theories fail on fix the 
referent of a proper name in all possible worlds. First, it is useful to analyze the 
notion of r/gZ(i//)'itself 
5.2 The notion of rigidity: 
If the designator does not designate any object in other worlds where it does 
not exist, then it may be called as what Salmon calls persistently rigid 
designator. In his arguments against Frege and Russell, Kripke seems to talks 
such sort of rigidity""*. In Identity and Necessity, Kripke asserts "...In a 
situation where the object does not exist, then we should say that the designator 
has no referent and that the object in question so designated does not 
exist... ""^ 
Ahmed's observation seems to be plausibly clear. I think that Kripke is 
interested to provide a criterion for designator to be existent in all or some or 
even none possible world. Kripkean notion of rigid designator may be called 
what he describes as strongly rigid. A proper name refers to the same thing in 
all possible worlds where that thing actually exists. These are the cases of 
necessary existence of certain specific properties of an object' . In order to be 
strongly rigid, a designator needs that its referent must actually exist in all 
possible worlds. If it is not so; then the designator is not strongly rigid but 
persistently rigid. 
""Ahmed, o/7.d/. 19. 
'' ^ Identity and Necessity, 173. 
Naming and Necessity, 48-49. 
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Nathon Salmon" ^ calls such designators as obstinately rigid which seems to be 
synonym with Kripke's notion of rigid designator as strongly rigid. I would 
prefer to introduce the term uniformly rigid designator to characterize the 
behavior of such proper names. 
In Identity and Necessity, Kripke asserts that 'a,- name, say, "Nixo.n," would be 
called as "Nixon" even if there is no person ever existed in any possible world. 
It seems surprising but Kripke argues that the name "Nixon" is going to 
designate the Nixon as a person in all possible worlds. Obviously in those 
worlds, it will be taken for granted that there is no actual existent person. The 
person may be character in some story or film or in some what Frege calls 
"work of fiction." The point is that even in such cases the nofion of rigidity 
novQV fails. I have held that there may be several names which are devoid of 
any actual referent. ' 
But how is it possible to develop a relation between a designator and its 
referent which is non- actual or fictional? In virtue of what 'Nixon' is going to 
designate Nixon while he does not exist at all. I even wonder how such 
arguments have become possible at the first place. Christopher Hughes tries to 
rationalize the issue in following manner: 
...a proper name designates the same thing with respect to eveiy 
possible world (even worlds in which that thing does not. exist), 
in much the way that a proper name designates the same thing 
'"Nathon Salmon, 1982, 33-34. 
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with respect to every time (even times at which the thing no 
longer exists, or did not yet exist)... "** 
In making these remarks, Hughes seems to accept at least one thing: non-
existence of referent of a proper name is a matter of some possible worlds i.e. 
situational. In other words, there must be at least one world in which the 
referent like Nixon, of proper name "Nixon" exists. 
It means that a proper name designate the same object in all possible worlds or 
what Hughes calls with respect to every possible world. The argument provides 
momentum to Kripke's anti-thesis against the description theory of Frege and 
Russell. Definite descriptions are non-rigid designators because same object is 
not designated by them, in all possible worlds i.e. the content of description is 
going to vary in different possible worlds. Hence, a proper name cannot be an 
abbreviated description. .' , 
Kripke tries to deal with the issue of void proper names''^ in holding that such 
proper names are still going to designate the same referent in all possible 
worlds. For example, if someone utters 'Unicom' had never existed, even then 
the proper name 'Unicorn' rigidly designates to an animal of particular kind 
that had never existed in some explained possible world. In 2005, in the capital 
of India, Delhi there was found a 'monkey man' which had spread violence all 
over the capital. Some people believe that 'monkey man' had never existed. It 
Hughes, OjD.c//.2004:2I. 1)8 
I have dealt with the issue of void proper names in my paper entitled "Frege: The theory of meaning 
concerning proper names". In the paper, I have pointed out a lacuna in Fregean approach over the 
issue. 
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was just wrong information which had been spread by some cunning poHtical 
people in order to create fear in the society. It is also true that such man has 
never been found, up to now. It seems quite controversial that whether 
"monkey man" really existed or not. But Kripke would have insisted that in 
spite of aforesaid fact, the name still designate 'monkey man' in some possible 
world in which he is so called i.e. Delhi. 
In Kripkean system, he insists that a proper name rigidly designates its referent, 
even in counterfactual situations in which the referent is absent. If we say that 
"Sir Syed Alimad Khan" founded "Aligarh Muslim University^" what we mean 
by it? Was it necessary that "Sir Syed Ahmad Khan" founded the 'Aligarh 
Muslim University'? Perhaps not. Some other person would have founded the 
university. "Sir Syed Ahmad Khan" would not have started the mission of 
founding a university at the first place, so that a particular community may rise. 
Kripke's view suggests that in some counterfactual situations, "Sir Syed 
Ahmad Khan" might not have founded the university or 'Aligarh Muslim 
University' might not have been founded at all. 
It seems surprising and awkward but Kripke suggest it as philosophical theory 
and not ordinary man's thought.'^ ^ We may suppose that in some possible 
world "Sir Syed Ahmad Khan" might not have founded the "Aligarh Muslim 
University." It may be argued whether such worlds are possible; Kripke claims 
that there are possibilities of such worlds in terms of presenting descriptions of 
' ° See also, Kripke. o/?.c/7. 290. Kripke held this point taking the example of 'Hitler' 
Actually Kripke is talking about some transworld identity. 
'^^Kripke, o/7.c/7,41. 
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these worlds. Possible worlds are in fact stipulated and not discovered. They do 
not mean a distant concrete world like our actual world. He insists that we may 
suppose that the description regarding possible worlds may be fixed in some 
counterfactual situation like 'the things might'have been'. He further asserts 
that an object may be identified in terms of its properties. The description of 
these properties may be described as the criteria of identity in all possible 
worlds'^ ^. Now such criteria are true in all possible worlds. 
If \yQ provide a description about "Sir Syed Ahmad Khan," we will have to 
provide a necessary and sufficient condition of this person as "Sir Syed Ahmad 
Khan." These conditions include certain properties essential to a certain person 
like "Sir Syed Ahmad Khan." Kripke makes a distinction between rigid 
designator and non-rigid designator. The former is that property of a proper 
name which rigidly designates the same thing in all possible worlds, while the 
later reflects those entities which contingently designates the object i.e. it may 
or may not designate the object. 
In order to refute the thesis of Frege-Russell, Kripke deals with three 
arguments what Salmon asserts as modal, epistemological, and semantical.'^'' 
The modal argument seems to be central to the refutation of Frege-Russell 
doctrine. It also seems to be the most discussed bne. 
"V6W.,44. 
See, Salmon, Reference and Essence, 23-31. 
5.3 Modal Argument: 
In this type of argument Kripke talks in terms of actual and possible worlds . 
Kripke talks an analogy of two ordinary dice from school exercises in 
probability. He holds that "...in fact introduced at a tender age to a set of 
(miniature) possible worlds. The thirty six.possible states of the dice are 
literally thirty six possible worlds...'^^. Now, there is only one, what he calls 
miniature world is actually realized, depending on the face of dice comes up 
such as 2, 4 or 6. 
I think that there remains no confusion on the issue. He further clarifies that 
'"possible worlds' are total 'ways the world might have been' or states or 
histories of the entire world."'^ ^ 
Kripke tries to portray the picture of the theory of proper names in holding that 
we can stipulate a reference by providing some unique properties to someone 
so that we can pick out that a particular individual in some using application of 
proper names. If we say that 'Stephan Hawking' is the person who challenged 
the theory of relativity of Albert Einstein, then there may be several people 
who are unaware of this fact. But these people successfully use the name in 
spite of being ignorant of his theory. But in such cases there is a violation of 
what Kripke calls non circulatory condition'^^ He uses another example of 
'Godel' who proved a theorem of incompleteness of Arithmetic, which is 
The possible worlds may mean different to different philosophers. For example, David Lewis thinks 
that possible worlds are some concrete worlds, similar to this world. 
Kripke.,op.cit. 16. 
'"/6;y.,p-18. 
See also, Kripke.,o/?.d/., 83. 
known as "Godel" theorem. But the reality is that his student "Schmidt" 
actually propounded the theorem. "Godel" somehow obtained the work. Now, 
referring to "Godel," we are actually referring to "Schmidt." 
Kripke tries to identify that the essential properties (attached with a particular 
name) by virtue of which we know a particular referent are not necessarily true 
of the object. The name, "Godel," in this case abbreviate a description in spite 
of the fact that in some counterfactual situation, it turned out to be false. But 
the way it abbreviate a description is different from the approach of Frege and 
Russell.'^ ^ Even if it is discovered that "Godel" wrongly credited for the proof 
of the incompleteness of arithmetic, but still he would be described as "Godel." 
Kripke also rejects Donnellan's suggestion of referential definite description 
according to which a definite description itself may be used as 'referential 
expression' in place of a proper name. 
One of the most significant intuitive doctrines of Kripke is that of proper names 
behaving as rigid designator. In previous example, someone other than 'Sir 
Syed Ahmad Khan' might have founded the university (his grandson Sir Ross 
Masood might have founded later on), but in that case too, the name "Sir Syed 
Ahmad Khan" remains the same. No other person except "Sir Syed Ahmad 
Khan" himself can replace him. Hence, Kripke describes proper names as rigid 
designator, which rigidly designates the same object in all possible worlds, 
irrespective of its properties which may alter across the world in which the 
'^'//)iJ..p.87. Footnote.37. 
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object exists.''^  If a proper name designates rigidly a particular object in all 
possible worlds then the designator may be described as strongly rigid as 
Kripke maintained. 
The concept of rigid designation may be comprehended by the notion of 
transworld identity criteria in which a certain name is stipulated (by some 
description, of the sort what might have occurred to him) and accordingly 
counterfactual situations may be described to explain the behavior of rigid 
designator. 
This view suggests that any theory of meaning concerning proper names is 
reduced to a theory of reference as the theory serves merely for stipulation of 
reference. The theory suggest nothing like meaning but only reference. Proper 
name 'Sir Syed Ahmad Khan' is associated with the description 'the founder of 
Aligarh Muslim University'. Now, what is the meaning of 'Sir Syed Ahmad 
Khan'? It is devoid of meaning or what Russell and Mill call connotation. It 
serves only in the determination of reference i.e. the person who founded 
Aligarh Muslim University, that's all. • . 
According to traditional description theory of Frege and Russell, an individual 
has been assigned such great works as necessarily immanent in their 
personality to perform great tasks. But it is not necessarily true that such 
individual involve in great tasks. For example, 'Sir Syed Ahmad Khan' might 
not have been founded the Aligarh Muslim University. 
'^°Ibid., p.48. 
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Kripke remarks on Searle's observation that a definite description is necessarily 
true for the referent in question. For example, "Sir Syed Ahmad Khan" may be 
described as "the founder of Aligarh Muslm University." But it is not 
necessary that he be "Sir Syed Ahmad Khan." He might not have ever thought 
of founding the university. He might have spent his entire Ufe in the job he was 
in, as "Sadar Amin" in Bijnor, India. Then, it will be impossible to call him as 
"Sir Syed Ahmad Khan." 
According to Kripke's notion of rigid designator, "Sir Syed Ahmad Khan" 
would still be called as "Sir Syed Ahmad Khan" as the name of the same 
person. The properties attributed originally, to him, might not have been 
attributed to him in some counterfactual situation. This theory of Proper name 
is all about fixing a reference in actual world; it may change its course in some 
counterfactual situation.' ^ ' 
Another interesting thing Kripke tries to clear that it is not conditional that the 
designated thing must be presented in all possible worlds. For example, if we 
say that "Sir Syed Ahmad Khan" had not existed at all, even in this case "Sir 
Syed Ahmad Khan" designates rigidly a name which had never been existed in 
any possible world. ' ' 
Kripke tries to frame the problem of reference stipulation. He argues about 
initial baptism in which a referent is fixed by mean of certain description. The 
name being used does not abbreviate description, as Frege and Russell 
Kripke cleared the point that the concept of rigid designation of proper names is applied to English 
language only and not for any other language. 
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maintains. The reference is fixed by mean of some contingent properties of the 
object i.e. in some counterfactual situation the properties of an object may not 
be satisfied. But the name being a rigid designator will continue to refer to that 
object.' 
Kripke's speculation concerning the object containing essential properties may 
be elaborated in his being recognized the distinction between a priori city and 
necessity. He talks about the "table" present in the room where he was 
delivering lecture. The table could have been made up of another material, say, 
of ice. It could have been placed exactly in the same position. But two tables 
are different from each other, as consist of different material. 
5.4 Argument involving Semantics: .; 
This argument does not talk in terms of necessity and possibility as the modal 
argument does. Kripke's refutation of descriptivism may be looked in terms of 
semantic argument. The argument follows that facts regarding the referent of a 
proper name is not contingently true; but it is actually true, provided those facts 
are discovered empirically. However, the same would be contingent; if 
descriptivism account is to be followed i.e. some particular proper name would 
mean same as its corresponding definite description. 
A proper name may be analyzed in correct sense by mean of a definite 
description which is empirically or what Hughes calls semantically equivalent 
' Kripke, op.cit, 114. See also footnote 56,57. It is very important to see the footnotes carefully. 
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to the referent. In order to deal with this sort of argument, I would like to 
consider once again Frege's example of "Aphla" and "Ateb" (The example is a 
general outline of pure descriptivism). Now, "Aphla" abbreviates to 'the 
mountain 5000 meters high from northern region' while "Ateb" abbreviates to 
'the mountain 5000 meters high from southern region'. And the empirical 
discovery has been made that two names, in fact, refer to the same mountain. 
This is impure account of descriptivism. The proposition attributeid to "Aphla" 
is same as the proposition attributed to "Ateb." 
That's why; it is against pure account of descriptivism because for them 
"Aphla" must consist of same unique properties (in terms of quality). 
According to pure descriptivism, it is necessary truth that "Aphla" exists if and 
only if it has got those set of unique properties which uniquely stands for it (the 
same is true for "Ateb"). But here, both the names are sharing most of the 
properties. Hence, pure aspect of descriptivism fails. But still impure or mixed 
aspect remains intact. They seem to hold both names abbreviates same 
description like "the mountain 5000 meters high', however with different 
senses. Before empirical investigation, both "Aphla" and "Ateb" thought to 
refer to different mountains. 
Considering Kripke's insight on the issue, even after empirical investigation, 
both proper names refer to different objects. "Aphla" refer to mountain from 
northern region while "Ateb" refer mountain from southern region. Both the 
names cannot mean the same. Even if there Hvould have been' still another 
mountain which is 5000 meters high from northern region, say, "Apheb;" still 
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"Apheb" may not be called as "Aphla." Hence, -Fregean identity terms "Aphla" 
is not "Ateb." 
Kripke seems to have a doubt whether a proper name has got an aggregation 
(or cluster or set) of purely necessary and sufficient qualitative properties of 
being a proper name.''^ ^ 
Description theories (both pure and mixed) seem to be shattered in front of 
Kripke's semantical argument. Mixed form of description theory may defend, 
to some extent, Kripke's modal argument. 
Ahmed claims that the semantic argument requires that there are some cases in 
which speakers are aware of only one description, uniquely satisfies by the 
referent of a proper name, in spite of accepting the suggestion of cluster theory 
of proper names.'•^ '^  
For example, "Godel," as a proper name, is commonly attributed to 'the man 
who proved a theorem of incompleteness of Arithmetic' and speakers are 
generally ignorant of other descriptions that uniquely satisfy him. But Kripke 
observes that it is quite possible that the description fails to refer to Godel, as a 
person. 
According to cluster approach, some description falls heavy on other, at least to 
common speakers of language. Some specific speaker may know the dominant 
description that falls heavy on the rest descriptions available. 
"Hughes, OjO.ci/. 18. 
'"Ahmed, 0/1 c/7., 30. 
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For example, a proper name like 'Charles Dai-win', consist of several 
descriptions attached to it, but the common or dominant one 'the first man who 
propounded the theory of evolution', fall heavy on the rest. Ignorant speakers 
do not mean 'Charles Darwin' as 'the first man who propounded the theory of 
evolution'. While another description could be 'the man whom historians call 
'Charles Darwin' seems to be more general known to maximum number of 
speaker in a speech community. Hence, 'Charles Darwin' does not mean same 
as 'the first man who propounded the theory of evolution', because the name is 
not semantically equivalent to the dominated dcfmitc description. 
In Kripke's example of "Godel," he was thought as 'the man who proved a 
theorem of incompleteness of Arithmetic'; but in fact 'Schmidt' did so. Now, 
incompleteness of Arithmetic theorem may be attributed to 'Schmidt' and not 
to 'Godel'. But the referent following the description 'the man who proved a 
theorem of incompleteness of Arithmetic' will change (from 'Godel' to 
'Sclmiidt). 
Looking on the speaker's side, the speaker may be aware to use a proper name 
that the name is common to maximum number of speaker in a certain speech 
community (the approach may be called as utilitarian approach). 
Kripke asserts that even in the absence of remembrance of reference in 
borrowing, a person may successfully use a proper name. He seems to suggest 
that the theory of meaning, as proposed by Frege and Russell, is different from 
'^ ^ Ahmed took the example of Columbus' to explain this issue. See, Ibid,32. 
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the theory of reference which reflects that the referent of proper name is 
determined by its description.''^  
Now, the theory of reference or what Ahmed calls reference fixing theory 
seems to be preserved while the theory of meaning of Frege and Russell to be 
I 
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shattered completely by Kripke. However, the theory of reference may be 
charged with criticism through the notion of reference- borrowing practices. A 
person may forget from where he borrowed the reference of a proper name. But 
still he may be successful to refer to that person. Hence, above argument make 
sense that semantic argument against descriptivism does not sounds justified. 
5.5 Epistemological argument: 
Some of Kripke's arguments are of epistemological nature, dealing with 
knowing the truth regarding reference a priori. Kripke's use^  of 'Godel's 
example is in fact two fold i.e. for epistemological as well as for modal 
arguments. The former need not be confused with the later, and in fact there is 
no confusion either. 
Looking on the epistemological aspect of Kripke's argument; we may assert 
that 'Godel' stands for 'the man who proved incompleteness of arithmetic 
theorem'; leads us truth about 'Godel' a priori, as per the conviction of 
description theory (pure). 
But Kripke insists that inspite of the fact that 'Godel' proved incompleteness of 
arithmetic theorem, the truth may not be known a priori. He provides 
'^ '^ Knpke.,op.a7. 31. See also, Ahmed, op cit., 35. 
'"/Wc/.,35. 
'^ ^ As Ahmed holds, see p-37. 
counterexamples in holding that some other person 'Schmidt' discovered the 
same and we have wrongly credited the same to 'Godel'. Now, it is later 
discovery and hence the truth is known a posteriori. The counter example is 
actually two fold i.e. one to refute descriptivism and another to refute 
Imrnanual Kant's epistemology and his slogan synthetic judgement a priori. 
In Kripke's example, 'Godel' is not equivalent to 'the man who proved 
incompleteness of arithematic theorum', which is mixed description. In 
contrast, pure descriptivism expexts that there is some description which is 
qualitative similar to a proper name like 'Godel'. 
Now, even in the absence of any genuine unique description attributed to him; 
one may still refer to 'Godel', but the name is again including itself This is 
what Kripke calls violation of circulatory condition. 
So, the knowledge of 'Godel' seems to be very difficult to knov/ a priori. For 
example, 'Diamond' purely describes 'the hardest substance on earth'. The 
knowledge may be known a priori as the speaker refers to the quality of 
something as hardest substance called 'Diamond' which nothing satisfies. 
However, if some discovery reveals that there is another substance which is 
hardest; then the knowledge would naturally be turned out to be a posteriori. 
Now, 'Diamond' does not satisfy the quality of being hardest substance. Even 
if there is availability of pure description, the description still fails to provide 
epistemological account of proper names. Kripke tries to convey that there can 
never be such description which can replace ai proper name. In other words, 
'^' See Frank Thilly, A Histoiy of Philosophy. 
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names can not abbreviate descriptions {pure or mixed). The knowledge of 
proper name does not obtain a priori in all the cases. 
Kripke defended descriptivist approach by providing several counterexamples 
like the definition of 'one meter' as 'stick S is one meter long at to'. This 
definition plays no role in providing meaning to 'one meter'. Kripke insisted 
that the definition merely suggests 'one meter' as the standard of length and not 
the length in itself'""^  
Kripke holds that 'one meter' may designate rigidly this entity i.e. length, in all 
possible worlds. The description of 'one meter-' as 'the length of S at to' does 
not necessarily designate it rigidly. In some counterfactual situation, the 
definition may change owing to some conditions like excessive heat or cold 
which may expand or condense the length of stick S at time to. 
The problem before Kripke is to fix the reference, not to provide a meaning to 
proper names. That's why he admits that definitions like that of 'one meter' 
suggest how reference of 'one meter' is stipulated. Epistemologically, Kripke 
asserts that the person who provides such definition might have been aware of 
it as length of 'one meter', a priori. That's why anyone may know 'the length 
of stick S at to' as 'one meter' without discovering himself that whether length 
of the stick as standard of length, is one meter or not''*'. Metaphysically 
treatment of this statement suggests it to be a contingent statement where 'one 
meter' behaves as a rigid designator. However the length is subject to change 
Naming and Necessity, 54. 
'"ibid. p.56. 
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as per the conditions like heat or cold. In this Sense the statement may reflect 
1 142 
contingent a prion truth. 
But I think that the standard of length is defined according to some particular 
conditions like a specific temperature and pressure. In this sense, the length is 
not going to change and will too behave as a rigid designator. In other words 
the description 'the length of stick S at to' (where to is defined) behaves as a 
rigid designator along with 'one meter'. This standard unit of length i.e. 'one 
meter' in MKS system is stipulated under specific ideal condifions. So the 
question of change in length does not arise in the first place. If we don't bother 
to preserve the standard unit of length as exactly 'one meter' according to the 
provided definition, then surely we may ghange external conditions like 
temperature or pressure. In this case, the definition may not rigidly designate 
'one meter', but it will not be the length which we call 'one meter' either. 
Kripke insists that the knowledge of proper names cannot be obtained a priori. 
5.6 Natural Kind Terms: 
Kripke maintains that his refutation against descriptivism for proper names also 
applies to the terms of natural kind''*^ He argues that natural kind terms like 
'water', 'gold' consist of same properties which are not necessarily known a 
priori. He refutes long standing doctrine of Kant in holding that analytic 
judgement like 'gold is yellow metal' may not be known a priori. In some 
" See also Naming and Necessity, Footnote 21, p.56.1t is not 'analytic' which demands necessary a 
priori truth. Here Kripke seems to successfully refute Immanuel Kant. 
"'^ Kripke,o/?.d/. 127-8., NN-322-3. 
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counterfactual situation, gold may not be of yellow in color. However, the term 
consists of some essential properties. For example, atomic number of gold is 
seventy nine (79)''*''. According to Kripke, this is essential property that may be 
attributed to gold. Likewise, the chemical composition of water is H2O, which 
is its essential property. 
In general natural kind terms are those expressions that may include elements 
like 'gold' compounds like 'water' aad species like 'tiger' etc. Kripke does not 
bother to describe in detail about the nature of natural kind terms. 
He claims that in addition to proper names, terms of natural kinds too behave 
as rigid designators. Scott Soames shares his observation with Kripke in 
holding that the propagation of natural kind terms is like proper names i.e. 
following a chain of communication. The terms are Millian and rigid. He 
asserts that the semantic properties of terms ate. different from their predicates. 
For example, 'red' rigidly designates color red. He holds that the predicate 'is 
red' refers to all things that are red colored which are likely to vary in different 
counterfactual situation. Hence, the predicate 'is red' is non-rigid.'''^ Kripke 
maintains that natural kind terms consist of some 'contingent properties' that 
are phenomenal in nature. 
For the first time, in the history of philosophy, Kripke tries to refute Kant's 
notion of a priori and analytic judgement and Considering theoretical 
identification, such as 'Water is H2O', 'Golcl is the element with atomic 
""* See also, Kripke.op.cil, 123-126, NN-319-21. 
'"^  Soames Scott, What are Natural Kinds?, School of Philosophy, Department of South California, 
Dec.2008. 
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number 79.''^'^ Now what are the essential properties of gold? Kripke says that 
according to Kant 'Gold is a yellow metal' is analytic judgment which is a 
priori. But we may observe thsA yellowness of gold can't be taken a priori as its 
essential property. In some counterfactual situation the color of gold may be 
changed, say, 'blue' instead of yellow. Hence, it can't be known a priori. When 
we heard of gold, we heard about thing sometimes discovered as a part of some 
speech-community. It contains certain properties and we call it 'Gold'. Kripke 
assumes that we may discover some another substance, say, fool's gold which 
resembles gold, in terms of some properties like yellowness. But in fact fool's 
gold is not real gold. Here the term 'Gold' behave as a rigid designator, which 
behave rigidly in all possible worlds like proper names. 
Some other natural kind terms too behave as a rigid designator. For example, 
'tiger' may be described with the description 'four legged striped carnivorous 
belonging to cat family'. Now the description is appealing to description 
theorists. The 'tiger' belongs to this unique description. The terms of natural 
kind may also be called as Proper names because they behave rigidly like them. 
That's why Kripke extends the notion of Proper names to natural kind terms 
such as 'gold', 'tiger', 'water', 'heat' etc. which are introduced by some 
introducers with descriptions like gold 'is a metal which consist of atomic 
number 79', tiger is 'four legged striped carnivorous belonging to cat family'. 
Water 'is H2O'. The behavior of these terms as a rigid designator is so because 
some of their properties like yellowness of gold is a contingent property but its 
"^/6/rf.,p.II6. 
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atomic number seventy nine (79) is an essential property of gold. The essential 
property is not going to change in all possible worlds. 
Ki'ipke maintains that those statements are necessarily true which are followed 
bj' some scientific discoveries such as gold possess atomic number 79. But no 
discovery is the last work. It opens to explore future scientific investigations. 
He asserts that the doctrine of rigid designation may be applied to the terms of 
natural kind such as 'tiger', 'dog' etc. Names of bacteria such as Escherichia 
Coli, bacteriophage, Herpes virus too behave as rigid designators because they 
belong' to a particular species. Mass terms such as 'gold', 'water' also behave 
likewise. And the terms of natural phenomenon such as 'light', 'sound', 'heat' 
also fall in the same category. 
Mill holds that common name or natural kind terms consist of connotation 
owing to their specific association with some species. In agreement with 
Russell, Mill holds that genuine Proper name serves the purpose of denotation 
only. While definite description possesses both denotation and connotation''*^ 
The cluster description theory suggests a cluster of properties which determines 
the referent of a Proper name. Kripke depicts that such cluster might not have 
been associated with the referent. But the term could have been existed even in 
the absence of the referent. Again,- Kripke tries to go in the problem of 
stipulation of reference. How reference of a certain term may be stipulated? 
Any term fixes its reference by mean some baptism like the definition of 'one 
meter', which stipulates its reference. Likewise, natural kind terms such as 
'•*' See also Kripke,o/?.c/7,134. 
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'alcohol', 'apple', 'lion' etc. too fixes in similar fashion. And the terms of 
natural phenomenon like 'sound', 'light' etc. also do so by mean of scientific 
observation like light is that 'which shows a stream of photon'. This is how 
terms pass in a linear chain of communication, irrespective of the ways which 
sp(;aker acquire to pass the same. I may assert that Kripke tries to overlook the 
notion of Fregean 'Sense', which seems not be avoided so easily. He also tries 
to depart from Kant slogan of synthetic judgment a priori in holding that all 
terms behaving as rigid designator reflect truth but contingently. The properties 
of referent may change in some possible world (transworld identity), but the 
term is going to behave as a rigid designator in all possible worlds. 
Kripke, raised another question of theoretical identification. He holds that even 
some scientific discoveries such as gold's atomic number 79 may turned out to 
be false as in case of identity terms i.e. Hesperus=Phosphorous. Now, Hesperus 
might not have been Phosphorous. Taking another example, Kripke argue that 
the identification of pain is often associated with the stimulation of C-fibers 
which is contingent truth. Because in some counterfactual situation 'pain' may 
not be associated with 'C-fibres firing', hence it is contingent property of 
'pain'. However, the phenomenological term 'pain' behaves as a rigid 
designator like Proper names. In similar line of argument he thinks that 'pain' 
could have existed without producing any sensaition of pain. Hence, description 
like 'pain' is 'C-fibres firing' is accidental property of 'pain', which could have 
been otherwise. The referent of such terms is determined by these accidental 
properties. In case of 'pain' the referent may be picked out by its 'immediate 
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phenomenological quality''"^^ While other such terms like 'heat', the referent 
may be picked out by the accidental or contingent properties (as 'molecular 
accelerated motion'). The sensibility in human beings would not have been so 
as to associate 'molecular accelerated motion' with 'heat'. Now, what is the 
cause of different behavior of reference stipulation of two such terms? 'Pain' is 
phenomenological term while 'heat' is something which may be known a 
posteriori. 
Kripke's argument against identity theorists seems to be well directed in 
holding that a physical state such as C-fibres 'firing corresponds to a mental 
state (pain) and vive- versa. It is not, the relation of identity between them as 
there lays a possibility of existence of one without another. Metaphysically, 
Kripke describes C-fibres as created by God which can stimulate them in some 
physical state, irrespective of its being felt as C-fibers in the form of pain. 
Hence, the relation between them can't be of identity because stimulation of C-
fibres may show its existence without pain. 
In general, natural kind terms may be described,as common nouns that apply to 
mass terms such as 'gold' or 'water'. Kripke maintains that his refutation 
against descriptivism for proper names also applies to terms of natural kind . 
He argues that natural kind terms like 'water', 'gold' consist of same properties 
which are not necessarily known a priori. He refutes long standing doctrine of 
Kant in holding that analytic judgment like 'gold is yellow metal' may not be 
known a priori. In some counterfactual situation, gold may not be of yellow in 
'^ ^ Kripke, op.c/7. 152. 
""Kripke, op.cit. 127-8., NN-322-3. 
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color. However, the term consists of some essential properties. For example, 
atomic number of gold is seventy nine (79).'^'' According to Kripke, this is 
essential property that may be attributed to , gold. Likewise, the chemical 
composition of water is H2O, which is its essential property. 
In general natural kind terms are those expressions that may include elements 
like 'gold' compounds like 'water' and species like 'tiger' etc. Kripke does not 
bother to describe in detail about the nature of natural kind terms. 
H(3 claims that in addition to proper names, terms of natural kinds too behave 
as rigid designators. Kripke maintains that natural kind terms consist of some 
'contingent properties' that are phenomenal in nature. For example, gold 
consist of yellowness, malleability, glittering nature etc.; water possess 
colorless, volatile ness, liquid at room temperature etc. Tiger has four legs, 
felinity (belonging to cat family), being carnivorous etc. He holds that these 
contingent properties attributed to the natural kinds, may not be known a 
priori. Some or all of these properties may not be attributed to a particular 
natural kind terms necessarily a priori. Kripke maintains that: 
Could we discover that gold was in fact yellow? ... Suppose there were an 
optical illusion which made the substance appear to be yellow;' but, in fact, 
once the peculiar properties of the atmosphere were removed, we would see 
tliat it is actually blue...what would be announced would be that though it 
''° See also, Kripke, op.cit., 123-126, NN-319-21. 
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appeared that gold was yellow, in fact gold has turned out not to be yellow, but 
blue.'^' 
In other place, Kripke holds that we use the term 'tiger' to designate a species, 
and that anything not of this species, even though it looks like a tiger, is not in 
fa.ct a tiger. Just as something may have all the properties by which we 
originally identified tigers and not yet be a tiger, so we might also find out 
tigers had none of the properties by which we originally identified them. 
Perhaps none are quadrupedal, none tawny yellow, none carnivorous, and so 
on; all these properties turned out to be based on optical illusion or other errors, 
as in case of gold." ^ ^ 
It seems plausible to accept that in some counterfactual situation, tiger has got 
none of these properties. Still we hold that tiger, exist but don't have got any of 
these properties. Hence, the knowledge of tiger because of these properties may 
not be obtained a priori. This epistemological argument looks more appealing 
HI case of other terms like gold, water, which has got some sort of chemical 
• • 153 
composition. 
For pure descriptivism, a proper name may be known a priori if and only if the 
name follows a unique description. Epistemologically, the knowledge of a 
P'roper name may be obtained by mean of a unique description which the 
ptroper name satisfies. 
'^'Kripke, OjD.c;/. 118, NN, 315-6. 
'"Kripke, o/?.c//., 121. 
' See also, Ahmed.op.c;7.6l. 
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In some using practices of proper names, it is assumed for descriptivism that 
competent speaker possess a knowledge (by mean of some analysis providing 
definition of tliat term) of some geometrical term like triangle (the competent 
speaker knows a priori that the sum total of all angles of a triangle is 180 
degree; of chemical term like water, gold(a priori knowledge of some unique 
properties).; of biological term like tiger, cat, Escherichia Coli, etc. 
Now, it is a matter of speculation that the natural kind terms seem to satisfy 
pure descriptivism account but only on the condition that are necessarily true of 
that term. According to Kripke, Mill accepted such account of these terms, but 
not that of proper names. 
Kripke utters that natural kind terms consist of properties that are necessarily 
true of it. The properties those are true of the term in all possible worlds. 
Moreoyer, these properties are subject to empirical investigation also. Gold 
consist of atomic number 79 is an example of such property. Now, the property 
may not be attributed to anything except gold. Even if some counterfactual 
situation, if we use the term gold we could not deny that element which has got 
si^ venty nine protons in its nucleus. 
tlere, pure descriptivism account may be preserved because a term like 'gold' 
necessarily follows necessary, analytic a priori descriptions. Ahmed raises such 
objection to this position of Kripke: 
It is trivial that in that world iron pyrites both exists and was iron 
pyrites? We can easily amend the argument to get around this 
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objection. We simply suppose that w contains iron pyrites, where 
gold is actually found while making no stipulation that the iron 
pyrites is not gold."^ "^  
The argument does not seem sound because 'iron pyrites' and 'gold' are two 
separate term, however, resembling each other. But any resemblance between 
two terms means distinction as with other terms which do not resemble at all. 
Even if, we do not stipulate that the iron pyrite is not gold; then it is taken for 
granted that iron pyrites is not, need not to be, gold. 
i4.hmed further goes to consider the intuitions (which seem to be acceptable, at 
least to Ahmed) that there would be a world where gold did not exist or there 
v/ould be a world where gold did not have atomic number 79. In nutshell, he is 
arguing that there are contrary intuitions which questions necessary properties 
cf gold in some possible world.'^ ^ 
It seems counterexample to Kripke, and naturally plausible to suppose. But 
answer may be provided in term of what Hughes calls bi-vocal aspect of proper 
names. The name 'gold' may be used for two referents. A persori may borrow 
the term 'gold' and superimpose the term on some new referent which is not 
element and does not consist of atomic number 79. But still, the new name (in 
new counterfactual situation) 'gold' don't have anything to do with old name 
•gold', which is also used by community of speakers who have got a common 
language. If I am right to infer, then Ahmed's argument is not well directed. 
'^ ''Ahmed,OjD.c/7 63. 
'"rt/rf.63-64. 
131 
However, Kripke's position against the thesis of Frege and Russell wavers a 
little by Ahmed's argument. 
To encourage pure descriptivism of Frege and Russell, 'gold' refers to such 
properties which nothing else describes or uniquely satisfies. Now, it is known 
a priori that gold satisfies such and such properties. Ahmed holds that "...it is 
unclear that the epistemological and modal claims refute the Frege-Russell 
thesis for natural kind terms."'^ ^ 
Kripke targets Frege and Russell, along with the Mill's account of natural kind 
te:rms (Lecture III, Naming and Necessity), while in lecture II he argues against 
descriptivism as proposed by Fregean and Russellian thesis. If the term 'tiger' 
has got various properties like a large carnivorous quadripedal feline, tawny 
yellow in color with blackish transverse stripes and white belly,'" then it is not 
necessary that the 'tiger' word satisfies all the properties (or weighted most or 
dominant property, as per descriptivism) apriori}^^ 
Kripke continues that in the absence of these properties (that is attributed to 
'tiger' by a certain community of speakers or by Shorter Oxford Dictionary), 
there may be a species different from 'tiger', say, it belongs to class reptile; 
having internal structure of reptilian type. But we can only say that the species 
belongs not to tiger but to some other animal like it. So, the properties 
attributed to natural tiger (or as the dictionary describes) may not be known a 
prion. 
'^ '^ Ahmed, op.clt. 68. 
'"shorter Oxford English Dictionary. 
'^Yripke, o/J.c/7. 318. 
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Believers of descriptivism may defend that there must be some purely, 
uniquely, analytic, necessary descriptions that may be attributed to tiger (as the 
dictionary tells). But what are the methods to acquire a priori knowledge of 
something (in the form of satisfying some unique properties or dominated 
ones), of something that may be called as 'tiger'? Is it the internal structure of 
mammals? Or are there some external properties (which are contingent, as 
Kripke holds)? Kripke suggests internal structure to be an empirical discovery. 
That's why descriptivism defense seems to be shaken, as they seem to be at 
loss to provide any descriptions that uniquely satisfies to the tiger. If some 
advocate of descriptivism insist that 'tiger' is that which may be described as 
'the animal that has got the properties of tiger'; then the description is 
becoming impure, and what Kripke calls violates circulatory condition. 
If we take geometrical term like triangle, the describing the term as geometrical 
figure consisting of three sides and the sum total of all angles of a triangle is 
180 degree. It may present a definition providing analytic and necessary 
description of something being a triangle. In the geometrical term, 
descriptivism seems to be defended in supplying some unique, analysis 
providing qualitative description. 
Hughes points this issue out that Gabriel Segal claims that a natural term like 
'water' is actually determines some extension honditions that leaives open the 
possibility that something is water (however, it could not been HiO).'^ ^ Now, 
'"Hughes.op.c//. 52. 
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scientific discoveries changed extension condition of the term water by 
stopping what Segal says a motley concept. Before 1750 (scientific discovery 
of water), it would not have been called as H2O. Only scientific discoveries 
endorse it with H2O. The same is true of gold (possessing atomic number 79); 
so is for 'tiger'. 
Now, if water had been discovered with 'such and such properties' and 
chemical composition H2O in 1750, it is not like that it had just started an 
expression of its extension condition; It was exactly the same in composition 
even before the discovery. Descriptivism still has to face Kripke's refutation as 
the situation shows contingent truth a posteriori instead of necessary truth a 
priori (epistemological account of descriptivism).'^ ° 
Kripke clarifies it that he is not presenting an organized theory of the reference 
of proper names, instead he tries to depict that is how proper names and natural 
kind terms determine and stipulate reference. The reference of proper names 
and natural kind terms are determined by a causal chain of communication 
linked with the history of that proper name or natural kind terms. 
Epistemologically, descriptivism (at least pure) tries to motivate an empirical-
less, a priori knowledge. Kripke contributes in refuting such an account of 
knowledge. Alternatively, he tries to endorse a posteriori knowledge. 
If the term 'water' has got impurities; then it would be still called 'water.' It is 
appealing to suppose that the contamination of water may change its physical 
"'" See also, Hughes, op.cil. 54. 
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and even chemical composition, then the stuff may not be described as 'water' 
in the stipulated sense in which a community of speakers use the term. 
In his work Language and Nature,' ' Chomsky holds that some stuff, to be 
'water' is based on its practical utility that interest is the concern of human 
beings. He takes example of a cup of water, when introduced a tea beg in to it; 
it becomes a tea and not water. However, the cup still contains water as H2O 
(along with added flavor of tea). Hughes points out that it does not contradict 
Kripke's assertions regarding the issue, he calls "... the relevant senses or 
standards of application are different."'^ ^ The point is that, this position does 
not provide any harm to Kripkean, thesis. Kripke maintains that the term 
'water' is stipulated to some unique set of essential properties which are in 
service of hs reference determination and stipulation. This is what philosophers 
belonging to descriptivism (like Frege, Russell, Searle), are doing. 
If we consider the approach of John Searle, then using the term 'water' as part 
of primary aspect of the speaker, his secondary aspect may be, say, a cup of tea 
(what Chomsky is describing); but still he nleans water which is H2O as its 
chemical composition etc. Hence, the confusion in describing impure water for 
the term 'water' is not making any difference as far as use of the natural kind 
term 'water', is concerned. Hughes puts it as "...the relevant senses or standard 
of application are different."'^ ^ 
'*' Noam, Chomsky, Mind, 104 (1995),22, 
'^ ^Hughes, o;7c;7.,64. 
'"'ibid, 64. 
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He holds that: 
"A strong form of Kripke's thesis- that "water" rigidly 
designates H2O is unambiguously and standard independently 
true-seems to be both initially plausible, and defensible, in the 
face of the arguments offered against it by Aune and 
Chomsky..."'^^ 
Kripke provides some surprising metaphysical assertions. In Naming and 
Necessity, he says that cats might turn out to be strange demons. In his view, 
cats might turn out to be animal, different from our general perceptions about 
cats and not that cats do not exist.'^ ^ He says that cats could have been 
discovered as belonging not to animal species, but to demons. But still, the term 
'cat', is going to remain 'cat'. All we can say is that the animal discovered does 
not belong to cat species. So, in actual and possible world, the 'cat' means a 
certain species of cat while demons means what Kripke calls 'cat-like being 
which is not an animal.'"^^ 
Now, reference stipulation practices natural kind terms follows, as per 
Descriptivism, some description, but the description is open ended i.e. it does 
not describes whether the term belong to a class of amphibian, birds, reptilian, 
or mammals, or even demons. In contrast, some terms like 'gold' are closed 
ended i.e. its description as 'the element possessing atomic number seventy 
'''ibid, 65. 
Kripke, op.cit. 319. 
'*^  Kripke, o/?.c//. 321. 
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nine (79) reflects its quality of being an element'^'.This is the weighted most, 
dominated description that may be attached to gold (to descriptivism or 
essential property (to Kripke). 
Ahmed tries to refute Kripke's thesis that 'gold' consist of some essential 
properties i.e. atomic number seventy nine (79), in holding that the premises of 
counterexample i.e. 'it would be a world where gold did not exist,' may be an 
acceptable intuition a metaphysical possibility. 
Kripke puts same argument for phenomenal terms for theoretical identification 
like 'light' (according to descriptivism, is an abbreviated description of 'stream 
of photons'), as he provided for mass terms like 'water'. There may be some 
possible world in which 'light' is not associated with 'stream of photons'. 
Kripke's utters: 
...When we have discussed a phenomenon which in all possible 
worlds will be molecular motion- which could not have failed to 
be molecular motion, because that's what the phenomenon is.'^ ^ 
170 
5.7 The New theory of reference: allegation and criticisms of Kripke 
The main idea of rigid designation seems to rest on the assumption that Kripke 
actually originated the idea. It was Ruth Barcan Marcus who originated the 
"'^  See also, Hughes, 0/? c//.,66. 
'** Ahmed, ojoc/V.,64. 
'*'Kripke.o/7.d/133. 
'™ My intention to pin down this allegation on Kripke by Smith is to critically investigate Kripke's 
thesis regarding reference of proper names. I am not intended to produce arguments for or against 
Smith. In fact, there can be none. These allegations seem to be one sided and what Soames calls is a 
work of credit and claims. 
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idea of rigid designation. It is indeed a big claim to made, but Quentin Smith 
did so. He raises objection in attribution of 'New Theory of Reference' to Saul 
Kripke and other leading philosophers of that time but ignoring Ruth Barcan 
Marcus who actually originated the theory. David Braun shows that direct 
reference theory concerning proper names was mainly provided by several 
landmarks of philosophy of language including Saul Kripke, David Kaplan, 
Keith Donnellan, Scott Soames etc. (Braun, 1994: 465, n. I).'^' 
Kripke tries to portray the futility of identity between names. Marcus depicts 
that 'identity between names are necessary''^ ^. For instance, 'Cicero' is 'TuUy' 
if somebody thinks this way; it means that the person believes that two names 
'Cicero' and 'TuUy' reflect necessary truths. Marcus uses the term 'tag' for 
Proper names. She depicts that Proper names serves merely the function of 
tagging. Now, I think that tagging seems to be like Russell's notion of 
denotation. In other words, the notion of tag seems to be associated with 
Russell's notion of Proper names working as denoting phrase. 
This property of proper names seems to be not accepted by Quine. He holds 
that in the evening planet 'Venus' may be tagged as 'Hesperus' and the same 
planet may be tagged as 'Phosphorous' in the morning. Later, empirical 
investigation reveals that the same planet had been tagged twice . But these 
empirical investigation shows that there is only one referent i.e. planet Venus, 
"'A'larcus. Kripke and the Origin of New Theory of Re/erhnce'm 'Synthese', Volume 104, No. 2, 
August 1995, pp. 179-189. Reprinted in (eds. James Fetzer and Paul Humphreys), The New Theory of 
Reference: Kripke, Marcus and Its Origins, Kluwer Academic Publishers: Synthese Library Series 
1998,3-12. 
'•'^ Marcus, Ruth Barcan: 1961, 'Modalities and Intensional Languages', Synthese, 100. 
' " See also, Kripke,o/7.c//, 100. 
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then tagging twice may provide no harm to oiir reference stipulation practice 
owing to the fact that it is known that 'Hesperus=Phosphorous'. Marcus says 
that such cases may be dealt by some dictionary which shows the same referent 
for two Proper names. 
Kripke emphasizes, '...being present at that discussion, I remember that she 
advocated the view that if you really have names, a good dictionary should be 
able to,,tell you that whether they have the same reference.''^ '* He thinks above 
view as incorrect and hence identity between names need not be necessarily 
true. But Quentin Smith criticizes this observation of Kripke, as Marcus later 
made it clear that what she meant by using the word 'dictionary' is the 
dictionary in mind that work just like encyclopedia (where names are present 
with same reference). 
Quine's idea that this twice tagged event may be applied to ordinary proper 
names. Kripke concludes that identity between names may not be true 
necessarily. The identity may be known a prioh^''^. However after empirical 
investigation, we may know that 'Hesperus=Ph6sphorus' i.e. a posteriori. 
It may also be inferred that 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorous' work as rigid 
designator in all possible worlds, when used as Proper names. Planet Venus is 
referred by both names in other possible worlds too, because reference fixing 
practices may be used in that world like providing description like our actual 
world. The point is that if we come to know by empirical investigation that 
""1^1 ,101 . 
'"Smilh. Quentin. 'Marcus, Kripke, and tlie Origin of Tiie New Theory of Reference' in Svnihese. 
Volume 104, No. 2, August 1995, 179-189. Reprinted in (eds. James Fetzer and Paul Humpiireys). 
"%-rf.,101. ' ; • •• 
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'Hesperus' referring to the same object as 'Phosphorous' is referring. Even if 
we infer that in some counterfactual situation, 'Hesperus' is refereeing to a 
certain star and 'Phosphorous' is referring to another star. Hence both are 
refereeing to different stars. In this case too Kripke says from inference of this 
actual world, we may say that both are refereeing to the same object. From this 
discussion we may deduce the following: 
a. "Venus"=" Venus" is known a priori. 
b. "Hesperus" and "Phosphorous" are functioning as rigid designators. 
c. "Hesperus" and "Phosphorous" are refereeing to the same object. 
d. Point iii) is not necessarily known a priori. 
e. Identity between names may not be necessarily true. 
f Point i) and ii), are true in all possible worlds. Point iii) is subject to 
empirical investigation. Hence, the reference of these two names is fixed by the 
empirical investigation of language user. Here, he seems to overlap with the 
notion of sense in that sense depends on the ways of presentation of an object. 
That's in this case senses are different. The sense too depends on the value of 
cognition i.e. empirical investigation. 
g. Kripke doubts in point iv) and asserts that ' there are contingent 
marks by which we identify a certain planet and give it a name''^^. We may 
also infer that: 
h. "Hesperus"^ "Phosphorous" may be known a posteriori. 
'"Kripke, o/?.c/7. 105. 
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He tries to explore the issue of stipulation of reference by means of using the 
notion of rigid designation. Identity between names is the issue of linguistic 
behavior. The reason for not doing so may be a belief on the person who first 
discovered the fact and then passed it to other speakers, perhaps in a linear 
fashion or what Kripke calls in a chain of communication. Hence, Kripke 
would not have been visualized the need to verification of the empirical 
investigation (i.e. whether the discovery that 'Hesperus'='Phosphorous') is 
right. May be it would not have been the case that the discoverer might have 
seen same other body in the morning instead of "Venus" and tagged it'^ ^ as 
'Phosphorous'. In spite of his repeated observation, he would have wrongly 
named, the body observed in the evening as "Hesperus" instead of 
"Phosphorous". In either case, there is wrong identification of name(s) with the 
same referent i.e. Venus. Another remarkable objection provided by Kripke 
runs like this. The fact that 'Hesperus'='Phosphorous' and the referent being 
the same object i.e. Venus, the claim that this identity between names is 
necessarily a posteriori truth. There is quite possibility that in future it may be 
discovered that "Hesperus" is not "Phosphorous". 
Quentin Smith asserts that Marcus provided great contribution and more than 
anybody else. She actually developed a new theory of reference. Kaplan 
advocates that new theory of proper names is provided by Kripke. He also 
coined the term rigid designation for proper names. He holds that a proper 
name designates the same thing in all possible worlds. But as far as this term is 
According to Marcus proper names serves the function of tagging. 
141 
concerned with common nouns, the credit should be given to Marcus and not to 
Kripke, as Kaplan did. Hence, Kripke's idea of proper names, behaving as a 
rigid designator is actually credited to Marcus and not to Kripke. 
It is indeed a big allegation. However, if the allegation is proved to be true, it 
may correct our grave misunderstanding regarding the issue. It is like Kripke's 
own example of 'Godel' who propounded 'incompleteness of arithmetic, but 
the theorem was actually given by 'Schmidt'. 'Godel' somehow obtained the 
work and published it by his own name. Of course, the same is not true of 
Kripke. It seems a misunderstanding on the part of initial acceptors of using 
applications of proper names. It is like a case of reference changing. 
John Perry, a scholar contributing in new theory of reference too ignores 
Marcus's contribution in new theory of reference. He thinks, in agreement with 
Kripke's idea that the reference of a proper name may be stipulated by causal 
chain of communication. Refuting Frege and Russell, he already maintained 
that descriptions don't play any role iri reference determination of proper name. 
Fregean sense too falls short of determining reference of a proper name. David 
Braun, in his work Nous, too suggests that Kripke, Dormellan, Kaplan, Salmon 
and Soames clearly advocate 'Direct theory of reference'. David Kaplan 
emphasizes 'New theory of Proper names' to Saul Kripke. 
According to Marcus, a proper name is an identifying description that serves 
just the function of tagging. It possesses no meaning or what Russell calls 
connotation. It is not an abbreviated description i.e. it can't be convertible with 
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any description.'''' It forms the basis of 'direct reference theory of proper 
names'. For example, "Kripke" refers only to or tags to "Kripke" and not to 
any description like 'The Author of Naming and Necessity'. In this sense 
proper names are directly referential. The problem of reference stipulation, 
encountered by Marcus runs like this. She asserts that descriptions do serve in 
discrimination of an object. But the practice is different form giving a proper 
name to an object. 
In Naming and Necessity, Kripke talks about Teference fixing practices of a 
proper name through some unique description. But the description is not part of 
the meaning of proper names. He thinks that the reference fixing practices are 
performed through a causal chain of communication which projects backward 
towards what he calls initial baptism, his innovation lies in the invention of this 
concept. 
What is more interesting thing observed by Quentin Smith is that modal 
arguments that were thought to be attributed tp Kripke, were actually provided 
by Marcus. Considering identity between names, "Hesperus" may be 
substituted for "Phosphorous". But in modal contexts, it may not be true. The 
identity merely reflects equivalence between two identity terms like 
"Hesperus" and "Phosphorous". The star that has seen in morning might have 
been seen in the evening. Refuting description theorists like Frege and Russell, 
Marcus depicts that if they would be right then a description like 'Venus is the 
'"Marcus, Ruth Barcan: 1961, 'Modalities and Intensional Languages', Synthese, 309-310. 
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evening star' would have been known a priori . While in fact, it is known a 
posteriori as it is subject to empirical investigation. Marcus further asserts that 
"Venus" shows modally stableseme, when an equivalence is created in holding 
that "Venus"= "Venus". It may be asserted that mere reflection of the term 
"Venus" shows that it signifies both "morning star" and "evening star". Now, 
previously described two names of the planet "Venus" i.e. "Phosphorous" and 
"Hesperus" may be substituted one for the another, as per the principle of 
substitutivity in all possible worlds where planet 'Venus' exists. And these 
names do not do so in the counterfactual situations where the planet do not 
exists. Hence, the names would behave as non-rigid designators'^'. 
According to what smith calls 'New theory of reference', proper names refer 
directly, hence are directly referential. While definite description, as per 
description theories, refer indirectly tlirough somewhat Marcus calls modally 
stable sense. 
Quentin Smith attributes another doctrine of Marcus that was thought to belong 
to Kripke i.e. the idea of necessity a posteriori. Now, the two names of planet 
"Venus" may be recognized as belonging ,to the same planet, only after 
empirical discovery. In this sense, the truth occurred is necessary but a 
posteriori. 
Most of the ideas found in Naming and Necessity (1980), were actually 
originated in 1961, when Marcus presented a paper entitled "Modalities and 
'^VW. 310. 
'^ '/6/W.,194. 
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Intentional Language". Kripke attended the seminar in which the paper was 
presented. He deliberately overlooked to quote Marcus in his work. It seems a 
fact, not an allegation. Smith suspects that Kripke might not have understood or 
grasped the idea delivered by Marcus at that time. Later he came to understand 
so but he never bothered to announce it. Smith asserts that: 
I believe a reasonable explanation of why Kripke did not 
attribute the central features of the "New Theory" to Marcus is 
that he originally misunderstood Marcus's New Theory of 
Reference. When he eventually understood it, after a year or two, 
the insight that came made it seem that the ideas were new. I 
suspect that such instances occur fairly frequently in the history 
ofthoughtandart.'^^ ' •; 
These are serious allegations imposed on Kripke by Smith. Scott Soames 
reacted against this allegation. He asserted that "...the charges Smith makes 
against Kripke are false and that the historical picture he paints are 
inaccurate. "'^ •^  He presents a systematic account of whole scenario and 
concluded that "...I also hope that no one will be distracted by Smith's 
overheated rhetoric and irresponsible sowing of discord from the truly 
outstanding contribution of both Kripke and Marcus."'^ "^  Later, Stephen Neale 
confirmed that there is no plagiarism found in Kripke's new theory of 
'^ ^Smiih, Quentin. 'Marcus, Kripke, and the Origin of The New Theory of Reference' in Synlhese, 
Volume 104, No. 2, August 1995, pp. 179-189. Reprinted in (eds. James Fetzer and Paul Humphreys). 
'^ "^  Scott Soames, "Revisionism about Reference: A Reply to Smith", in Synthese 104:191-216, 
1995.He presented this paper in the division eastern meeting of the APA Boston, December 1994. 
'^ '' Soames, '"Revisionism about Reference: A Reply to Smith", in Synthese 209. 
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reference, as per allegations raised by Smith.'^ ^ Kripke has been criticized by 
several others including Michael Dummett, Gareth Evans, and recently by Arif 
Ahmed etc. 
Ahmed tries to criticize Kripke's thesis (on terms of natural kind) in holding 
that he provides no sufficient argument for necessity of theoretical 
identification like 'heat' is theoretical identified for 'molecular, motion'. He 
argues that a sort of identity is observed between heat and molecular motion. 
Heat may be associated with some properties. But these properties may vary in 
several counterfactual situations. He says how empirical science demonstrates 
the association of 'heat' with 'molecular motion'. Now, as I understand, 
Ahmed wishes to express that the notion of rigidity does not satisfactorily 
applies to the terms of natural kind (particularly the cases of theoretical 
identification like 'heat'). It does not seem necessary identification of 
something to be 'heat' and its association with'"molecular motion'. 'Heat' and 
'molecular motion', both behave as rigid designators. 
Kripke himself realizes that "...heat might have turned out not to have been 
molecular motion, and that gold might have turned out not to have been the 
element with the atomic number seventy nine."'^ ^ 
Kripke asserts against description theories that it is most likely that a name may 
be borrowed from a speaker without any description about it. Even a child may 
'^ ^ Leiter reports: A Philosophy Blog, No plagiarism here, The originality of Saul Kripke,The New 
Theory of Reference: Kripke, Marcus and its origin, edited by Paul W. Humphreys and James H. 
Fetzer, TLS February 9, 2001. 
"'ftW.UO. 
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refer to Saul Kripke, hearing that he is eminent living philosophers of language, 
without getting it aside among the names used in the speech community. 
Secondly, a description may be used to identify a referent. For example, proper 
name "Saul Kripke"is 'the author of Naming and Necessity'. But it is not 
necessary that he is the author oi Naming and Necessity, as some other person 
would have delivered the lecture on the subject. Now, what purpose these 
arguments serve? Is there any solution to bridge the speaker's utterances and 
thoughts in his mind? It is natural to expect; that name-token • used by the 
speaker must correspond to its right referent, which provides reinforcement 
with the same name token. 
The description theory of Frege and Russell suggest that the descriptions play 
pivotal role in identification and stipulation of reference. Frege and Russell 
hold that a description may replace a proper name. That's why; I call this 
theory replacement theory. Kripke claims that the only function of description 
is to fix a reference. But in some counterfactual situation it may fail to do so, 
in such cases how we are going to fix a reference? He suggests that the 
stipulation of reference is performed by some 'causal chain of communication' 
which project backward towards finding the cause of a proper name, instead of 
some description as Frege and Russell hold. 
The problem of picking out a reference must be examined with great care. 
Kripke promotes Searle's suggestion that the classical description theory 
shouldbe transformed in to cluster theory of description. In other words, single 
'^'Kripke.o/7.d/.58. 
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description may fall short of fixing a reference and hence a cluster of 
descriptions may be helpful in fixing a reference. The theory too suffers from 
several demerits. However, the demerits are not as severe as that of classical 
theory of description (of Frege and Russell). 
Russell thinks that one must be able to refer to the objects, he is thinking. This 
principle of Russell is refuted by Kripke. Evans put remark on this refutation in 
holding that '...he would have shown something of even greater importance 
than the unacceptability of the description theories of Names, or than any of the 
many other fascinating conclusions contained in the lectures. But I think it fair 
to say that Kripke didn't refute Russell's princij^le.''^ ^ Kripke's argument may 
be evaluated on the conception of belief which speaker express regarding a 
referent. A speaker must not only be able to express a belief, but he must also 
be able to possess thoughts about the referent. He must be able to use the 
referent, in countless ways, but the referent must remain intact. In contrast with 
Russell's conception, countless properties of an object and its thinking may be 
performed, even in the absence of the object. It is here, modal intuition comes 
in. 
Kripke's refutation of Frege and Russell on the basis of modal intuition could 
have a more rational approach i.e. in the form of consistent, self-evident 
approach. Evans even suggests that it could have been in the form of thought, 
judgment, belief etc and some theory about each of them. *^^ I think that it is 
justified and wise suggestion on the part of Evans. But any theory related to 
Evans, opcit., 74. 
''Ibid. J6. 
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speaker's psychology would still be failed to provide a satisfactory answer to 
Kripke's refutation. Merely describing modal intuitions as self-evident 
principles will not be of much value as it should possess some rational basis.'^ 
In several places in Naming and Necessity, 'Kripke's argument, seems to be 
weak. His refutation against descriptivist philosopher had been assumed as 
right by several philosophers. The refutation has something to do with the 
functioning of human thought and other psychological state of mind regarding 
objects. 
The same has been assumed without any arguments expected on the part of 
philosophers.''^' Evans suggests that the abandonment of identification 
principle of Russell seems to be a consequence of speaker's sayings and 
thinking. Now such abandonment is to be preserved. Kripke's refutation 
suggests that he has mistaken belief for thought. Now, the approach of 
description theories directs us towards a certain belief about the reference 
identification and stipulation. However, I think Frege and Russell initially had 
a thought for this approach (both independently). The refutation on the part of 
Kripke seems to run on this assumption. The description theories merely 
suggest a way of reference stipulation. I think that Frege and Russell nowhere 
claimed that this is and will be the only way to determine reference and its 
fixation with a Proper name. Kripke tries to provide just another way for this 
' " I think that modal intuition does not contain rational basis; and is metaphysical. It even seems a 
guess work. However, the way Kripke's argument describes, it looks appealing. 
'Evans, opcit., 76. 
'''Ibid J6. 
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(in the form of causal theory of reference), however in a better and more 
sophisticated way. He himself admits this, elsewhere in Naming and Necessity. 
Likewise, I intended to think that recently introduced interdisciplinary science 
'cognitive science''^ "^ seems to present a more plausible and comprehensive 
way to solve the problems related with reference, by knowing the functioning 
of human mind and its relation with external objects. Secondly, Kripke 
assumes similarity between using application of proper names by competent 
speaker and ignorant speaker too. Both are successful in providing reference of 
a proper name. Both borrowed reference in similar fashion i.e. by some causal 
chain created during the course of communication from at the time of initial 
baptism to present use of the name. 
Now, question arises that in virtue of what a speaker is entangled in a particular 
using application of proper name regarding a particular name at a particular 
time framework? What is the criterion of choosing a definite using application? 
In virtue of what, a particular name is ejected among the vast data of names in 
a given speech community? What is the rational basis for this selection? 
Evans also tries to raise similar question. He asserts that '...It is unfortunate 
that Kripke chooses to analyze the notion in this way ''^ '^  It is plausible 
clear outcome of Kripke's proposal which suggest that speaker's utterance 
possess (both competent and ignorant) some causal basis of the relation 
between an object and its respective utterance.. In other words, we may describe 
See also, Jamil,S. "Philsophy of Language in Future" in Anusilana, Banaras Hindu University, 
Varanasi, India,2010,Voi.XII, 25-29. 
"''Evans, opcit., 11. 
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it as speaker's thinking about an object, directly rests on the causal substratum 
which in turn established by the inseparable relation of an object with the 
mental picture of the speaker involved in using application of a proper name in 
question. Now, thoughts seem to possess certain expressional instinct which 
scatters itself in order to create a link with the object of thought, during the 
process of communication. In present case, the link is causal. 
Several philosophers including David Kaplan, independent of Kripke advocate 
'Direct Theory of Reference', in which the object of our thought are subject to 
some direct empirical investigation or the same through some speakers. Now, it 
too contains some causal basis. 
The causal relation involved between subjectivity of speaker i.e. his 
psychology and the objectivity i.e. concerned object, must have some 
relational basis. In other words, the relation must not be successful in 
determining or tracing the right kind of object under consideration. In order to 
achieve this objective, Evans suggest a model called 'The Photograph Model of 
Mental Representation', according to which 'causal relations embedded in 
mental states that are true of objects, are traced out. This tracing out of causal 
relation, in the view of Kripke and others, supplies a basis of inter-relation 
between psychological state of mind regarding an object and the object itself ^ ^^  
He admits himself that there may be confusion in differentiation of one object 
from other. Kripke's proposal suggests digging out the history behind a proper 
lbid.,78. Evans assumes that approach refer to only one object, which is captured permanently at the 
time of production. ' 
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name, which is causally related with the object thought. Evans observes an 
analogy between Kripke's model and Photograph model. The later may be 
applied to a wide variety of cases. It suggests'what Evans calls 'The Historical 
Explanation Theory of Reference'. It is also clear that Kripke's work inspired 
several others to work on the functional aspect of thought, in relation with 
phenomenal objects. 
I think that Evans's evaluation of Kripke's model is well directed in first phase 
of his criticism, but as far as analogy of Kripke's model with Photograph model 
is concerned, there is no point of comparison between them. Evans remarks 
that Kripke's work direct the relational aspect of thought or belief with object. 
It may be true, but I find Kripke too moves around the notion of reference 
stipulation. That's why he provided a-causal basis of such stipulation, through 
a historical chain of communication that runs in a linear fashion. 
Kripke's doctrine that proper names are rigid designators and definite 
descriptions non-rigid ones thus provides a mechanism which both has the 
same effect as scope distinctions and must be explained in terms of them. We 
could get the same effect by viewing proper names, in natural language, as 
subject to a convention that they always have wide scope; Kripke is saved from 
having to view definite descriptions as non-rigid in some contexts and rigid in 
others only by explicitly appealing to the mechanism of scope in their case. 
Such an explanation would not demonstrate the non-equivalence of a proper 
name with a definite description in any very strong sense: it would simply 
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show that they behaved differently with respect to ad hoc conventions 
employed by us for determined scope. 
It seems that Dummett's criticism overlooked the notion of modality or what 
we may call modal intuitions (we have already discussed the utility of these 
intuitions in philosophy) or by what preoccupation with Frege's theory of 
meaning. Hughes asserts "I find it puzzling, and somewhat worrisome, that 
Dummett takes a sentence which I think has no true reading to have one" 
(Hughes:2004, 8-9). Hughes says that Dummett criticism of Kripke does not 
seem to be well directed because of the wrong interpretation (or false readings 
of sentences like 'St Arme could not but have been a parent' possess false 
reading but 'The mother of Mary could not but have been a parent' possess true 
as well as false reading). This I believe too is a wrong interpretation of 
Kripke's thesis. Hughes again says: 
"...perhaps his intuitions are corrupted by a prior commitment to 
descriptivism". But then, how do I know that my own intuitions 
aren't corrupted by exposure to Kripke, Putnam, et aliil Fm not 
sure, but I take comfort from the fact that if I am blind... my form 
1Q7 
of blindness is very widespread." 
Moving in line with Hughes, I am inclined to think that modal arguments 
(which are being presented as device for refuting descriptivisrn) is commonly 
attributed to or what Hughes calls 'standing convention' like "...a sentence like 
"*M/.,128. 
'"Hughes, op.C77.8-9. 
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'n might have been F' is to be understood as equivalent to 'The G is such that it 
• 1 OS 
might not have been F\ and not to 'it might have been that: the G is F'..." 
5.8 Rigid designation v/s Rigid application 
Devitt calls Kripke's argument as "lost rigidity" argument as the rigidity of 
definite description seems to be lost in this process.'^ ^ He infers that Kripke's 
argument does not stand for all description theories. He says that the 
descriptions followed by proper names may be "rigidified". These rigidified 
descriptions seem to be safe from Kripke's refutation. However, Kripke's 
position is true for most of the description theories. But what makes a 
description rigidified! Devitt suggests attaching a modal operator like actually 
in order to make a description rigidified. For example, "the person who was 
actually the last great philosopher of antiquity" is a rigidified description of 
name "Aristotle". The same is true of natural kind terms.^ *^^  
Kripke, as Devitt assumes considers natural kind terms for their likeness with 
proper names. The terms have not been considered by description theories of 
proper names, Devitt maintains. He invents the notion of "rigid application" for 
all those rigid designators (including natural kind terms) which may be applied 
rigidly in all possible worlds. But whether applied or not; a rigid designator 
will continue to be so in all possible worlds (Kripke would have answered). He 
holds that natural kind terms like 'gold' function as rigid applier while its 
contingent description involving contingent properties like yellowness. 
'"'Michael Devitt, -'Rigid Application" in Philosophical Studies, (2005) 125:139-165. 
^™yWJ.145-147. 
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malleability is non-rigid applier. But if the description is rigidified i.e. adding 
modal operator, the description may behave as rigid applier. 
Devitt maintains that the notion of rigid application does same job as rigid 
designation. But I think that both notions stand similar. The former is 
applicative while later stands for designating the reference of a proper name or 
natural kind terms. 
Schwartz holds that all natural kind terms are not rigid applier (he is quoting 
example of 'frog'). He maintains that in addition to natural kind terms, there 
are nominal kind terms which may be called As rigid applier. But, primary task 
is not to have such kind distinction but to cover these terms which description 
theory covers and those which the theory avoids . Schwartz supposes that a 
frog might have been died as 'tadpole' (the name of frog's larvae). And tadpole 
too may not function as rigid applier because it may become frog in later 
stages. So, natural kind terms, as Schwartz puts it, are not rigid applier. Devitt 
tries to present a solution to the problem of failure of rigid applier to natural 
kind terms like frog. He holds "...where rigidity (in the case that concern us) is 
explained by causal theory, weak rigidity is partly explained by a causal theory 
and partly by a description theory." '^'^  Devitt claims that Schwartz criticism of 
rigid application is not well directed because rigidity is not meant for 
identifying the kind of natural terms. Schwartz claims natural kind terms to be 
non- rigid because of, what Devitt calls 'their mode of reference is partly 
descriptive.' Devitt thinks that the notion of rigid application may offer a 
^"'Devitt, o/7.d/. 154. 
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similar theoretical work for terms of natural kinds as that of the notion of rigid 
designators.^ ^^ 
For the first time, in the history of philosophy, Kripke tries to refute Kant's 
notion of a priori and analytic judgement and Considering theoretical 
identification, such as 'Water is H2O', 'Gold is the element with atomic 
number seventy nine (79).'•^ °'* Now what are the essential properties of gold? 
Kripke says that according to Kant 'Gold is a yellow metal' is analytic 
judgment which is a priori. But we may observe that yellowness of gold can't 
be taken a priori as its essential property. In some counterfactual situation the 
color of gold may be changed, say, 'blue' instead of yellow. Hence, it can't be 
loiown a priori. When we heard of gold, we heard about thing sometimes 
discovered as a part of some speech community. It contains certain properties 
and we call it 'Gold'. Kripke assumes that we may discover some another 
substance, say, fool's gold which resembles gold, in terms of some properties 
like yellowness. But in fact fool's gold is not real gold. Here the term 'Gold' 
beha\'e as a rigid designator, which behave rigidly in all possible worlds like 
proper names. 
Some other natural kind terms too behave as a rigid designator. For example, 
'tiger' may be described with the description,'four legged striped carnivorous 
belonging to cat family'. Now the description is appealing to description 
theorists. The 'tiger' belongs to this unique description. The terms of natural 
kind may also be called as proper names because they behave rigidly like them. 
'''Ibid.\59. 
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That's why Kripke extends the notion of proper names to natural kind terms 
such as 'gold', 'tiger', 'water', 'heat' etc. which are introduced by some 
introducers with descriptions like gold 'is a metal which consist of atomic 
number 79', tiger is 'four legged striped carnivorous belonging to cat family'. 
Water 'is H2O'. The behavior of these terms as a rigid designator is so because 
some of their properties Yike yellowness of gold is a contingent property but its 
atomic number seventy nine (79) is an essential property of gold. The essential 
propert)' is not going to change in all possible worlds. 
Kripke maintains that those statements are necessarily true which are followed 
by some scientific discoveries such as gold possess atomic number seventy 
nine (79). But no discovery is the last work. It opens to explore future scientific 
investigations. He asserts that the doctrine of rigid designation may be applied 
to the terms of natural kind such as 'tiger', 'dog' etc. Names of bacteria such as 
Escherichia Coli, bacteriophage, Herpes virus too behave as rigid designators 
because they belong to a particular species. Mass terms such as 'gold', 'water' 
also behave likewise. And the terms of natural phenomenon such as 'light', 
'sound', 'heat' also fall in the same category. 
Mill holds that common name or natural kind terms consist of connotation 
owing to their specific association with some species. In agreement with 
Russell, Mill holds that genuine Proper name serves the purpose of denotation 
only. While definite description possesses both denotation and connotation . 
The cluster description theory suggests a cluster of properties which determines 
"^^  See also Kripke, op.cil. 134. 
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the referent of a Proper name. Kripke depicts that such cluster might not have 
been associated with the referent. But the term could have been existed even in 
the absence of the referent. Again Kripke tries to go in the problem of 
stipulation of reference. How reference of a certain term may be stipulated? 
Any term fixes its reference by mean some baptism like the definition of 'one 
meter', which stipulates its reference. Likewise, natural kind terms such as 
'alcohol', 'apple', 'lion' etc. too fixes in similar fashion. And the terms of 
natural phenomenon like 'sound', 'light' etc. also do so by mean of scientific 
observation like light is that 'which shows a stream of photon'. This is how 
terms pass in a linear chain of communication, irrespective of the ways which 
speaker acquire to pass the same. I may assert that Kripke tries to overlook the 
notion of Fregean 'Sense', which seems not be avoided so easily. He also tries 
to depart from Kant slogan of synthetic judgment a priori in holding that all 
terms behaving as rigid designator reflect truth but contingently. The properties 
of referent may change in some possible world (trans-world identity), but the 
term is going to behave as a rigid designator in all possible worlds. 
5.9 Beyond rigidity argument: 
Soames tries to criticize Kripke's thesis in holding that contingent a priori truth 
and necessary a posteriori truth are separate issues. In Kripke's example, 
'Hesperus' is 'Phosphorous', is a posteriori truth. Soames considers this a 
priori..This identity relationship becomes a posteriori if a sort of replacement 
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happens in 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorous' with what he calls appropriate 
rigidified description. 
The length of stick S is one meter, if there is aireplacement of one meter with 
real length that stick S possess; it is a contingent a priori truth. But it is stick S 
of one meter length is contingent a posteriori, as Soames claims. It is plausible 
to consider this owing to empirical investigation. 
Soames suspects Kripke's position in holding that there seems to be a 
underestimated gap between contingent a priori (knowing that a sentence is 
true) and contingent a posteriori (knowing the truth expressed) or what I wish 
to call as hybridized or mixed truth. The disquotational principles seem to be 
problematic, that may fill the so called underestimated gap. According to 
Soames, Kripke overstresses the issue of 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorous' being 
different names of same planets having different locations in the sky . 
Soames maintains that the issue merely shows that the resulting position is 
false rather than the expressed proposition could be false. And the principles of 
Strong Disquotation (SDQ)^ °^  and Strong Disquotation and Justification 
(SDJ) • could fill that gap. But these principles are insufficient to fill that gap 
because how these principles express varifed attitudes towai:ds the same 
proposition. Soames emphasized that Kripke's thesis that necessary truths 
caimot be known a priori is objectionable. 
^'^Kvlpke.op.cit. 104. 
SDQ, as I understand, understanding a sentence S, realized it acceptable, if and only if he believes 
that the proposition is expressed semantically by S. See Soames, Beyond Rigidity: unfinished Semnatic 
Agenda of Naming and Necessity,!)^. 
°^* SDJ tries to enrich epistemological content of the expressed proposition of a sentence S, in Gettier 
framework. The person is justified in believing (based on some evidence) the proposition semantically 
expressed by sentence S. 
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As far as contingent truths a priori is concerned, Weak Disquotation and 
Strong Disquotation and Justification (WDJ), '^" which are concerned with the 
conversion of acceptable linguistic assertion (e.g. one meter length of stick S) 
in to knowledge (Soames seems to be too much concerned about epistemology 
rather than truth). This obtained knowledge may be converted in to a priori 
knowledge by still another principle, viz. Weak Linguisticism about the a priori 
(WLA). Soames refutes each of these principles. 
Soames thinks that we know a priori 'Hesperus' is 'Phosphorous' because we 
think a priori 'Hesperus' is 'Hesperus'. But how this we do. Soames replies "a 
modest theoretical framework that goes beyond what Kripke explicitly 
commits himself to in Naming & Necessity.'''^^^ Soames takes two alternative of 
fixing a reference of one meter i.e. by mean of empirical investigation and by 
mean of what he calls "blind" fixing of reference.^ ''^  
Kripke was actually concerned about the later method of reference stipulation 
(based on empirical investigation). Soames claims "creates too large of a gap 
between the proposition expressed by a sentence...and the information with 
which competent speakers are presented when they understand the 
"^^  SDQ, as I understand, understanding a sentence S, realized it acceptable, if and only if he believes 
that the proposition is expressed semantically by S. See Soames, Beyond Rigidity: unfinished Semnatic 
Agenda of Naming and Necessity,3S4. 
SDJ tries to enrich epistemological content of the expressed proposition of a sentence S, in Gettier 
framework. The person is justified in believing (based on some evidence) the proposition semantically 
expressed by sentence S. 
The knowledge would be a priori, if and only if, the person's knowledge about the expressed 
proposition of a sentence is based on the knowledge of facts (of semantics) about the proposition. 
1 think going in further detail, to explain the principle basis of Soames refutation; is not plausible 
here. . ' _ 
Soames, Beyond Rigidity: unfinished Semantic Agenda ofl^aming and Necessity, 3 73. 
It seems, to me, mere assumption of taking stick S as of one meter length without verifying its 
actual length. 
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sentence"^'^ Yablo further goes "Soames blames the bad results on bhnd 
reference-fixing...Soames concludes that neither scenario delivers on Kripke's 
promise of a priori knowledge that stick S is a meter long. 
If there is assurance that my knowledge about the proposition expressed by a 
sentence is true; then this understanding generates a sort of a priori knowledge. 
The principles basis of this argument is what Yablo points out Regular Old 
Linguisticism about the a priori (RLA). In contrast with Kripke's criticism, 
RLA supplies a priori knowledge. 
I can argue that Kripke does not even touch this sort of theoretical framework 
at all. Soames's refutation of Kripke is not well directed. Kripke did not intend 
to provide such perspective. His refutation of a priori knowledge suggests that 
the sort of knowledge is obtained only after empirical verification. Hence, 
knowledge may not be obtained a priori. For example, the knowledge 
'Hesperus' is 'Phosphorous' may not be known a priori. 
Now, if we have already knows both terms and also knows that both refer to 
the same thing. The later part itself based on empirical investigation; hence the 
knowledge thus obtained becomes a posteriori. Hence, Soames seems to 
include a posteriori knowledge of'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorous' to be a priori 
by means of introducing several principles like SDQ, SDJ, WDQ, WDJ, WLA, 
RLA, as Yablo tries to analyze. Soames assertion does not seem to distort 
•| Soames, Beyond Rigidity: unfinished Semantic Agenda of Naming and Necessity, 415. 
•''^ Yablo,S. (2007)"Soames on Kripke," Philosophical Studies, 135(3):451-460.p.455. 
Kripkean system. It merely seeks to explain the proper, guaranteed 
understanding of the terms used in utterances. 
Sider and Braun try to draw distinction bet^^en a semantic expression and 
assertion. The intention is to preserve the Fregean sense and Millian thesis 
along with providing value to Kripkean system^ His approach considers the 
enrichment of a proper name, say, 'Aristotle' with a description of a sort 'the 
teacher of Alexander'. But intuitive truth value seems to be a function of 
descriptive enrichment of the contexts. If we consider Kripke's example of 
'Godel', then 'GSdel' seems to be descriptively enriched by 'the person who 
proved incompleteness of theorem'. But in fact, this is not true '^^ . 
According to Sider and Braun, Soames suggests that in Godel example, some 
speaker who is unaware of Godel's theft may still uses in utterances like: 
According to Soames, by uttering 'the host believes that Prof 
Godel will speak on logic', Smith primarily asserts the 
descriptively enriched proposition. The host believes that Prof 
Godel, who stole the incompleteness proof form Schmidt, will 
speak on logic .^ "^  
Soames think that such descriptive enrichment are partly true (because Prof 
Godel is actually going to speak on logic) and partly false (because Prof Godel 
is wrongly attributed to incompleteness theorem of arithmetic). Kripke 
^" Theodore Sider and David Braun, Kripke's Revenge, Pliiiosophical Studies 128 (2006): 669-682. 
'^^  IbidA. 
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considers that the usage of Godel may be true in spite of its wrong attribution 
to incompleteness theorem. 
It is plausible to consider Soames thesis that in different contexts, the usage of 
sentences may assert different propositions. Like Kripke, Soames too tries to 
focus on counterarguments against descriptivisip (pure/impure). The arguments 
were based on some intuitions regarding truth value of sentences. He even 
considers such arguments based on logical intuitions (intuitions involving 
argument's validity). 
Sider and Braun consider Soametic perspective on logical intuitions regarding 
counterarguments on descriptivism. They consider pragmatic and Tran 
contextual position on logical intuitions that a competent speakers of language 
may intuit in a particular context (in case of pragmatic position) or in all 
contexts (in case of Tran contextual position), provided the argument asserted 
by that argument in that context is valid. They hold: 
If speakers inherit in a context that an argument is valid, then the 
argument it asserts in that context is valid. (It)... is a consequence 
of both the Trans-contextual and pragmatic positioning. 
Soames theory lays too much emphasis on logical intuitions. Speaker's 
mtuitions seem to be what Hawthorne calls semantic blindness. Soames 
perceives substitution of a proper name with rigidified description, which 
results in shifting route to truth from a posteriori to a priori truths. 
^ '^John Hawthorne (2004), Knowledge and Lotteries, Oxford, OUP. 
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The basic question is that how a name acquire meaning or reference (for to 
Frege meaning of a name is its referent). Yablo holds that this foundational 
question is the principle target of Kripke. Soames objection to Kripke seems to 
be based on the expressed hybrid truth. 
Kripke holds that the essential properties attributed to natural kind terms are 
rigid while contingent properties are non-rigid. For example, 'gold' containing 
'atomic number 79' is rigid while 'yellow metal' (which Kant • describes) is 
non-rigid. The same is true of other worlds. The essential properties attributed 
to the terms are, to Kripke, necessary but a posteriori (subject to empirical 
investigation). The essential properties of natural kind terms are: 
1. Outcome of scientific empirical investigation, hence a posteriori. 
2. Helps in reference stipulation of the term. 
3. Functions rigidly as the term itself 
4. Necessary identical to its associated term. 
Now, in virtue of what the concept- remains in all possible worlds? Searle 
would have answered it, in terms of intentionality i.e. speaker's intentions to 
express the concept. Davis points out that Kripke's notion of rigid designator 
can't be analytic because it is not clear what description uniquely follows a 
proper name. A proper name can't be linked analytically to a definite 
description. Davis holds: 
...In fact, no description referring to a name can be analytically 
tied to that name. The meaning of "Aristotle" does not guarantee 
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that its referent is named "Aristotle" or bears any relation at all to 
that name. And if someone asks a user of "Aristotle" who he is 
referring to, it would beg the question for him to answer using the 
second order description..P"^ 
Hence, if we ascribe the sense with Kripkean thesis, there seems to be no 
analytic necessity in his thesis. He only talks about epistemic and metaphysical 
necessity. It suggests no hope for analytic necessity. But this is not true for 
theoretical identification. For example, 'Water is H2O' is analytically true. 
In spite of severe criticism by various philosophers like Dummett, Evans, and 
Soames; Kripke's refutation of Frege-Russell's thesis is an organized and 
systematic work. 
''^" Ibid.hi. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
The philosophy of language deals with philosophical questions to clarify, to 
explore, to analyze, and to make sense of human language. It tries to put a 
systematic and organized account of language. It is philosophical critique about 
language which looks into the nature, origin, and development of language. It 
inquires about the meaning of "meaning" itself. It seeks to know the nature of 
meaning of words, and thereby sentences. This discipline of philosophy has 
been primarily initiated by German mathematician Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob 
Frege. 
In his work Begriffsscrift, Frege tried to create a formal system of language in 
which mathematical assertions may be proved. He observed that natural 
language is too vague to perform investigation in sciences like mathematics. 
While formal language consists of syntax which is more comprehensive and 
plausible to understand. In his earlier thesis Grundlagen, he is interested to 
know the meaning of words which combine to make a sentence meaningful. 
While using the word "meaning", obviously we are not talking about literal 
meaning of words. Rather the intention is to know: in virtue of what a 
particular word has got a particular meaning? How is it that some two words 
have got the same meaning? How is it that a word has got more than one 
meaning? What is the exact, definite meaning of the words? What speaker does 
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with these words while using them? How the hearer is going to understand a 
word, uttered by a speaker in the same sense? All these questions belong to 
philosophy of language. 
Philosophical interest on this issue of proper names was first observed in Veda. 
In Greek philosophy, Cratylus (Plato's dialogue) was found to be earliest text 
to discuss proper names. In beginning of the dialogue, Hermogenes (a character 
in the dialogue) asks Socrates to clarify whether names are natural or 
conventional devices for communication. 
There are various issues related to proper names like: how the reference of 
proper names may be identified? In virtue of what the reference of proper 
names may be stipulated? How proper names got their reference at the first 
place? How proper names co-refer two or more identical objects? 
This dissertation is an effort to answer first twp questions i.e. how the reference 
of proper names may be identified and stipulated? Philosophers of language 
like Frege, Russell, Searle, and Kripke deal with this problem in their own 
ways. 
Frege uses word proper names for all singular terms generally. However, he 
nowhere provided a definite criterion for an expression to be regarded as proper 
name. He thinks that proper names are linguistic devices that stand for objects. 
According to him, proper names reflect the most general logical function of 
linguistic expressions. This reflection is the foxmal criteria of expressions to be 
called as proper names. Proper names serve the function of ejecting the 
concerned object in question. Proper names pick out particular objects for 
which they stand. He takes these objects as the meaning of proper names. 
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He describes proper names to a variety of objects such as planets, human 
beings and the terms of natural kinds such as 'tiger,' 'water,' 'gold' etc. He 
even regards numbers as objects and hence numerical terms may be described 
as proper names as per the Fregean criteria. The criterion for such ascription of 
numbers in the category of proper names is that they fall in to the category of 
objects. He even thinks of points, lines, shape and even weight as proper names 
because of the same reason. He further ascribes classes in the category of 
proper names e.g. 'the class of mammals', 'the'class of bachelors' etc., as the 
classes fulfils the criteria of being a proper name. That's why, he call such 
classes as classes objects for objects can be the only criteria of being a proper 
name. 
Frege calls meaning (Bedeutung) a semantic property. He invents the notion of 
sense (Sinn). Sense is that semantic property of a word or sentence by virtue of 
which it reveals meaning of the word or sentence. He thinks of sense as a way 
of description. This way seems to be an important ingredient in providing 
meaning to words or sentences. Now, he thinks that the sense of a sentence 
directly depends on the sense of its constituent parts. 
The objective of Frege's invention of the notion of sense is to provide the 
maintenance of objective content in the utterances being used among speakers 
of language. Hence, sense seems to be the property of propositions by virtue of 
which they are capable of transferring this content. 
Frege tries to present a system of communication. The competent speaker of 
language expresses a particular sentence, say, 'PN is R', where 'PN' is a proper 
name and R is the referent of this proper name, as some concrete entity. Now, 
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the speaker consists of thoughts in his mind about the referent, the content of 
this thought depends on the sense he ascribe to the proper name 'PN'. The 
expression of thought has to be concerned with the referent R, which has to be 
thought in particular way. This way determines the sense of proper names. 
The hearer of this sentence understands it and the thought associated with it, in 
the same way i.e. having similar truth value as the utterance of the speaker. In 
this case, the content of thought of the hearer will also have to be determined 
by the, sense he stipulates to the same expression. But there seems to be no 
justification that both speaker and hearer understand the sentence in the same 
way. However, both may believe to involve in the same practice. Hence there 
seems to no epistemological value of these utterances. 
On assuming that both speaker and hearer, who is competent speaker of 
language, are using objective property of expression of human language and 
both hold a definite sense to it, we may claim that the hearer will receive the 
same thought as expressed by the speaker. Now considering this, we are 
moving with the idea of Frege. He seems to agree on the point that there may 
be some instances in which propositions of a natural language are successful in 
expressing a thought. 
But the notion of empty proper names threatens the very foundation of the 
theory of meaning. In principle there should not be any semantic value of 
empty proper names. However, Frege holds that they still possess sense and 
hence semantic value. This is where the invalidity Frege's argument lies. 
The notion of sense is useful in several cases like proper names showing 
identity between them and hence between two propositions that contain them. 
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In the metaphor used above, different senses are reflected by two proper names 
present in two propositions. However, their referent is same. 
Frege's notion of reference of proper names, assumes that the meaning of a 
proper name or sentence may be revealed even in the absence of referents. But 
the meaning may not be revealed in the absence of sense. Hence, it seems that 
he thinks the notion of sense as superior and more fundamental to reference. It 
appears that Frege treats the theory of meaning as an integral part of the theory 
of sense and the theory of reference. Both the theories are inseparably 
connected to the notion of proper names. 
Frege seems to be too much concerned about the Ideal aspect of language. 
That's why he was concerned about the construction of propositions as well as 
truth value reflected by them. It seems that he proposed the theory of meaning 
for this purpose. The notion of sense serves the function of providing a way to 
determine the reference. The notion of reference has been treated as 
fundamental concept on which the notion of proper names rests. The notion 
also provides semantic value to the propositions. 
In his theory of meaning, Frege tried to create a highly ideal account of 
language. His theory of meaning offers an organized account of the theory of 
sense and the theory of reference. In spite of the criticism of the Fregean notion 
of sense by Kripke, there are several virtues of the theory which motivates 
philosophers to put evolutionary approach on the issue. Frege's insistence on 
propositional content of utterances containing proper names may be preserved 
along with Searle's intentional content, speech acts theory of Searle and 
Austin. 
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The classical description theory of Frege and Russell suggest that a proper 
name behave as an abbreviated definite description. Frege claims that the sense 
of a proper name is associated with the sense of its definite description. Both 
Frege and Russell hold that the referent of a proper name consists of distinctive 
properties necessarily supplied by the definite description stands for it. The 
theory suggests that a proper name is synonym 'to the description "that uniquely 
attached to it. 
This does not mean that a proper name may be substituted in place of its 
definite description. The theory says that a proper name consist of same 
meaning as some definite description which the name unique satisfies. 
An improved version of the theory has been presented by Searle and Strawson. 
According to the theory, a proper name consists of a cluster or set of purely 
necessary and sufficient qualitative properties of being a proper name. That's 
why; the version is termed as cluster theory. Now, out of several properties 
attached to a proper name, only . dominant or weighted most property 
determines the referent of the name. For example, "Aristotle" is known by the 
description 'the teacher of Alexander the great'. But there may be other 
dominant descriptions in this category. It is not necessary either that the name 
satisfies all the properties or weighted most or dominant property. 
The description theory (of Frege and Russell) claims that a proper name 
consists of some purely, uniquely, analytic, necessary descriptions that may be 
attached to the name. Christopher Hughes suggests that the theory (both 
classical and improved) offers pure and impure aspects. The requirement of 
pure aspect is that the description should not contain any proper name, 
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demonstrative or indexical. Impure description does not reflect any such 
requirement. The theory deals with both pure and impure aspects. Hence, it has 
got two fold applications. However, neither classical nor modern theorists draw 
such distinction. 
The description theory determines the sense as well as reference of proper 
names. That's why Devitt referred description theory as complete theory of 
meaning. 
In his seminal lectures Naming and Necessity, Kripke's threefold argument 
directed towards the refiitation of the description theory (both pure and impure 
aspects). Frege and Russell's thesis had been principle target of Kripke. He had 
been found to argue more against impure aspect of the theory. According to 
Kripke, the only virtue of the thesis of Frege and Russell is that the thesis 
serves the purpose of reference stipulation of proper names. 
Kripke suggests that instead of definite descriptions, causal history of proper 
names may stipulate their referent in a more comprehensive manner. In order to 
identify the referent of a proper name, one needs to go in to causal chain of 
communication, established by the users of a particular speech community. He 
tries to provide an alternative model to Frege and Russell in terms of proposing 
causal theory or new theory of reference. Frege did not talk about such causal 
linking of a name with the concerned object. 
The causal theorists suggest that a proper name has got some causal history 
which determines its referent. The theory suggests that a proper name behave 
rigidly in all possible worlds in which the n^me exists. Kripke insists that a 
proper name is introduced by some initial baptism in some using application of 
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proper name. He tries to present an improved approach over description theory 
which suggests the non-rigid nature of proper 'names. The causal theory also 
avoids propositional approach of Frege, intentionality approach of Searle. The 
theory suggests reference identification and stipulation of proper names purely 
on causal basis. 
Application of Fregean sense in causal theory reveals the significance of 
preserving the notion of sense. In Frege's example, both 'Aphla' and 'Ateb' 
have got different meanings because: 
a. Both display different senses. 
b. Both belong to two distinct using applications of Proper names. 
c. Causal theorist explains that both names have different roots of origin or 
what Devitt calls different groundings. 
d. The theorists also explain that both names possess different reference 
borrowing practices. 
e. 'Aphla' is 'Aphla' reflects uninformative ness; while 'Aphla' is 'Ateb' 
provides some information. 
Hence, both names have got different meanings because of c and d (Causal 
theorists). The problem of ambiguity among names i.e. what are determinant 
factors which binds a particular use of proper name with its right bearer? Devitt 
tries to solve the problem of ambiguity of proper names by coining terms 
'token' and 'type' and explains relation between them. But his suggestion does 
not seem to add anything new in the problem. However, the suggestion makes 
problem better defined that's all. He re-frames the problem like this....the 
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semantic type is explained by the token which speaker possess in his mind. 
Description theorists relate a name token with a definite description attached 
with it. Causal theorists suggests, as we already maintained that the type of 
token being associated with a name is determined by its causal origin and 
reference borrowing. 
The causal theory of proper names works through a causal chain of 
communication. The chain starts by mean of initial baptism, the initial 
grounding of a proper name. Then the reference is being borrowed by the users 
of language in a certain using application of proper names, in a certain speech 
community. In spite of criticism of the theory by several philosophers including 
Evans (by mean of his example of 'Madagascar'), Searle (by his notion of 
intentionality) etc., the theory has got several virtue which it' plausible to 
accept, however partially. 
Kripkean proposal for reference stipulation practices of proper names (in terms 
of the causal theory) is actually not presented in the form of what he utters as a 
full blown theory of the reference of proper names. He is committed to present 
a better picture of the reference stipulation practices. In this sense, the theory is 
not structured. In spite of the fact that the grounding of a proper name may be 
non-baptized one (as in case of 'Madagascar') or by mean of referential move; 
the reference of a proper name (Kripke argues) is fixed by originally baptized 
name (arbitrarily or by fixing a description). 
Frege and Russell's thesis of descriptivism (both pure and impure version) had 
been main target of Kripke's seminal lectures Naming and Necessity. Kripke 
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claims that 'Nevertheless I think it's pretty certain that the view of Frege and 
Russell is false.' 
Kripke tries to establish the argument that definite descriptions fail to stipulate 
the referent of a proper name because the description may change in some 
counterfactual situations. For example, 'Steve Jobs' may not be substituted 
with the description 'the founder Apple Corporation Ltd.' as there might have 
been some person other than Steve Jobs who would have founded the 
company. 
Kripke mainly establishes this modal argument to refute the doctrine of Frege 
and Russell. He holds that the description theories only provide reference to a 
proper name. The description does not provide meaning to a proper name but it 
only helps in reference determination of the same. 
Kripke tries to present an alternative model for reference identification and 
stipulation. He invents the notion of rigidity; arid maintains that a proper name 
function as rigid designator which rigidly designates the same referent in all 
possible worlds. According to him, the description theories fail on fix the 
referent of a proper name in all possible worlds. 
Similarly, in Identity and Necessity, Kripke asserts that a name, say, 'Nixon', 
would be called as 'Nixon' even if there is no person ever existed in any 
possible world. It seems surprising but Kripke argues that the name 'Nixon' is 
going to designate the Nixon as a person in all possible worlds. Obviously in 
those worlds, it will be taken for granted that there is no actual existent person. 
The person may be character in some story or film or in some what Frege calls 
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'work of fiction'. The point is that even in such cases the notion of rigidity 
never fails. 
A proper name may be analyzed in correct sense by mean of a definite 
description which is empirically or what Hughes calls semantically equivalent 
to the referent. In order to deal with this sort of argument, I would like to 
consider once again Frege's example of 'Aphia' and 'Ateb' (The example is a 
general outline of pure descriptivism). Now, 'Aphla' abbreviates to 'the 
mountain 5000 meters high from northern region' while 'Ateb' abbreviates to 
'the mountain 5000 meters high from southern region'. And the empirical 
discovery has been made that two names, in fact, refer to the same mountain. 
This is impure account of descriptivism. The proposition attributed to 'Aphla' 
is same as the proposition attributed to 'Ateb'. 
That's why it is against pure account of descriptivism because for them 'Aphla' 
must consist of same unique properties (in terms of quality). According to pure 
descriptivism, it is necessary truth that 'Aphla' exists if and only if it has got 
those set of unique properties which uniquely.'Stands for it (the same is true for 
'Ateb'). But here, both the names are sharing most of the properties. Hence, 
pure aspect of descriptivism fails. But still impure or mixed aspect remains 
intact. They seems to hold both names abbreviates same description like "the 
mountain 5000 meters high', however with different senses. Before empirical 
investigation, both 'Aphla' and 'Ateb' thought to refer to different mountains. 
Considering Kripke's insight on the issue, even after empirical investigation, 
both proper names refer to different objects. 'Aphla' refer to mountain from 
northern region while 'Ateb' refer mountain' from southern region. Both the 
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naimes cannot mean the same. Even if there would have been still another 
mountain which is 5000 meters high from northern region, say, 'Apheb'; still 
V^pheb" may not be called as 'Aphla'. Hence, Fregean identity terms 'Aphla' is 
not 'Ateb'. 
Considering on the epistemological aspect of Kripke's argument; we may 
assert that 'Godel' stands for 'the man who proved incompleteness of 
arithmetic theorem'; leads us truth about 'Godel' a priori, as per the conviction 
of description theory (pure). 
But Kripke insists that inspite of the fact that 'Godel' proved incompleteness of 
arithmetic theorem, the truth may not be, known a priori. He provides 
counterexamples in holding that some other person 'Schmidt' discovered the 
same and we have wrongly credited the same to 'Godel'. Now, it is later 
discovery and hence the truth is known a posteriori. The counter example is 
actually two fold i.e. to refute descriptivism and Immanual Kant's 
epistemology (synthetic judgement a priori) simultaneously. 
In Kripke's example, 'Godel' is not equivalent to 'the man who proved 
incompleteness of arithematic theorum', which is mixed description. In 
contrast, pure descriptivism expexts that there is some description which is 
qualitative similar to a proper name like 'Godel'. 
Now, even in the absence of any genuine unique description attributed to him; 
one may still refer to 'Godel', but the name is again including itself This is 
what Kripke calls violation of circulatory condition. 
So, the knowledge of 'Godel' seems to be very difficult to know a priori. For 
example, 'Diamond' purely describes 'the hardest substance on earth'. The 
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knowledge may be known a priori as the speaker refers to the quality of 
something as hardest substance called 'Diamond' which nothing satisfies. 
However, if some discovery reveals that there is another substance which is 
hardest; then the knowledge would naturally ,be turned out to be a posteriori. 
Now, 'Diamond' does not satisfy the quality of being hardest substance. Even 
if there is availability of pure description, the description still fails to provide 
epistemological account of proper names. Kripke tries to convey that there can 
never be such description which can replace a proper name. In other words, 
names can not abbreviate descriptions (pure or mixed). The knowledge of 
proper name does not obtain a priori in all the cases. 
JLripke defended descriptivist approach by providing several counterexamples 
like the definition of 'one meter' as 'stick S is one meter long at to'. This 
definition plays no role in providing meaning to 'one meter'. Kripke insisted 
that the definition merely suggests 'one meter' as the standard of length and not 
the length in itself. 
Kripke holds that 'one meter' may designate rigidly this entity i.e. length, in all 
possible worlds. The description of 'one meter' as 'the length of S at to' does 
not necessarily designate it rigidly. In some counterfactual situation, the 
definition may change owing to some conditions like excessive heat or cold 
which may expand or condense the length of stick S at time to. 
The problem before Kripke is to fix the reference, not to provide a meaning to 
proper names. That's why he admits that definitions like that of 'one meter' 
suggest how reference of 'one meter' is stipulated. Epistemologically, Kripke 
asserts that the person who provides such definition might have been aware of 
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it as length of 'one meter', a priori. That's why anyone may know 'the length 
of stick S at to' as 'one meter' without discovering himself that whether length 
of the stick as standard of length, is one meter or not. Metaphysically treatment 
of this statement suggests it to be a contingent statement where 'one meter' 
behaves as a rigid designator. However the length is subject to change as per 
the conditions like heat or cold. In this Sense the statement may reflect 
contingent a priori truth. 
Kripke holds that his criticism against Frege-Russell's thesis of descriptivism 
f(3r proper names also applies to terms of natural kind. He claims that natural 
kind terms like 'water', 'gold' consist of same properties which are not 
necessarily known a priori. He refutes long standing doctrine of Kant in 
holding that analytic judgment like 'gold is yellow metal' may not be known a 
priori. In some counterfactual situation, gold may not be of yellow in color. 
However, the term consists of some essential properties. For example, atomic 
number of gold is seventy nine (79). According to Kripke, this is essential 
property that may be attributed to gold. Likewise, the chemical composition of 
water is H2O, which is its essential property. 
Kripke utters that natural kind terms consist of properties that are necessarily 
true of it. The properties those are true of the term in all possible worlds. 
Moreover, these properties are subject to empirical investigation also. Gold 
consist of atomic number seventy nine (79) is an example of such property. 
Now, the property may not be attributed to anything except gold. Even if some 
counterfactual situation, if we use the term gold'we could not deny that element 
which has got seventy nine protons in its nucleus. 
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Ahrned further goes to consider the intuitions .(which seem to be acceptable, at 
least to Ahmed) that there would be a world where gold did not exist or there 
would be a world where gold did not have atomic number seventy nine (79). In 
nutshell, he is arguing that there are contrary intuitions which questions 
necessary properties of gold in some possible world. 
It is a counterexample of Kripke's argument. However, Hughes suggests a way 
out; he talks about bi-vocal aspect of proper names. The name 'gold' may be 
used for two referents. A person may borrow the term 'gold' and superimpose 
the term on some new referent which is not .element and does not consist of 
atomic number seventy nine (79). But still, the new name (in new 
counterfactual situation) 'gold' don't have anything to do with old name 'gold', 
which is also used by community of speakers who have got a common 
language. If I am right to infer, then Ahmed's argument is not well directed. 
However, Kripke's position against the thesis of Frege and Russell wavers a 
little by Ahmed's argument. 
To encourage pure descriptivism of Frege and Russell, 'gold' refers to such 
properties which nothing else describes or uniquely satisfies. Now, it is known 
a priori that gold satisfies such and such properties. Ahmed holds that "...it is 
unclear that the epistemological and modal claims refute the Frege-Russell 
thesis for natural kind terms." 
Kripke targets Frege and Russell, along with the Mill's account of natural kind 
terms (lecture III, Naming and Necessity), while in lecture II he argues against 
descriptivism as proposed by Fregean and Russellian thesis. If the term 'figer' 
has got various properties like a large carnivorous quadripedal feline, tawny 
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yellow in color with blackish transverse stripes and white belly , then it is not 
necessar}' that the 'tiger' word satisfies all the properties (or weighted most or 
dominant property, as per descriptivism) a priori. 
Kripke continues that in the absence of these properties (that is attributed to 
'tiger' by a certain community of speakers or by Shorter Oxford Dictionary), 
there may be a species different from 'tiger', say, it belongs to class reptile; 
having internal structure of reptilian type. But we can only say that the species 
belongs not to tiger but to some other animal like it. So, the properties 
attributed to natural tiger (or as the dictionary describes) may not be known a 
priori. 
Believers of descriptivism may defend that there must be some purely, 
uniquely, analytic, necessary descriptions that rfiay be attributed to tiger (as the 
dictionary tells). But what are the methods to acquire a priori knowledge of 
something (in the form of satisfying some unique properties or dominated 
ones), of something that may be called as 'tiger'? Is it internal structure of 
mammals? Or are there some external properties (which are contingent, as 
Kripke holds)? Kripke suggests internal structure to be an empirical discovery. 
That's why descriptivism defense seems to be shaken, as they seem to be at 
loss to provide any descriptions that uniquely satisfies to the tiger. If some 
advocate of descriptivism insist that 'tiger' is that which may be described as 
'the animal that has got the properties of tiger'; then the description is 
becoming impure, and what Kripke calls violates circulatory condition. 
The main idea of rigid designation seems to rest on the assumption that Kripke 
actually originated the idea. It was Ruth Barcan Marcus who originated the 
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idea of rigid designation. By providing counterexamples, Quentin Smith tried 
to prove his claims to be true. He raises objection in attribution of 'New Theory 
of Reference' to Saul Kripke and other leading philosophers of that time but 
ignoring Ruth Barcan Marcus who actually originated the theory. David Braun 
shows • that direct reference theory concerning proper names was mainly 
provided by several landmarks of philosophy of language including Saul 
Kripke, David Kaplan, Keith Donnellan, Scott Soames etc. 
Quentin Smith asserts that Marcus provided great contribution and more than 
anybody else. She actually developed a new theory of reference. Kaplan 
advocates that new theory of proper names is provided by Kripke. He also 
coined the term rigid designation for proper names. He holds that a proper 
name designates the same thing in all possible worlds. But as far as this term is 
concerned with common nouns, the credit should be given to Marcus and not to 
Kripke, as Kaplan did. Hence, Kripke's idea-of proper names, behaving as a 
I'igid designator is actually credited to Marcus and not to Kripke. 
Quentin Smith even claims that modal arguments that were attributed to 
Kripke, were actually provided by Marcus. Considering identity between 
names, 'Hesperus' may be substituted for 'Phosphorous.' But in modal 
contexts, it may not be true. The identity merely reflects equivalence between 
two identity terms like 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorous'. The star that has seen in 
morning might have been seen in the evening. Refuting description theorists 
like Frege and Russell, Marcus depicts that if they would be., right then a 
description like 'Venus is the evening star' would have been known a priori. 
While in fact, it is known a posteriori'as it is subject to empirical investigation. 
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Marcus further asserts that 'Venus' shows modally stablesense, when an 
equivalence is created in holding that • Venus'= 'Venus'. It may be asserted that 
mere reflection of the term 'Venus' shows that it signifies both 'morning star' 
and 'evening star.' Now, previously described two names of the planet 'Venus' 
i.e. "Phosphorous" and 'Hesperus' may be substituted one for the another, as 
per the principle of substitutivity in all possible worlds where planet 'Venus' 
exists. And these names do not do so in the counterfactual situations where the 
planet do not exists. Hence, the names would behave as non-rigid designators. 
These are serious allegations imposed on Kripke by Smith. Scott Soames 
reacted against this allegation. He asserted that "...the charges Smith makes 
against Kripke are false and that the historical picture he paints are inaccurate." 
He presents a systematic account of whole scenario and concluded that "...I 
also hope that no one will be distracted by Smith's overheated rhetoric and 
irresponsible sowing of discord from the truly outstanding contribution of both 
Klripke and Marcus." Later, Stephen Neale confirmed that there is no 
plagiarism found in Kripke's new theory of reference, as per allegations raised 
by Smith. 
Kripke has been criticized by several others including Michael Dummett, 
Gareth Evans, and recently by Arif Ahmed. Ahmed tries to criticize Kripke's 
thesis (on terms of natural kind) in holding that he provides no sufficient 
argument for necessity of theoretical identification like 'heat' is theoretical 
identified for 'molecular motion'. He argues that a sort of identity is observed 
between heat and molecular motion. Heat may be associated with some 
properties. But these properties may vary in several counterfactual situations. 
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He says how empirical science demonstrates the association of 'heat' with 
'molecular motion'. Now, as I understand, Ahmed wishes to express that the 
notion of rigidity does not satisfactorily applies to the terms of natural kind 
(particularly the cases of theoretical identification like 'heat'). It does not seem 
necessary identification of something to be "heat' and its association with 
'molecular motion'. 'Heat' and 'molecular motion', both behave as rigid 
designators. 
Kripke himself realizes that "...heat might have turned out not to have been 
molecular motion, and that gold might have turned out not to have been the 
element with the atomic number seventy nine (79)." 
Kripke's refutation of Frege and Russell on the basis of modal intuition could 
ha '^e been developed on the basis of even more strong argument. Evans 
suggests that it could have been in the form of thought, judgment, and belief 
Unlike Frge and Russell, Kripke di-d not provide any organized theory of 
reference of proper names. His refutation against descriptivist philosopher had 
bei^ n assumed as right by several philosophers. The refutation has something to 
do with the functioning of human thought and psychological state of mind. 
Some philosophers just accepted Kripke's argument, assuming it to be sound. 
However, his argument looks appealing. 
E^ a^ns suggests that the abandonment of identification principle of Russell 
seems to be a consequence of speaker's sayings and thinking. Now such 
abandonment is to be preserved. Kripke's refutation suggests that he has 
mistaken belief for thought. Now, the approach of description theories directs 
us towards a certain belief about the reference identification and stipulation. 
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However, I think Frege and Russell initially had a thought for this approach 
(both independently). The refutation on the part of Kripke seems to run on this 
assumption. The description theorists suggest a way of reference stipulation 
only. I think that Frege and Russell nowhere claimed that this is and will be the 
only way to determine reference and its fixation with a proper name. Kripke 
tries to provide just another way for this (in the form of causal theory of 
reference), however in a better and more sophisticated way. He himself admits 
this in his seminal lecture Naming and Necessity. 
I can be argued that recently introduced interdisciplinary science 'cognitive 
science' presents a more plausible and comprehensive way to solve the 
problems of the identification and stipulation of reference of proper names 
beicause through this approach, we can know better understand of human mind 
and its relation with external objects. However, this issue is beyond the scope 
of this dissertation. 
Secondly, Kripke assumes similarity betweefi using applicaticin of proper 
names by competent speaker and ignorant speaker too. Both are successful in 
providing reference of a proper name. Both borrowed reference in similar 
fishion i.e. by some causal chain created during the course of communication 
(from the time of initial baptism to current usage of the name). 
I think that Evans evaluation of Kripke's model is well directed in first phase of 
his criticism, but as far as analogy of Kripke's model with Photograph model is 
concerned, there seems to be no point of comparison between their approaches. 
Evans remarks that Kripke's work direct the relational aspect of thought or 
belief with object. It may be true, but I find Kripke too moves around the 
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notion of reference stipulation. Tliat's why he provided a causal,basis of such 
stipulation, through a historical, causal chain of communication that runs in a 
linear fashion. 
KrijDke's doctrine that proper names are rigid designators and definite 
descriptions are non-rigid designators provides a mechanism of identification 
and stipulation of reference. 
If I have rightly understood, Kripke had been unable to produce sound 
arguments that definite descriptions (rigidified) may also function as rigid 
designators like proper names. These descriptions may not necessarily behave 
non-rigidly. Kripke's argument does not demonstrate this equivalence of proper 
names with definite descriptions. 
According to Dummett, Kripke's argument also seems to be shattered in the 
light of Frege's theory of meaning. In this case the argument is discounted from 
modal intuitions. Dummett criticism of Kripke does not seem to be well 
directed because of the wrong interpretation of Kripke's thesis against 
descriptivism. 
Deivitt calls Kripke's argument as "lost rigidity" argument as the rigidity of 
definite description seems to be lost in this process. He infers that Kripke's 
argument does not stand for all description theories. He says that the 
descriptions followed by proper names may be "rigidified." These rigidified 
descriptions seem to be safe from Kripke's refutation. However, Kripke's 
position is true for most of the description theories. But what makes a 
description rigidified? Devitt suggests attaching a modal operator like actually 
in order to make a description rigidified. For example, 'the person who was 
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actually the last great philosopher of antiquity' is a rigidified description of 
name 'Aristotle'. The same is true of natural kind terms. 
Scott Soames tries to criticize Kripke's position (on the issue of identical 
terms) in holding that there seems to be a underestimated gap between 
contingent a priori (knowing that a sentence is true) and contingent a posteriori 
(knowing the truth expressed) or what I wish to call as hybridized or mixed 
truth. He claims that Kripke's thesis that necessary truths cannot be known a 
priori is objectionable. He even claims that the principles of Strong 
Disquotation (SDQ) and Strong Disquotation and Justification (SDJ) could fill 
that gap. As far as contingent truths a priori is concerned, Weak Disquotation 
(WDQ) and Strong Disquotation and Justification (WDJ), which are concerned 
with the conversion of acceptable linguistic assertion (e.g. one meter length of 
sti(± S) in to knowledge (Soames seems to be too much concerned about 
epistemology rather than truth). This obtained knowledge may be converted in 
to a priori knowledge by still another principle, viz. Weak Linguisticism about 
the a priori (WLA). Soames refutes each of these principles. 
I b'elieve that Kripke does not even touch this sort of theoretical framework at 
all. His argument is beyond such framework. As I see it, his refiitation of a 
priori knowledge suggests that the knowledge>bich is being called as a priori 
is obtained only after empirical investigation. For example, the knowledge 
'Hesperus' is 'Phosphorous' may not be known a priori, as only empirical 
investigation can demonstrate the fact that 'Hesperus' means same as 
'Phosphorous'. Hence, the knowledge may be obtained a posteriori. I argue 
that Soames is mistaking to consider a posteriori knowledge to ht a priori by 
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means of introducing several principles like SDQ, SDJ, WDQ, WDJ, WLA, 
RILA. That's why Soames refutation does not seem to distort Kripkean system. 
The objective here is to preserve the Fregean sense and Millian thesis along 
with providing value to Kripkean system. His approach considers the 
enrichment of a proper name, say, 'Aristotle''with a description of a sort 'the 
teacher of Alexander'. But intuitive truth value seems to be a function of 
descriptive enrichment of the contexts. If we consider Kripke's example of 
'Godel', then 'Godel' seems to be descriptively enriched by 'the person who 
proved incompleteness of theorem'. But in fact, this is not true. 
Hence, if we ascribe the sense with Kripkean thesis, there seems to be no 
analytic necessity in his thesis. He only talks about epistemic and metaphysical 
necessity. It suggests no hope for analytic necessity. However, in case of 
theoretical identification like 'Water is H2O', analytic necessity may be found. 
In spite of severe criticisms and allegations, Kripkean system provides a great 
C(3ntribution in the tradition of analytic philosophy, logic, and philosophy of 
language. 
188 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
1. Ahmed, Arif. (2007) Saul Kripke. New York, NY; London: Continuum. 
2. Akmajian, A. and F. Heny. (1975). An Introduction to the Principles of 
Transformational Syntax. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
3. Akmajian, A., R.A. Demers, and R.M. Hamish. (1979). Linguistics: An 
Introduction to Language and Communication. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
Press. 
4. Alastair Fowler. (2008), 'Proper Naming: Personal Names in 
Literature', quarterly journal Essays in Criticism, Vol.LVIII.,N0.2. 
5. Almog,J. 1985. "Form and Content" Nous 19: 603-16. 
6. Almog, Joseph. (1984) "Semantical Anthropology" in P. French et al, 
eds., Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 9,479-90. 
7. Almog, Joseph. (1986) 'Naming Without Necessity', The Journal of 
Philosophy, 83,210-42. Braun, David: 1993, 'Empty Names', Nous, 
27(4),443-69. 
8. Alston, W. (1963) "Meaning and Use," Philosophical Quarterly, 
51:107-24. 
9. Aquist, L. (1965) A New Approach to the Logical Theory of 
Interrogatives. Uppsala: Filosofiska Institutionen, Uppsala University. 
10. Armstrong, D.M. (1971) "Meaning an4 Communication". Philosophical 
Review 80: 427-47. 
189 
1 i. Armstrong, D.M. (1978) Nominalism and Realism: Universals and 
Scientific Realism, Volume 1. Cambridge:"' Cambridge University Press. 
12. Armstrong, D.M. (1980) "Against 'Ostrich' Nominalism: A Reply to 
Michael Devitt". Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 61: 440-9. 
13. Austin, J.L. (1961) "Performative Utterances," in J.L. Austin, 
Philosophical Papers, Oxford:Oxford University Press. 
H.Austin, J.L. (1962a) How to do Things with Words. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press. 
15. Austin, J.L. (1962b) Sense andSensibilia. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
16. Ayer, A.J. (1946) Language, Truth and Logic. London: Victor Gollancz. 
17. Ayer, A.J. (1959) Logical Positivism. New York: The Free Press. 
IS.Bertrand Russell. (1994), 'Foundation of Logic', edited by Alasdair 
Urquhart with the assistance of Albert C. Lewis, published in the form 
of collected paper of Bertrand Russell Vol.4. Routledge, London. 
19.Bertrand Russell. (1997), The problems of philosophy, Oxford 
University Press, Chennai. 
20. Beth EW. The Foundations of Mathematics (1959) 4 North Holland: 
Amsterdam. Revised edition. 
21. Black, Max (1973) "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice's 
View," New Literary History, 4:257-79. 
22. Black, Max and Geach P.T. (eds) (1952). Translations from the 
philosophical Writings ofGottlob Frege. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
190 
23. Black, Max and Geach P.T. (eds) (1952). Translations from the 
philosophical Writings ofGottlob Frege. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
24.Bourbaki Nicholas. (1949) "Foundations of Mathematics 5 for the 
Working Mathematician". Journal of Symbolic Logic 14((4)):l-8. 
25.Bourbaki Nicholas. (1950)"The Architecture of Mathematics". 
American Mathematical Monthly 57:221-232. 
26. Bradley, F.H. (1930) Appearance and Reality, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
27. Branch, Taylor. (1977), "New Frontiers in American Philosophy: Saul 
Kripke". New York Times Magazine. 
28. Braun, David: 1993, "Empty Names", Nous, 27(4),443-69. 
29.Burge, Tyler (1973) "Reference and Proper Names," Journal of 
Philosophy, 70:425-39; reprinted in Davidson, D. and Harman, G. 
(1975) (eds) Semantics of Natural Language, Dordrecht: D. Reidel. 
30.Burge Tyler (1974) "Demonstrative Constructions, Reference and 
Truth," Journal of Philosophy, 71:205-23. 
31. Burge Tyler (1979) Individualism and the mental. In: French PA, Uehling 
TE Jr., and Wettstein HK (eds) Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol X: 
Studies in the Philosophy of Mind. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press: 73-121. 
32. Byrne, Richard (1995) The Thinking Ape: The Evolutionary Origins of 
Intelligence; Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
191 
33. C. King, Jefffrey and UC Davis. (2003) "Tense, Modality, and Semantic 
Values" Philosophical Perspectives,Language and Philosophical 
Linguistics. Ed. by John Hawthorne & Dean Zimmerman Vol.17. 
34. Carnap, Rudolf. (1932) "The Elimination of Metaphysics Through 
Logical Analysis of Language" in Ayer 1959: 60-81. 
35. Carnap, Rudolf (1956) Meaning an^ Necessity, second edition, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
36. Cartwright, Richard (1960) "Negative Existentials". Journal of Philosophy 
57: 629-39. Reprinted in Caton 1963. 
37. Cartwright, Richard (1962) "On the Origins of Russell's Theory of 
Descriptions," in Richard Cartwright, Philosophical Essays, Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press. 
38.Chakrabarti,S.C. (2007), Proper Names of Persons in Vedic Literature, 
School of Vedic Studies, Rabindra Bhara'ti University. 
39. Chomsky, Noam (1957) Syntactic Structures. The Hague: Mouton & Co. 
40. Chomsky, Noam (1959) Review of Skinner 1957. Language 35: 26-58. 
Reprinted in Fodor and Katz 1964. 
41. Chomsky, Noam (1961) "On the Notion 'Rule of Grammar"'. In Fodor 
and Katz 1964: 119-36. 1st. publ.. Proceedings of the Twelfth Symposium 
in Applied Mathematics XII (1961). 
42. Chomsky, Noam (1961) Aspects of the Theory of Syntax Cambridge, 
Mass.: MIT Press. 
192 
43. Chomsky, Noam (1961) Topics in the Theory of Generative Grammar, 
The Hague: Mouton & Co. Excerpts in Searle 1971. 
44. Chomsky, Noam (1969 a) "Linguistics and Philosophy". In Hook 1969: 
51-94. Excerpts in Stich 1975. 
45. Chomsky, Noam (1969 b) "Comments on Harman's Reply". In Hook 
1969:152-9. 
46. Chomsky, Noam (1971) "Deep Structure, Surface Structure, and Semantic 
Interpretation". In Steinberg and Jacobovits 1971: 183-216. • 
47. Chomsky, Noam (1975) "Knowledge of Language". In Gunderson 1975: 
299-320. 
48. Chomsky, Noam (1980) Rules and Representations. New York: 
Columbia University Press. 
49. Christopher Hughes (2004), Kripke : Names, Necessity, and Identity. 
ISBN 0-19-824107-0. 
50. Christopher Norris (2007), Fiction, Philosophy and Literary Theory: 
Will the Real Saul Kripke Please Stand Up? London: Continuum. 
51. Consuelo Preti (2002), On Kripke. Wadsworth. ISBN 0534583660 
52. Copi, Cohen (2010), Introduction to Logic, Pearson Higher Ed., USA. 
53. Cooper, D.E. (1986) Metaphor, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
54. Cresswell, M.J. (1973) Logic and Language, London: Methuen. 
55.Currie, Gregory. 1982. Frege, an Introduction to his Philosophy. 
Totowa, N.J.: Bams and Noble. 
193 
56. Curry Haskell B. An Outline of a Formalist 8 Philosophy of 
Mathematics (1951) Amsterdam: North Holland. 
57. Davidson, Donald (1967 a) "The Logical form of Action Sentences," in N. 
Rescher (ed.), The Logic of Decision and Action, Pittsburgh: University of 
Pittsburgh Press. 
58. Davidson, Donald (1967 b) "Truth and Meaning," Synthese, 17:304-23; 
reprinted in Donald Davidson (1984) Inquiries into Truth and 
Interpretation, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
59. Davidson, Donald and Jaakko Hintikka, (eds) (1969) Words and 
Objections: Essays on the Work ofW. V.Quine. Dordrecht: Reidel. 
60. Davidson, Donald and Gilbert Harman (eds) (1972) Semantics of Natural 
Language. Dordrecht: Reidel. 
61. Davidson, Donald (eds) (1975) The Logic of Grammer, Encino, CA: 
Dikenson. 
62. Davidson, Donald and Gilbert Harman (eds) (1976) The Logic of 
Grammar. Encino, Calif.: Dickenson 
63. Davidson, Donald (1980) Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, •. • 
64. Davidson, Donald (1984) Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 
65. Davidson, Donald (1986) "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs," in E. 
LePore, Truth and Interpretation: Perspective of the Philosophy of Donald 
Davidson, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
194 
66.Davies, Martin (2003) "Philosophy of Language", The Blackwell 
Companion to Philosophy, second edition, Ed. Nicholas Bunnin and 
E.P. Tsui-James.USA:Blackwell Pubhshers Ltd. 
67.Davies, S. (1991) Pragmatics: A Reader, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. ' 
68. Devitt, Michael (1979) "Against Incommensurability". Australasian 
Journal of Philosophy 57:29-50. 
69. Devitt, Michael (1980a) "Brian Loar on Singular Terms". Philosophical 
Studies 31: 271-80. 
70. Devitt, Michael (1980b)"'Ostrich Nominalism' or 'Mirage Realism'?". 
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 61:433-9. 
71. Devitt, Michael (1981a) Designation. New York: Columbia University 
Press. 
72. Devitt, Michael (1981b) "Donnellan's Distinction". Midwest Studies in 
Philosophy, Volume VI: The Foundations of Analytic Philosophy, eds 
Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein: 
511-24. 
73. Devitt, Michael (1983) "Dummett's Anti-Realism". Journal of Philosophy 
80: 73-99. 
74. Devitt, Michael (1984a). Realism and Truth. Oxford: Blackwell 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press). 
75. Devitt, Michael (1984b) "Thoughts and their Ascription". Midwest 
Studies in Philosophy, Volume IK: Causation and Causal Theories, eds. 
195 
Peter A. French, Theodore E.- UehHng Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein: 
385-420. 
76. Devitt, Michael (1985) Critical Notice of Evans 1982. Australasian 
Journal of Philosophy 63: 216-32. 
77. Devitt, Michael (1996) Coming to Our Senses. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
78. Devitt, Michael and Kim Sterelny (1989)_ "What's Wrong with ^he Right 
View'". In Philosophical Perspectives, 3: Philosophy of Mind and Action 
Theory, ed. James E. Tomberlin. Atascadero: Ridgeview Publishing 
Company, 497-531. 
79. Devitt, Michael, and Kim Sterelny (1999).Language and Reality: An 
Introduction to the Philosophy of Language. 2nd. edn. Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishers. 
80. Donnellan KS (1966) Reference and definite descriptions. Philosophical 
ReviewlS: 281-304. ' •; 
81. Donnellan, Keith S. (1968) "Putting Humpty Dumpty Together Again". 
Philosophical Review 11: 203-15. 
82. Donnellan KS (1972) Proper names and identifying descriptions. In: 
Davidson D and Harman G (eds) The Semantics of Natural Language, pp. 
356-379. Dordrecht: Reidel. 
83. Donnellan, Keith S. (1974) "Speaking of Nothmg". Philosophical Review 
83: 3-31. Reprinted in Schwartz 1977. 
196 
84. Donnellan, Keith S. (1983) "Kripke and Putnam on Natural Kind Terms". 
In Carl Ginet and Sydney Shoemaker (eds), Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
85.Dretske FT (1981) Knowledge and the Flow of Information. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press. 
86. Duhem Pierre. Essays in the History and 9 Philosophy of Science— 
Agniew Roger, Baker Peter, eds. (1996) Hackett: Indianapolis. 
87. Dummett, Michael, (1976) "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in G. Evans 
and J. McDowell (ed.), Truth and Meaning, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
88. Dummett, Michael (1977) Elements of Intuitionism. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press. 
89. Dummett, Michael (1978) Truth and Other Enigmas, Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
90. Dummett, Michael (1981) Frege: Philosophy of Language. London: 
Duckworth. 
91. Dummett, Michael. (1981) The Interpretation of Frege's Philosophy. 
London:Duckworth. 
92. Erwin, E. (1970) The Concept ofMeaninglessness, Baltimore, MD: Johns 
Hopkins University Press. 
93. Erwin, E., L Kleinman, and E. Zemach (1976) "The Historical Theory of 
Reference" Australasian Journal of Philosophy 5A: 50-7. 
197 
105. Frege Gottlob. Kleine Schriften—Angelleli I, 14 ed. (1967, 
1990) Hildesheim: Georg 01ms. 
106. Frege,Gottlob. (1979) Posthumous Writings. Ed. Hans Hermes. 
107. G.W. Fitch (2005), Saul Kripke. ISBN 0-7735-2885-7. 
108. Geach P.T. and Max, Black. Translations from the philosophical 
Writings of Gottlob Frege. Blackwell, Oxford, 1952. 
109. Gillies Dona 151d. Philosophy of Science in the Twentieth 
Century (1993) Oxford: Blackwell. 
110. Godel Kurt. "Is mathematics syntax of 17 language?" In: 
Collected Works III—Godel Kurt, ed. (1995) Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 334-356. (version III) and pp. 356-362 (version V). 
111. Godel Kurt. "Some basic theorems on the 16 foundations of 
mathematics and its implications". In: Collected Works III—Godel 
Kurt, ed. (1995) Oxford: Oxford University Press. 304-323. (version 
III) and pp. 356-362 (version V). 
112. Godfrey-Smith P (1992) Indication and adaptation.Synthese92: 
283-312. 
113. John HaMhome (2004), Knowledge and Lotteries, Oxford, OUP. 
114. Hill Claire 0., Rosado Haddock Guillermo E. 18 Husserl or 
Frege?: Meaning, Objectivity and Mathematics (2000, 2003) Chicago et 
al.: Open Court. 
199 
94. Evans, Gareth. (1973) "The Causal Theory of Names," Aristotelian 
society Supplementary Volume, 47:187-208. 
95. Evans, Gareth. (1977) "Pronouns, Quantifiers, and Relative Clauses (I)," 
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 7:467-^36. 
96. Evans G (1982) The Varieties of Reference, McDowell J (ed.). Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 
97. Field Hartry. Realism, Mathematics and 11 Modality (1989) Oxford: 
Blackwell. 
98. Field Hartry .Mathematics without Numbers 10 (1980) Oxford: 
Blackwell. 
99. Fitch, G.W. (2005) Saul Kripke. 
100. Fodor JA (1990) A Theory 'of Content and Other Essays. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press: 51-136. 
101. Fowler, Alastair (2008). "Proper Naming: Personal Names in 
Literature", quarterly journal Essays in Criticism, Vol. VIII. No.2. 
102. Frege Gottlob (1893) "On Sense and reference". In: Geach P and 
Black M (eds) Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob 
Frege. Oxford: Blackwell (1952). 
103. Frege Gottlob. Die Grundlagen der 12 Arithmetik, 1894—Thiel 
Christian, ed. (1986) centenary edition. Hamburg: Felix Meiner. 
104. Frege Gottlob. Grundgesetze der Arithmetik 13 (1962) two 
vols. (I) 1893 and (II) 1903, reprint Hildesheim, Georg Olms. 
198 
115. Hodges Wilfrid. "Elementary ,Logic". In: 19 Handbook of 
Philosophical Logic I—Gabbay D, Guenthner F, eds. (1983) Dordrecht: 
Reidel. 1-131. 
116. Horwich P (1998) Truth.lnd edn. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
117. Hughes, Christopher. (2004), Kripke: Names, Necessity, and 
Identity. 
118. Husserl Edmund. Formale und tranzendentale 21 Logik,1929 
(1974) Martinus Nijhoff: Den Haag. 
119. Husserl Edmund. Logische Untersuchungen 20 (1900-01) two 
vols. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff. 1975 (I) and 1984 (II). 
120. Jamil, S. (2010), "Frege: The Theory of Meaning Concerning 
Proper Names", Vol. 4, No.l, Kritike: An online journal of philosophy, 
Phillipines. 
121. Jamil,S. (2010) "Philsophy of Language in Future" in Anusilana, 
Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi, India,2010,Vol.XII, 25-29. 
122. John McDowell, "On the Sense and reference of a Proper name" 
in Reference, truth and reality (essays oh the Philosophy of Language), 
edited by Mark Platts, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1980. 
123. Kaplan D (1989) Demonstratives: an essay on the semantics, logic, 
metaphysics, and epistemology of demonstratives and other Indexicals. 
Afterthoughts. In: Almog J, Perry J, and Wettstein H (eds) Themes from 
Kaplan. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 481-614. 
200 
124. Kaplan David (1989), Demonstratives: an essay on the semantics, 
logic, metaphysics, and epistemology of demonstratives and other 
Indexicals. Afterthoughts. In: Almog J, Perry J, and Wettstein H (eds) 
Themes from Kaplan. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 481-614. 
125. King, Jefffrey C. and UC Davis, U.C. (2003) "Tense, Modality, 
and Semantic Values" Philosophical Perspectives, Language and 
Philosophical Linguistics. Ed. by John Hawthorne & Dean Zimmerman 
17. 
126. Kripke, Saul. (1959) "A Completeness Theorem in Modal 
Logic", Journal of Symbolic Logic 24(1): 1-14. 
127. Kripke, Saul. (1962) "The Undecidability of Monadic Modal 
Quantification Theory",' Zeitschrift fur Mathematische Logik und 
GrundlagenderMathematikS:l\3-\\6 \ • . 
128. Kripke, Saul. (1963) "Semantical Considerations on Modal 
Logic", Acta Philosophica Fennica 16:83-94 
129. Kripke, Saul. (1963)"Semantical Analysis of Modal Logic L 
Normal Modal Propositional Calculi", Zeitschrift fiir Mathematische 
Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik 9:67-96 
130. Kripke, Saul. (1964) "Transfinite Recursions on Admissible 
Ordinals, I" (abstract), The Journal of Symbolic Logic, Vol. 29, No. 3, p. 
162. ' 
201 
131. Kripke, Saul. (1964) "Admissible Ordinals and the Analytic 
Hierarchy" (abstract), The Journal of Symbolic Logic, Vol. 29, No. 3, p. 
162. 
132. Kripke, Saul. (1965) "Semantical Analysis of Intuitionistic Logic 
I", In Formal Systems and Recursive Functions, edited by M. Dummett 
and J. N. Crossley. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co. 
133. Kripke, Saul. (1965) "Semantical Analysis of Modal Logic IL 
Non-Normal Modal Propositional Calculi", In The Theory of Models, 
edited by J. W. Addison, L. Henkin and A. Tarski. Amsterdam: North-
Holland Publishing Co. 
134. Kripke, Saul. (1965) "An Extension of a Theorem of Gaifman-
Hales-Solovay," Fundamenta Mathematicae, Vol. 61, pp. 29-32. 
135. Kripke, Saul. (1971) "Identity and Necessity", In Identity and 
Individuation, edited by M. K. Munitz. New York: New York 
University Press. 
136. Kripke, Saul. (1972) Naming and Necessity, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 
137. Kripke, Saul. (1975) "Outline of a Theory of Truth", Journal of 
Philosophy 72:690-716. Sets his theory of truth (against Alfred Tarski), 
where an object language can contain its own truth predicate. 
138. Kripke, Saul. (1976) "Is There a Problem about Substitutional 
Quantification?", In Truth and Meaning: Essays in Semantics, edited by 
Gareth Evans and John McDowell. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
202 
139. Kripke, Saul. (1977) "Speaker's Reference and Semantic 
Reference", Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2:255-276 
140. Kripke, Saul. (1979) "A Puzzle about Belief, In Meaning and 
Use, edited by A. Margalit. Dordrecht and Boston: Reidel. 
141. Kripke, Saul. (1980) Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press. 
142. Kripke, Saul. {l%2)Wittgenstein on Rules and Private 
Language: an Elementary Exposition. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press. 
143. Kripke, Saul. (1986) "A Problem in the Theory of Reference: the 
Linguistic Division of Labor and the Social Character of Naming," 
Philosophy and Culture (Proceedings of the XVlIth World Congress of 
Philosophy), Montreal, Editions Montmorency: lAl-lAl. 
144. Kripke, Saul. (1992) "Summary: Individual Concepts: Their 
Logic, Philosophy, and Some of Their Uses." Proceedings and 
Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 66: 70-73 
145. Kripke, Saul. (2005) "Russell's Notion of Scope", Mind 
114:1005-1037 
146. Kripke, Saul. (2008)"Frege's Theory of Sense and Reference: 
Some Exegetical Notes," Theoria 74:181-218. 
147. Kusch, Martin. (2006), A skeptical Guide to Meaning and Rules. 
Defending Kripke's Wittgenstein. Acumben: Publishing Limited. 
203 
148. Lewis Carroll. (2000), The Annotated Alice, ed. Martin Gardener, 
New York. 
149. Linsky, Leonard (1977), Names and Descriptions. University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago. ; Marcus, Ruth Barcan: 1993, Modalities. 
Oxford University Press, New York. 
150. Linsky, Leonard (1977), Names and Descriptions. University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago. ; Marcus, Ruth Barcan: 1993, Modalities. 
Oxford University Press, New York. Almog, Joseph: 1984, 'Semantical 
Anthropology', in P. French et al., eds., Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 
9,479-90. 
151. Lu, WANG (2008), "Theories of Meaning" Higher Education 
Press andSpringer-Verlag. 
152. Marcus, Ruth Barcan (1961), 'Modalities and Intensional 
Languages', Synthese, 13,303-22. 
153. Marcus, Ruth Barcan. (1971), 'Essential Attribution', Journal of 
Philosophy, 68, 187-202. 
154. Marcus, Ruth. (1961), "Modalities and Intensional Languages", 
Synthese, 13,303-22. 
155. Margolis E and Laurence S eds (1999) Concepts: Core Readings. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
156. Martin Kusch (2006), A sceptical Guide to Meaning and Rules. 
Defending Kripke's Wittgenstein. Acumben: Publishing Limited. 
204 
157. McDowell, John (1980) "On the Sense and reference of a Proper 
name" in Reference, truth and reality (essays on the Philosophy of 
Language), Mark Platts (ed.), Routledge & Kegan Paul, London. 
158. Millikan R (1984) Language, Thought, and Other Biological 
Categories. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
159. Millikan R (1984), "Language,, Thought, and Other Biological 
Categories". Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
160. Mohammad Muqim. "Sense And No-Sense Theories On Proper 
names," Indian Philosophical Quaterly XXXIII No. I, Jan 2006, p.95. 
161. Neale S (1990) Descriptions. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
162. Neander K (1995). Misrepresenting and malfunctioning. 
Philosophical Studies 79: 109-41. 
163. Neander K (1995). Misrepresenting and malfunctioning. 
Philosophical Studiesl9: 109-41. ' ; 
164. Norris, Christopher. (2007), Fiction, Philosophy and Literary 
Theory: Will the Real Saul Kripke Please Stand Up? London: 
Continuum. 
165. Papineau D (1987) Reality and Representation. Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell. 
166. Platts, Mark (1979), Ways of Meaning: An introduction to a 
Philosophy of Language. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
167. Preti, Consuelo. (2002), OnKripkt. Wadsworth. ' 
205 
168. Putnam H (1975) Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical 
Papers, vol 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 196-290. 
169. Putnam Hilary (1980) "Models and reality ".Journal 24 of 
Symbolic Logic 45:464-482. 
170. Quine W.O. From a Logical Point of View 25 (1953) 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
17k Quine W.O. Ontological Relativity and Other 26 Essays (1969) 
New York: Columbia University Press.' , 
172. Robert J. Clack. (1972), Bertrand Russell's Philosophy of 
Language, Martinus Nijhoff, The Haque, Netherlands. 
173. Russell B (1912) The Problems of Philosophy. London: Oxford 
University Press (1959): 46-59. 
174. Russell, Bertrand (1918/1956) "The Philosophy of Logical 
Atomism," in R. Marsh (ed.) (1956) Logic and Knowledge, London: 
Allen & Unwin. 
175. Russell, Bertrand (1919/1971) 'Introduction to Mathematical 
Philosophy, New York: Clarion Books/ Simon & Schuster. 
176. Russell, Bertrand Foundation of Logic, Alasdair Urquhart (ed.) 
(1994) with the assistance of Albert C. Lewis published in the form of 
collected paper of Bertrand Russell Vol.4. London: Routledge. 
177. Sainbury, R.M. (2003), "Frege and Russell", The Blackwell 
Companion to Philosophy, second edition, edited by Nicholas Bunnin 
and E.P. Tsui-James, USA: Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 
206 
178. Sainbury, R.M.(2003), "Frege and Russell", The Blackwell 
Companion to Philosophy, second edition, edited by Nicholas Bunnin 
and E.P. Tsui-James, Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 
179. Searle,J.R. (1958) "Proper Names". Mind61: 166-73. Reprinted 
inCatonl963. 
180. Searle, J.R. (1969) Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of 
Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
181. Searle, J.R., ed. (1971) The Philosophy of Language. London: 
Oxford University Press. .. 
182. Searle, J.R. (1972) "Chomsky's'Revolution in Linguistics". New 
York Review of Books. Reprinted in Harman 1974: 2-33. 
183. Searle, J.R. (1977) "Reiterating the Differences: A Reply to 
Derrida". Glyph \:\9Z-209. 
184. John (1979), Expression and Meaning (Studies in the theory of 
Speech acts) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
185. Searle, J.R. (1983a) Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of 
Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
186. Searle, J.R. (1983b) "The Word Turned Upside Down". New 
York Review of Books 30: 74-9. 
187. Searle, J.R., and L. H. Mackey. (1984) "An Exchange on 
Deconstruction". New York Review of Books 31: 47-8 
188. Sider, Theodore and Braun, David, Kripke's Revenge, 
Philosophical Studies 128 (2006): 669-682. 
207 
189. Smith, EE and Medin DL (1981) Categories and Concepts. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
190. Smith, Quentin (1995), 'Marcus, Kripke, and the Origin of The 
New Theory of Reference' in Synthese, Volume 104, No. 2, pp. 179-
189. Reprinted in (eds. James Fetzer and' Paul Humphreys). 
191. Soames, Scott. (2002) Beyond Rigidity: The Unfinished Semantic 
Agenda of Naming and Necessity. 
192. Sterelny, Kim. (1983b) "Mental Representation: What Language 
is Brainese". Philosophical Studies 43: 365-82. 
193. Sterelny, Kim. (1984) Review of Woodfield 1982. Journal of 
Semantics 3: 277-94. 
194. Sterelny, Kim. (1990) The Representational Theory of Mind: An 
Introduction. Cambridge: Blackwell. 
195. Sterelny, Kim. (1993) "Refuting Eliminitavism on the Cheap?" 
Mindand Language Z'.Ti^-lS. 
196. Sterelny, Kim. 1981. Critical Notice of Dennett 1978. 
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 59: 442-53. 
197. Sterelny, Kim. (1982) "Against Conversational Implicature". 
Journal of Semantics 1: 187-94. 
198. Sterelny, Kim. (1983a) "Natural Kind Terms". Pacific 
Philosophical Quarterly 64: 110-25. 
208 
199. Stich, Stephen P. (1972) "Grammar, Psychology, and 
Indeterminacy". Journal of Philosophy 69: 799-818. Reprinted in Block 
1981. 
200. Stich, Stephen P. (1982) "On the Ascription of Content". In 
Woodfield 1982: 153-206. 
201. Stich, Stephen P. (1983) From Folk Psychology to Cognitive 
Science. Cambridge, Mass.: Bradford/MIT Press. 
202. Stich, Stephen P. (1985) "Could Man be an Irrational Animal? 
Some Notes on the Epistemology of Rationality." In Komblith 1985: 
249-67. 
203. Stich, Stephen P. (1971) "What Every Speaker Knows". 
Philosophical Review 80: 476-96. 
204. Stich, Stephen P. (1978a) "Empiricism, Innateness, and Linguistic 
Universals". Philosophical Studies 33:273-86. 
205. Stich, Stephen P. (1978b) "Beliefs and Subdoxastic States". 
Philosophy of Science 45: 499-518. 
206. Stich, Stephen P. and Ted Warfield. (1994) Mental 
Representation: A Reader. Cambridge Mass.: Basil Biackwell. 
207. Stich, Stephen P., ed. (1975) Innate Ideas. Berkeley: University 
of California Press. 
208. Stove, D. C. (1991) The Plato Cult and Other Philosophical 
Follies. Oxford: Basil Biackwell, 
209 
209. Strawson, P.F. (1959) Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive 
Metaphysics. London: Methuen. 
210. Strawson, P.F. 1950.• "On Referring". Mind 59: 320-44. 
Reprinted in Caton 1963 and Rosenberg and Travis 1971. 
211. Suppes, F. ed. (1977) The Structure of Scientific Theories. 
Urbana: University of Illinois, 2nd ed. 1st ed. 
212. "The thought" (translated by A.M. and Marcelle Quinton), in P.F. 
Strawson (ed.) (1967), Philosophical Logic, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Logic and Language. Atascadero: Ridgeview. 
213. Tarski, Alfred. (1956) Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics. 
Transl. by J.H. Woodger. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
214. Taylor Branch (1977), "New Frontiers in American Philosophy: 
Saul Kripke". New York Times Magazine. 
215. The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Paul Edwards, Vol.3. 
The Macmillan Company &The Free Press, New York, 1967. 
216. Tomberlin, James E. ed. (1994) Philosophical Perspectives, 8: 
217. Unger, Peter. (1983) "The Causal Theory of Reference". 143: 
1-45. 
218. Wamock, G.J. (1958) English Philosophy Since 1900. London: 
Oxford University Press. 
219. Weber, Max. (1949) The Methodology of the Social Sciences, 
trans, and eds, E. A. Shils and H. A. Finch. Chicago: Free Press. 
210 
220. Wettstein, Howard. (1991) "Has Semantics Rested on a 
Mistake?". Journal of Philosophy. 83: 185-209. 
221. Whorf, Benjamin Lee. (1956) Language, Thought, and Reality, 
ed. and intrc, JohnB. Carroll, Cambridge' Mass.: MIT Press. 
222. Wiggins, D. (1965) "Identity-Statements". In Butler 1965:40-71. 
223. Wilson, N.L. (1959) "Substances without Substrata". Review of 
Metaphysics 12: 521-39. 
224. Wittgenstein Ludwig. German witli English 28 translation 1922 
(1961) London: Routledge. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (German 
ong\m\Logisch-philosophische Ahhandlung 1921). 
225. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. (1953) Philosophical Investigations. 
Transl. by G.E.M. Anscombe. Oxford: Blackwell. 
226. Woodfield, A., ed. (1982) Thought and Object. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 
227. Wright. Crispin. (,988) "Realism, Antirealism, Irrealism, Quasi-
Realism". Fhihsophkai Qmrterfy 31: 47-67. 
228. YablcS. (2007rSoames on Kripke." Plrilosophical Studies, 
•I35(3):451-460. 
229. Zemaclr. Eddy. (1977) "Puma's Theoty on tlre Reference of 
Substance Terms". Journal of Philowphyly. 116-27. 
